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Abstract
The prevalence of high-performance mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets has
brought fundamental changes to the existing wireless networks. The growth of multimedia and
location-based mobile services has exponentially increased the network congestion and the demands
for more wireless resources. The extremely high computational complexity and communication
overhead resulting from the conventional centralized resource management methods are no longer
suitable to capture the scale of tomorrow’s wireless networks. As a result, the resource manage-
ment in next-generation networks is shifting from the centralized optimization to the self-organizing
solutions. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the effectiveness of matching theory, a pow-
erful operational research framework, for solving the wireless resource allocation problems in a
distributed manner. Matching theory, as a Nobel-prize winning framework, has already been widely
used in many economic fields. More recently, matching theory has been shown to have a promising
potential for modeling and analyzing wireless resource allocation problems due to three reasons: (1)
it offers suitable models that can inherently capture various wireless communication features; (2) the
ability to use notions, such as preference relations, that can interpret complex system requirements;
(3) it provides low-complexity and near-optimal matching algorithms while guaranteeing the system
stability.
This dissertation provides a theoretical research of implementing the matching theory into
the wireless communication fields. The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as
follows.
• An overview of the basic concepts, classifications, and models of the matching theory is pro-
vided. Furthermore, comparisons with existing mathematical solutions for the resource allo-
cation problems in the wireless networks are conducted.
• Applications of matching theory in the wireless communications are studied. Especially, the
stable marriage model, the student project allocation model and so on are introduced and
vii
applied to solve the resource allocation problems, such as the device-to-device (D2D) com-
munication, LTE-Unlicensed, and so on.
• Both theoretical and numerical analysis are provided to show that matching theory can model
complex system requirements, and also provide semi-distributive matching algorithms to
achieve stable and close-optimal results.
• The potential and challenges of the matching theory for designing resource allocation mech-
anisms in the future wireless networks are discussed.
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The emergence of the novel wireless networking paradigms has forever transformed the way
in which the wireless systems are operated. In particular, the need for the self-organizing solutions
to manage the scarce spectral resources has become a prevalent theme in many wireless systems.
To meet the exponentially increased traffic demand, a lot of new paradigms have proposed such as:
a) cognitive radio networks, in which cognitive devices can adaptively opportunistically access the
wireless spectrum, b) small cell networks, which boost the network capacity and coverage via the
deployment of low-cost small cell base stations, and c) large-scale D2D communications, which can
be deployed over both cellular and unlicensed bands to improve system throughput. This is gradually
leading to the future multi-tiered heterogeneous wireless architecture, as shown in Fig. 1.1.
Effectively managing resource allocation in such a complex environment warrants a funda-
mental shift from the traditional centralized mechanisms towards the self-organizing optimizing ap-
proaches. The need for this shift is motivated by practical factors such as increased network density
and the need for low-latency communications. In consequence, there is a need for self-organizing
systems in which small cell base stations and even devices can have some intelligence to make
resource management decisions rapidly. Indeed, there has been a recent surge in literature that pro-
poses new mathematical tools for optimizing the wireless resource allocations. Examples include
centralized optimization and game theory approach. The centralized optimization techniques can
provide optimal solutions. However, they often require global network information and centralized
control, thus yielding significant overhead and complexity. This complexity can rapidly increase
when dealing with combinatorial, integer programming problems such as the channel allocation
and user association. Moreover, centralized optimization may not be able to properly handle the
challenges that emerge in the dense and heterogeneous wireless environments.
The aforementioned limitations of the centralized optimization have led to an interesting body
1
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Figure 1.1: A future wireless network with a mixture of small cells, cognitive radio devices, and
heterogeneous spectrum bands.
of literature that deals with the use of noncooperative games for the wireless resource allocations [1].
Despite the potential, such approaches present some shortcomings. First, classical game-theoretic
algorithms, such as the best response mechanism, require the knowledge of other players’ actions,
thus limiting their distributive implementations. Second, most game-theoretic solutions, such as the
Nash equilibrium, investigate the one-sided (or unilateral) stability notions in which the equilibrium
deviations are evaluated unilaterally. Such unilateral deviations may not be practical when investi-
gating the assignment problems between distinct sets of players. Last, but not least, the tractability of
equilibrium in the game-theoretic methods requires having certain form of structure in the objective
function, which cannot be satisfied in some practical wireless applications.
Recently, the matching theory framework has emerged as a promising technique for the wire-
less resource allocations which can overcome some limitations of the game theory and centralized
optimization approaches [2]. The matching theory is a Nobel-prize winning framework that pro-
vides mathematically tractable solutions for the combinatorial problem of matching players from
two distinct sets [3] [4], depending on the individual information and preference of each player.
The advantages of matching theory for wireless resource management include: 1) suitable models
for characterizing interactions between the heterogeneous nodes, each of which has its own type,
objective, and information, 2) the ability to define the general “preferences” that can handle the
heterogeneous and complex considerations related to the wireless quality-of-service (QoS) require-
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ments, 3) suitable solutions, in terms of stability and optimality, that can accurately reflect different
system objectives, and 4) efficient algorithmic implementations that are inherently self-organizing.
In this thesis, we aim to provide a matching-based framework that can solve various resource
allocation problems in the 5G wireless networks. We show how to apply suitable matching models
to solve specific wireless communication problems through the illustrations of our applications. For
each of the matching applications, we provide the matching game modeling, solution discussion,
and performance evaluations.
1.1 5G Wireless Communications
Various new paradigms have emerged during the development of the 5G networks. In the
following sections, we introduce these new technologies regarding their potentials and challenges in
boosting the 5G network capacities.
1.1.1 Device to Device Communication
To satisfy the increased traffic demand, the device-to-device (D2D) communication technol-
ogy has been proposed for the Long Term Evaluation-Advanced (LTE-A) standard. In the D2D
communications, the user equipment communicates with each other through a direct link by using
the licensed resources instead of communicating with the BSs. It is considered to have some ad-
vantages such as: offloading the traffic, improving the system throughput, as well as extending the
network coverage [5] [6].
Typically, in the D2D communications, the system throughput and reliability are considered
as the optimization objectives in some existing works. For example, Kaufman and Aazhang in [7]
intend to optimize the system throughput, while simultaneously guaranteeing the QoS requirements.
However, being such a promising technology, the D2D communications also pose new challenges
to the traditional cellular networks. One most critical issue is the interference brought by the chan-
nel reuse between the D2D and cellular users. Effective approaches to solve this problem include
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transmission power management [8], interference avoiding multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO)
techniques [9] and advanced coding schemes [10].
1.1.2 Content Caching
Nowadays, with the emerging of mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, more and
more users are accessing the online social networks such as Facebook, Flickr and so on. As one
of the largest online social networks, Facebook stores billions of photo contents. To deliver the
contents to users efficiently, heterogeneous cache centers are used to support the Facebook Backend
storage center. One important measurement to evaluate the user satisfaction is the response delay of
the user request, which is highly depending on the data fetching paths, and thus relating to specific
content caching allocation techniques. As a result, an appropriate content caching methodology can
play a major role in improving the user satisfaction.
Before discussing any caching method, we first introduce the Facebook photo storage archi-
tecture. There are typically three layers of cache centers in front of the backend storage, also called
the Haystack storage. These three cache layers are the Browser cache, the Edge cache, and the
Origin cache. The Haystack storage stores all the data [11], part of which will be cached to the one
of the three-layer cache centers to reduce the service latency. The first layer, which is the closest
to the end users, is the Browser cache. The Browser cache centers are typically embedded in the
user equipment such as desktops and mobile phones. The second layer cache is called the Facebook
Edge cache [12], and the third layer is called the Origin cache. When a user requests data from
Facebook, it first looks up the content in the user’s local browser cache. If the fetch is a miss, the
browser sends an HTTP request to the Internet, and the Facebook web server calculates a photo
fetching path, which directs the search process to the higher layers of cache. Then, if the search in
the Edge cache fails again, it will proceed to the Origin cache. If a miss happens again, the last try
would be the Backend storage, which guarantees a 100% hit since it stores all the data [13].
4
1.1.3 LTE-Unlicensed
To meet the mobile traffic demand, an intuitive idea is to exploit more licensed spectrum,
which ensures the reliable and predictable performance. However, it is not quite possible that suf-
ficient additional licensed spectrum can be available in the near future. A growing interest in ex-
ploiting the unlicensed spectrum to boost the network capacity has recently arisen. Some cellular
network operators have deployed the Wi-Fi access points to offload the cellular traffic to the unli-
censed spectrum. However, such efforts are limited by some disadvantages such as the extra cost
due to the investment in backhaul and core networks, degradation of the Wi-Fi performance, and
lack of good coordination between the cellular and Wi-Fi systems. Another way to augment the
LTE capacity to meet the traffic demands is to integrate the unlicensed carriers into the LTE system
to enhance the cellular transmission using the carrier aggregation (CA) technology. The CA tech-
nology provides the option of aggregating two or more component carriers into a combined virtual
bandwidth for enhanced transmission [14]. By aggregating the unlicensed spectrum into cellular
networks with CA, the capacity of the LTE network can be boosted, while maintaining the seamless
mobility management and predictable performance. This technology is commonly referred to as the
LTE-Unlicensed [15].
1.1.4 LTE Assisted V2V Communications
The technology of the connected vehicles has been envisioned as a paradigm capable of pro-
viding increased convenience to drivers, with applications ranging from road safety to traffic effi-
ciency. In the traditional IEEE 802.11p based vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, reliable
and efficient performance cannot be guaranteed since 802.11p is CSMA/CA based. Besides, the high
cost of deploying roadside units (RSUs) cannot be ignored. Thus, the concept of integrating LTE
into the V2X communications has been proposed, which is commonly referred to as the LTE-V [16]
or the LTE-based V2X [17]. The objectives of the study on LTE V2X communications include the
definition of an evaluation methodology and the possible scenarios for vehicular applications, and
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the identification of necessary enhancements to the LTE physical layer, protocols, and interfaces. So
far, 3GPP has defined 18 use cases in TR 22.885 for the LTE-based V2X services, such as Case 5.1:
Forward collision warning, Case 5.8: Road safety services, Case 5.9: Automatic parking system,
and so on [18].
1.1.5 Fog Computing
Cloud computing is an Internet-based computing platform that provides shared processing
resources and data to computers and other devices on demand. The cloud computing and storage
solutions can provide users and enterprises with various capabilities to store and process their data
in the third-party data centers [19]. In particular, mobile cloud computing (MCC), as a combination
of cloud computing, mobile computing and wireless networks, has made it possible for the mobile
users to access the cloud resources to offload the computational tasks [20]. With the emerging of
the new paradigm, namely, Internet of Things (IoT), a new range of services and applications have
been enabled, such as the connected vehicles, smart grid, wireless sensor networks and so on. Not
only facing the volume, velocity and variety increase in the communication contents, but also the
new communication requirements, such as location awareness, real-time mobility management, and
so on. Therefore, it requires a new designed MCC framework to meet these critical requirements.
CISCO first proposed the idea of Fog Computing in 2014, as a platform that exists between
the end devices and the cloud data centers. It provides computation, storage and communication
resources to the nearby mobile users [21]. Fog computing brings the cloud closer to the end users,
and is characterized by features such as low latency, wide-spread distribution, support for mobility,
heterogeneity, interoperability and federation [22]. Largely distributed at the network edge, the fog
nodes (FNs) provide storage, computation and communication capabilities. An FN can be a cellular
BS, a Wi-Fi AP or a femtocell router with upgraded CPU and memories in either fixed locations,
such as a shopping mall, or being mobile [23].
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1.1.6 Wireless Network Function Virtualization
Nowadays, virtualization has become a popular concept applied in many areas, such as the
virtual memory, virtual machine and virtual data center. Virtualization refers to the abstraction and
sharing of resources among different parties. It offers great network flexibility, maximizes network
utilization, as well as inspires new services and products [24]. On the other hand, the mobile wireless
traffic is expected to grow exponentially due to the massive user number and the rich communication
contents. By extending the network virtualization into cellular networks, and more specifically, by
abstracting, slicing and sharing the physical infrastructures and radio resources, the wireless traffic
can be relieved. This paradigm is commonly referred to as the wireless network virtualization [25].
1.1.7 Mobile Crowd Sensing
The widespread of mobile devices, such as smartphones and vehicular systems, has provided
us a new type of sensing infrastructure. These smart mobile devices are embedded with various
types of sensors, such as camera, GPS, accelerator, digital compass, light sensor, and even health
and pollution monitoring sensors in the future. These sensed data has enabled a broad range of
applications such as the road transportation, health care, environmental surveillance, marketing and
so on [26]. Compared with the traditional static sensor networks, utilizing the mobile people-centric
measurement has many advantages, such as cost-efficient, scalable, better storage and computation
capability, direct access to the Internet and so on [26]. This new paradigm is typically referred to
as the mobile crowd sensing (MCS), where individual users with sensing and computing devices
collectively share data and extract the information to measure and map the phenomena of common
interest [27].
1.2 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follow. In Chapter 2, we discuss the fundamental def-
initions of the matching theory, including the introduction of the stable (SM) marriage problem,
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the conventional matching models, and the wireless-oriented matching models. Then in Chapter 3,
we implement the SM model to solve the resource allocation problem in the D2D communications,
and study the strategic issue in matching. Then, the Facebook content caching problem will be
discussed in Chapter 3, modeled by the student admission (SA) matching game. In Chapter 4, the
resource allocation problem in the LTE-Unlicensed with network dynamics is studied. Chapter 5
discusses the LTE assisted V2V communications, which is solved by modeling it as the stale fixture
(SF) game. Then, we study the joint computational and radio resource allocations in the fog com-
puting framework, and model it with the student project allocation (SPA) game in Chapter 6. The
wireless network virtualization problem is discussed in Chapter 7, and is modeled as the three-sided
stable marriage (3DSM) matching game. Besides, we study mobile crowd sensing application, and
model the problem with the SF model in Chapter 8. Finally, two of my future works are proposed in
Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2
Fundamentals of Matching Theory
2.1 Priliminaries
Matching theory, in economics, is a mathematical framework attempting to describe the for-
mation of mutually beneficial relationships over time. Before Gale and Shapley first studied the
stable marriage and college admission problems in 1962, many matching problems were solved by
the “free for all market1” [3]. Economists have identified several issues such as unraveling, conges-
tion, and exploding offers in the “free for all market”. Since then, with decades of efforts devoted
to the matching algorithms (i.e., there arises a trusted third party, which collects information, runs
the matching algorithm, and broadcasts the matching results), these problems could be avoided. As
a result, these matching mechanisms are well developed and widely used in many areas, such as
the national resident matching program in the United States, the college admission in Hungary, the
incompatible kidney exchange market, the partnership formation in peer-to-peer (P2P) network, and
so on.
To start with, we use the classical matching model stable marriage (SM) [28] as an illustration
example. Assume a set of men and a set of women, and each of them is called a matching agent.
A preference list for each agent is an ordered list based on the preferences over the other set of
agents who he/she finds acceptable. A matching consists of (man, woman) pairs. As a fundamental
requirement in any matching model, the stability concept refers to the case that, no blocking pair
(BP) exists in a matching. A BP is defined as a (man, woman) pair, who both have the incentive
to leave their current partners and form a new marriage relation with each other. A stable matching
can be achieved by using the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm, which is widely deployed and has been
customized to generate stable matchings in many other models.
The GS algorithm is an iterative procedure, where players in one set make proposals to the
1“The free for all market” term refers to the period before matching theory came into application, as well as the way
that matching problems were dealt with during the period.
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Initialize:
Users’ preference lists (PLs);
Resources’ PLs;
Propose:
Each user proposes to its most favorite 
resource; and delete it from its PL;
Check:
If all users’ PLs are empty?
Accept/reject:
Each resource keeps the most favorite users 
regarding its quota and PL among the proposals; 
and reject the rest;
Check:
If all users are matched?
Terminate:
A stable matching between 
users and resources.
No
Yes Yes
No
Figure 2.1: The Gale-Shapley algorithm.
other set, whose players, in turn, decide to accept or reject these proposals, w.r.t. their quota. Players
make their decisions based on their individual preferences. This process admits many distributed
implementations which do not require the players to know each other’s preferences [28]. The GS
algorithm terminates when no further proposals are made. A flow chart illustrating the execution of
GS is shown in Fig. 2.1.
2.2 Conventional Matching Models
Matching problems can be classified in different ways. One typical classification is shown in
Fig. 2.2. The detailed explanations are provided as follows:
• Bipartite matching problems with two-sided preferences. Here the participating agents can be
partitioned into two disjoint sets, and each member of one set ranks a subset of the members
in the other set in order of preference. Example applications include assigning junior doctors
to hospitals, pupils to schools and school leavers to universities.
• Bipartite matching problems with one-sided preferences. Again the participating agents can
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Bipartite matching with 
two-sided preferences
Stable Marriage (SM); 
Hospital Resident (HR); 
Worker-Firm (WF);
Bipartite matching with  
one-sided preference
Housing allocation (HA); 
Assigning paper to reviewers; 
DVD rental markets;
Non-Bipartite matching  
with preferences
Stable roommate (SR); 
Forming chess tournament pairs; 
Creating P2P partnerships.
Figure 2.2: Conventional classification of matching theory.
be partitioned into two disjoint sets, but this time only one set of players rank the subsets of
the members in the other set in order of preferences. Example applications include campus
housing allocation, DVD rental markets and assigning reviewers to conference papers.
• Non-bipartite matching problems with preferences. Here, all the participating agents form a
single homogeneous set, and each agent ranks a subset of the others in order of preferences.
Example applications include forming pairs of agents for chess tournaments, finding kidney
exchanges involving incompatible (patient, donor) pairs and creating partnerships in P2P net-
works.
On the other hand, if we consider the capacity/quota allowed for each agent, we can have the
following classification.
• One-to-one matching. It means each member of one set can be matched to at most one player
from the opposite set. Examples include SM problem, forming roommate pairs, and so on.
The one-to-one matching can be bipartite matchings with two-sided preferences (e.g., the SM
problem), or bipartite matchings with one-sided preferences, or non-bipartite matchings (e.g.,
the stable roommate problem).
• Many-to-one matching. It means each agent of one set can be matched to more than one
member from the opposite set up to the capacity, while agents from the opposite side can only
be matched to one agent at most. Examples are like allocating residents to hospitals, assigning
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school leavers to universities. Still, the many-to-one matching can be bipartite matchings with
two-sided preferences (e.g., the hospital resident allocation problem), or bipartite matchings
with one-sided preferences (e.g., the student housing allocation problem), or non-bipartite
matchings.
• Many-to-many matching. It means agents from both matching sets can be matched to more
than one agent up to their capacities. Examples include creating partnerships in P2P net-
works and assigning workers to firms problem. The many-to-many matching can be bipartite
matchings with two-sided preferences (e.g., the finding kidney exchange problem), or bipartite
matchings with one-sided preferences, or non-bipartite matchings.
2.3 Wireless-oriented Matching Models
To implement matching theory into the wireless resource allocations, we assume the wireless
users and resources as the matching players. To capture the various wireless resource management
features, we condense the rich matching literature into three new classes of problems, illustrated in
Fig. 2.3, with the following properties:
1. Class I: Canonical matching: This constitutes the baseline class in which the preference of
any resource (user) depends solely on the information available at this resource (user) and
on the users (resources) to which it is seeking to match. This is useful to study the resource
management within a single cell or for allocating orthogonal spectrum resources. Some of the
applications discussed in the thesis belong to this category, for example, Chapter 3, 4, 6 and
9.
2. Class II: Matching with externalities: This class allows finding desirable matchings when the
problem exhibits “externalities”, which can be translated into the interdependencies between
the players’ preferences. For example, in a small cell network, whenever a user is associated
with a resource, the preference of other users will change since this allocated resource can
create interference to other users using the same frequency. Thus, the preference of any player
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Externality: cell size 
control/breathing
Externality: Interference
Class I - Canonical Matching Games:
- Example application: Allocation of 
orthogonal spectrum in cognitive radio 
networks 
Class II - Matching with Externalities:
- Example application: Proactive cell 
association, context-aware allocation, 
interference management, and load 
balancing
Class III - Matching with Dynamics:
- Example application: Resource 
management with environmental 
variations
Time axis
Environment
 change
ĂĂExternality: Peer effect
Figure 2.3: Wireless-oriented classification of matching theory.
depends not only on the information available at this player, but also on the entire matching.
We distinguish between two types of externalities: conventional externalities and peer effects.
In the former, the dependence of the preferences refers to the performance change due to the
interference between the matched (user, resource) pair. In the latter, the preference of a user
on a resource will depend on the identity and number of other users that are matched to the
same resource. Such peer effects are abundant in the wireless environment. We have also
discussed how to address the external effect in some of the chapters, such as Chapter 5 and 7.
3. Class III: Matching with dynamics: The third class, matching with dynamics, is suitable for
scenarios in which one must adapt the matching processes to dynamics of the environment
such as fast fading, mobility, or time-varying traffic. Here, at each time, the preferences of the
players might change and, thus, the time dimension must be considered for in the matching
solution. However, for a given time, the matching problem can either belong to class I or class
II. The dynamic issue is also discussed in this thesis, such as in Chapter 5.
Mathematically, the formulation of problems in all three classes will follow the basics of
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Section 2.1. For class I, the preferences of one player set simply depend on the other player set.
However, for class II, the preferences will now depend not only on the matched player set, but also
on the entire matching, due to externalities. For class III, one can introduce a time-dependent state
variable in the matching to achieve dynamic stability. Subsequently, the preferences will be time and
state dependent, if the problem has both dynamics and externalities. The transition between states
depends on the application being studied. For example, if the state represents the activity pattern
of a licensed user, the transition would follow a classical Markov model. In contrast, if the state
represents a dynamically varying fast fading channel, one can use differential equations to represent
the state transition.
2.4 Matching Theory in Wireless Communications
The basic wireless resource management problem can be modeled as a matching game be-
tween resources and users. Depending on the scenarios, the resources can be of different abstraction
levels, representing base stations, time-frequency chunks, power, or others. Users can be devices,
stations, or smartphone applications. Each user and resource has a quota that defines the maximum
number of players with which it can be matched. The main goal of matching is to optimally match
resources with users, given their individual and different objectives and also their self-learned infor-
mation. Each user (resource) builds a ranking of the resources (users) using a preference relation.
In its basic form, a preference can simply be defined in terms of a utility function that quantifies
the quality of service (QoS) requirements achieved by a certain matching. However, a preference
is more generic than a utility function in that it can incorporate additional qualitative measures ex-
tracted from the information available to users and resources. In the wireless resource management,
the matching stability implies the robustness to deviations that can benefit both the resource owners
and the users. In fact, an unstable matching can for example lead to undesirable cases in which a
base station can swap its least preferred user with another base station since this swap is beneficial
to both the resource and the user. Having such network-wide deviations ultimately leads to unstable
network operations. This concept is very useful in matching problems and is broadly applicable to
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all classes.
The information exchange during the matching is implemented in a semi-distributive way,
meaning some of the operations are made based on the players’ locally collected information, while
some other decisions may require the global information from the centralized agent (e.g., eNBs).
Before the execution of any matching algorithm, the first step is to set up the preference lists for
all players. The preference list is set up through the local information collection by each player.
The collected/exchanged information can be channel state information (CSI), player location, or
any other information that interests the player. After the information collection, players will rank
the other type of players, according to their preferences, into descending/ascending orders. Thus,
the preference list set-up is implemented distributively, without requiring any centralized agent. To
explain the information exchange during the actual matching algorithm implementations, we need
to first clarify the major operations that involve message exchange during the matching. Take the
GS algorithm for example, most operations taken by the players, are the proposing, accepting and
rejecting operations. To realize these operations, players need to maintain their preference lists and
the temporary matching matrix. The proposing information is sent from one type of player to the
other type through the communication signal with specific overhead that indicates the proposing
operation. Those users, who have received the proposal signals, will decide who to keep and who to
reject according to the preference lists and capacity requirements, and also update their temporary
matching matrixes. The rejecting/accepting operations are realized by sending the communication
signals with rejecting/accepting overheads to the rejected players. The players, who received such
signals will update their matching matrixes and then decide whether to start new proposals or not.
Thus, GS algorithm can be implemented in a fully distributive way. However, there are still some
operations that may require the assistance from the centralized agents in some other matching al-
gorithms. For example, in the random path to stability (RPTS) algorithm, introduced in Chapter 5,
each iteration involves the detection of a BP. Such detection requires the computation of the cen-
tralized agents (e.g., eNBs), who have access to all players’ preference lists. Once a BP is detected,
the centralized agent will inform the involved players in this BP of the BP status through commu-
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nication signals. Then the informed BP players will take the divorce and remarry actions with the
related users indicated in the communication signals. The divorce and remarry actions are realized
by the rejecting and accepting operations. To summarize, most operations in a matching algorithm
can be implemented distributively, while a small part of the operations require the assistance from
the centralized agents, and thus making our matching framework a semi-distributive one.
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Chapter 3
Matching and Cheating in Device to Device
Communications Underlying Cellular Networks
In the device-to-device (D2D) communications, the mobile users communicate directly with-
out going through the base station (BS). The D2D commutation has the advantage of improving
spectrum efficiency. However, the interference introduced by the resource sharing in D2D has be-
come a new challenge. In this chapter, we try to optimize the system throughput while simultane-
ously meeting the QoS requirements for both D2D users and cellular users (CUs). We implement
the SM model to solve the resource allocation between D2D users and CUs. We introduce two stable
matching algorithms to optimize the social welfare while ensuring the network stability. Moreover,
we introduce the idea of cheating in matching to further improve D2D users’ throughput. The cheat-
ing mechanism is proven to be able to benefit a subset of all the D2D users without reducing the
rest of D2D users’ performances. Through the simulation results, we demonstrate the effective-
ness of our proposed algorithms in terms of improving both the D2D users’ and the whole system’s
throughputs [29].
3.1 Introduction
To satisfy the increased traffic demand, the device-to-device (D2D) communication technol-
ogy has been proposed for the Long Term Evaluation-Advanced (LTE-A) standard. In the D2D
communications, the user equipment communicates with each other through a direct link by using
the licensed resources instead of communicating with the BSs. It is considered to have some advan-
tages such as: offloading the traffic, improving the system throughput and energy efficiency, as well
as extending the network coverage [5] [6].
Typically, in the D2D communications, the system throughput and reliability are considered
as the optimization objectives in some existing works. For example, Kaufman and Aazhang in [7]
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intend to optimize the system throughput, while simultaneously guaranteeing the QoS requirements.
However, being such a promising technology, the D2D communications also pose new challenges to
the traditional cellular networks. One most critical issue is the interference brought by the channel
reuse between D2D and cellular users. Effective approaches to solve this problem include transmis-
sion power management [8], interference avoiding multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) tech-
niques [9] and advanced coding schemes [10].
Indeed, there has been a recent surge in the literature that proposes new mathematical frame-
works, such as game theory [5] [30], auction theory [31], social networks [32] and graph theory [33],
to solve the resource allocation problems in the D2D communications. For example, Wang et al.
in [30] developed a Stackelberg game model between the CUs and D2D users, such that both the
network throughput and user fairness are taken into account. Then in [31], Xu et al. introduce a
reverse iterative combinatorial auction mechanism to deploy the D2D communication as an under-
lay for the downlink (DL) transmission in the cellular networks. Zhang et al. in [32] proposed an
approach to improve the performance of D2D users by exploiting the social ties among individual
users. Based on the users’ social network profiles, they successfully offloaded the data traffic in the
D2D networks by modeling the problem as the so-called Indian Buffet Process. In [33], a frame-
work of the D2D resource allocation is presented to maximize the network throughput. A so-called
Kuhn-Munkers algorithm is utilized to solve the bipartite matching between the D2D users and CUs,
which achieves the optimal solution regarding the system throughput.
The Kuhn-Munkers algorithm adopted in [33] solves the resource allocation problem by mod-
eling it as a weighted bipartite matching graph and achieves the optimal social welfare. However,
beyond social welfare, another important concept for the resource management should be consid-
ered, which is called the network stability. This stability notion implies the robustness to deviations
that can benefit both the resource owners and the users. In fact, an unstable matching may lead to
undesirable and messy network operations. This motivates us to find a stable and efficient resource
allocation method. Thus, in this chapter, we propose a one-to-one matching framework to solve the
resource allocation problem in D2D communications. Our main contributions are summarized as
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follows:
1) We propose a network consists of both D2D and cellular users, where D2D users seek
to share CUs’ spectrum to maximize the system utilization while satisfying the QoS requirements
of both types of users. This resource sharing problem is formulated as a mixed integer non-linear
programming (MINLP) problem.
2) We solve this resource allocation problem by modeling it as the SM game to find a stable
matching between admissible D2D pairs and CUs. Two stable matching algorithms: the Gale-
Shapley (GS) algorithm and minimum weight stable matching algorithm are proposed as two solu-
tion approaches.
3) We investigate how to further improve some D2D users’ throughput by taking the cheating
action. The cheating action is realized by implementing the so-called coalition strategy (CS). In
addition, we discuss the impact of the cabal (defined in Definition 3.5) size on the cheating results.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First in Section 3.2, we introduce the related
works of matching theory. Then in Section 3.3, we model and formulate the resource allocation
problem. The optimization problem is solved in Section 3.4 and then the cheating issue is discussed
in Section 3.5. The proposed algorithms are evaluated in Section 3.6. Finally, conclusions are drawn
in Section 3.7.
3.2 Related Works
Bayat et al. have studied the resource allocations in the cognitive radio networks, the physical
layer security problem, as well as the femtocell negotiation problem using the matching theory. The
spectrum allocation problem in the cognitive radio networks is studied in [34]. It’s modeled as the
one-to-one bipartite matching problem between the primary user and secondary user. The GS algo-
rithm is utilized sequentially with dynamic preferences. The physical layer security issue is studied
in [35] [36]. It’s modeled as the one-to-one bipartite matching between the source-destination pairs
and jammer nodes. In [37], a many-to-many bipartite matching between the wireless operators
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(WOs) and femtocell access points (FAPs) is studied. The problem is solved with two rounds of
matchings, where the second round matching is based on the negotiating results from the first round.
Saad et al. have applied matching theory into the channel assignment and the small cell as-
sociation problems. They study the joint uplink(UL)/DL resource allocations in [38]. They model
the interactions between the mobile users and UL subcarriers as the bipartite matching with two-
sided preferences, and model the interactions between the users and DL subcarrier as the bipartite
matching with one-sided preferences. The matching process is repeated until the system utility is
maximized or no subcarrier needs to be reallocated. In [39], the context-aware user-cell association
problem in small cell networks is discussed. They model it as the one-to-one bipartite matching
between users and small base stations (SBSs). Starting from a random matching, users propose to
the SBSs with better utilities and the SBSs decide whether to accept or reject based on their own
interests. Then in [40], the many-to-one bipartite matching game is proposed to model the interac-
tions between the UL users and SBSs. In this problem, the college admission game is performed
at first, and then the transfer coalitional game is used repeatedly until the convergence to the Nash
equilibrium. The many-to-many bipartite matching between the SBSs and the service providers’
servers (SPS) is studied in [41]. The SPSs aim to cache the videos to SBSs to reduce end-user delay,
while the SBSs agree to cache different videos based on their popularities in order to reduce the
backhaul link load. Finally, a pair-wise stable matching is reached.
Leshem et al. have studied the channel assignment problems using matching theory, and also
studied the fast matching algorithms. The one-to-one bipartite matching between the channel and
users is discussed in [42]. The GS algorithm is used to solve the problem. Then in [43], a fast
matching algorithm for asymptotically optimal channel assignment is proposed, which yields an
asymptotically optimal matching. A similar idea is presented in [44], where a modified distributed
auction algorithm is proposed, and then a matching algorithm is proposed to find the asymptotically
optimal solution in a faster way.
Rami et al. have studied an adaptive cross-layer scheduling in the LTE DL in [45]. They apply
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the many-to-one bipartite matching to model the problem and propose a Pareto-efficient allocation
to find the trade-off between the system throughput and user fairness. In [46], a similar algorithm
is applied in the channel allocation problem in the CR networks. In addition, a distributed English
auction method is utilized to reach the Walrasian equilibrium in the network.
There are some other works that focus on the matching-based wireless resource allocations
such as [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52], and so on. To the best of our knowledge, not many works
in the D2D communications have implemented the matching theory approach. In this chapter, we
try to optimize the performance of D2D networks while satisfying the QoS requirements utilizing
two matching algorithms. Moreover, we investigate the cheating issue in matching, which has never
been discussed in previous wireless resource allocation works.
3.3 System Model and Problem Formulation
We consider the spectrum sharing between CUs and D2D users, as shown in Fig. 3.1, where
L D2D user pairs coexist with N CUs. Each D2D pair tries to find a suitable CU to share its
allocated licensed channel. Fig. 3.2 will be explained in Section 3.4. In this chapter, we assume
the UL transmission resources of CUs can be shared with D2D users since the UL spectrum is
typically lighter loaded than the DL spectrum. Thus, the interference caused by the spectrum sharing
only affects the BS side. Both CUs and D2D pairs need to satisfy certain signal to interference
noise ratio (SINR) requirements before they can set up the spectrum sharing between them. We
represent the CUs’ set as C = {c1, ...ci, ..., cN}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N and the D2D users’ set as D =
{d1, ..., dj , ..., dL}, 1 ≤ j ≤ L. In this chapter, we assume that L = N 1.
We consider both fast fading and slow fading, caused by the multipath propagation effect and
the shadowing effect, respectively. Thus, the channel gain between ci and the BS can be expressed
as gi,B = Kβi,Bζi,BL−αi,B , where K is a constant value that determines system parameter, βi,B is
the fast fading gain, ζi,B is the slowing fading gain, and α is the path loss exponent. Similarly, we
1This assumption is based on the concern that in order to realize stable matching and cheating algorithm as introduced
in Section 3.4 and 3.5, we need to have the same number of matching agents in both sides (otherwise we can not guarantee
the results). The necessity of this assumption is also validated through simulation.
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Figure 3.1: D2D communication underlying cellular network
define the channel gain between the D2D user pair dj as gj , the channel gain for the interference
link between dj and the BS as hj,B , and the channel gain for the interference link between ci and dj
as hi,j . We use Li,B to represent the distance between ci and the BS.
To set up the spectrum sharing between any D2D pair and the CU, a minimum SINR require-
ment must be satisfied for either the D2D pair or the CU. Let P ci and P
d
j denote the transmission
power of ci and dj , and let Γci and Γ
d
j be the SINR of ci and dj , respectively. The power of the
...
...D2D pairs:
Cellular 
Users:
A
cce
p
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b
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Figure 3.2: D2D matching system model
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additive white Gaussian noise on each channel is assumed to be σ2.
Then, we can formulate the maximum throughput problem in the D2D networks as follows:
max
ρi,j ,P ci ,P
d
j
∑
ci∈C
∑
dj∈D
Wi[log(1 + Γ
c
i ) + ρi,j log(1 + Γ
d
j )], (3.1)
subject to Γci =
P ci gi,B
σ2 + ρi,jP dj hj,B
≥ Γci,min,∀ci ∈ C, (3.2)
Γdj =
P dj gj
σ2 + ρi,jP ci hi,j
≥ Γdj,min, ∀dj ∈ D, (3.3)
∑
dj∈S
ρi,j ≤ 1, ρi,j ∈ {0, 1},∀ci ∈ C, (3.4)
∑
ci∈C
ρi,j ≤ 1, ρi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀dj ∈ D, (3.5)
P ci ≤ P cmax,∀ci ∈ C, and (3.6)
P dj ≤ P dmax, ∀dj ∈ D, (3.7)
where ρi,j is the binary resource indicator for ci and dj . Here, ρi,j = 1 if dj reuses ci’s channel Wi,
and ρi,j = 0 otherwise. We assume that each CU cui gets an equal share of spectrum Wi from the
BS. We use Γci,min and Γ
d
j,min to denote the minimum SINR requirements for ci and dj , respectively.
We use P cmax and P
d
max to denote the maximum transmission power for ci and dj , respectively. All
the notation representations in this chapter are summarized in Table 3.1.
In order to optimize the system throughput while satisfying the QoS requirements, we try to
find a proper CU for each D2D user and decide the optimal transmission powers for each sharing
pair simultaneously. (3.1) represents the system objective, which aims to maximize the system
throughput. (3.2) and (3.3) denote the SINR requirements for the CUs and D2D user, respectively.
(3.4) and (3.5) indicate the capacity requriments for CUs and D2D users, respectively. (3.6) and
(3.7) define the maximum transmission powers for the CUs and D2D users, respectively.
This optimization problem is an MINLP problem [53], which is generally NP-hard to solve.
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Table 3.1: Notation
Symbol Definition
N the number of CUs
L the number of D2D pairs
C the set of CUs
D the set of D2D pairs
ci CU ci
dj D2D pair dj
Sci the set of D2D pairs that can be admitted by CU ci
Sdj the set of CUs that can be admitted by D2D pair dj
Γci SINR of ci
Γdj SINR of dj
Γci,min minimum SINR requirement for ci
Γdj,min minimum SINR requirement for dj
P ci transmission power of ci
P dj transmission power of dj
P cmax maximum transmission power for ci
P dmax maximum transmission power for dj
gi,B channel gain between ci and BS
gj channel gain between dj
hj,B channel gain of interference link from dj to BS
hi,j channel gain of interference link from ci to dj
ρi,j If dj share resource with ci,then ρi,j = 1; otherwise 0
σ2 white Gaussian noise
Thus, we try to solve the problem by dividing it into three subproblems in the next section.
3.4 Resource Allocation with True Preferences
We divide the resource allocation problem into three steps, i.e., the admission control, the
optimal power allocation and the stable matching between admitted D2D users and CUs. The first
two steps are presented in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.2, respectively. In the third step, the GS
algorithm is introduced to find a stable matching, and is discussed in Section 3.4.3. Moreover, we
propose the minimum weight stable matching algorithm to pursue an optimal stable matching in
Section 3.4.4.
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Figure 3.3: Admission area and power control illustration.
3.4.1 Admission Control
In this subsection, we will determine the acceptable pairs consisting of one CU and one D2D
user pair. A set is called admissible only when both CU’s and D2D user’s transmission powers can
be adjusted to satisfy the minimum SINR requirements. Thus, the admissible sets can be determined
by the following equation,

Γci =
P ci gi,B
σ2+ρi,jP dj hj,B
≥ Γci,min,
Γdj =
P dj gj
σ2+ρi,jP ci hi,j
≥ Γdj,min,
P ci ≤ P cmax,
P dj ≤ P dmax.
(3.8)
It’s not hard to derive the above four linear relations between ci’s transmission power P ci and
dj’s transmission power P dj from (3.8). A sharing pair is called admissible if and only if there exist
P ci and P
d
j that can satisfy all the four linear relations. According to (3.8), we draw the three possible
scenarios when a sharing pair consisting of ci and dj is admissible in Fig. 3.3, where l1 =
Γci,minhj,B
gi,B
,
l2 =
gj
Γdj,minhi,j
, P 1min =
σ2Γci,min
gi,B
, and P 2min =
σ2Γdj,min
gj
. The shadow part Aadmin in Fig. 3.3a, 3.3b
and 3.3c are the transmission power pairs (P dj , P
c
i ) that can satisfy (3.8). If a sharing pair does not
belong to any of the above scenarios (i.e., the shadow area is empty), then this pair is not admissible.
We denote all the admissible D2D users for ci as Sci , and all the admitted CUs for dj as S
d
j .
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3.4.2 Optimal Power Allocation
In the second step, the optimal transmission power for each admissible pair will be deter-
mined. The optimal power pair is represented as,
(P ci
∗, P dj
∗
) = arg max
(P ci ,P
d
j )∈Aadmin
Wi[log(1 + Γ
c
i ) + log(1 + Γ
d
j )], (3.9)
where Aadmin represents all the transmission power pairs that belong to the shadow area defined
previously. We define f(P ci , P
d
j ) = Wi[log(1 + Γ
c
i ) + log(1 + Γ
d
j )], and it’s easy to derive that
f(λP ci , λP
d
j ) > f(P
c
i , P
d
j ) if λ > 1. Thus, we know that at least one transmission power in
(P ci
∗andP dj
∗
) is bounded by the peak value.
Now we are ready to find out optimal transmission powers for each adimissible sharing pair.
In scenario one, as shown in Fig. 3.3a, in order to maximize f(P ci , P
d
j ), at least one user should
transmit at its peak power. Thus, ci should transmit at P cmax, while dj will reside on the segment
BC. As proved in [54], f(P ci , P
d
j ) is a convex function over either P
c
i or P
d
j , when the other value
is fixed. Thus, P dj
∗ must be located on either point B or C. Similar result holds for the scenario
two, as shown in Fig. 3.3b, where P dj
∗ should be the peak transmission power, and P ci
∗ will locate
on either pointD or E. Ad for the third scenario, as shown in Fig. 3.3c, the optimal power pair shall
locate on segment CF or segment FE.
3.4.3 Stable Matching by GS Algorithm
After we have identified all the admissible pairs and the optimal transmission powers, we need
to find a proper CU for each D2D user pair. We apply the SM game to match the D2D users with
the CUs [3], and the mapping is illustrated in Fig. 3.2.
The GS algorithm [28] is used to find a stable solution in the SM game. For an instance of
the SM game, each man and each woman permute the opposite player set according to his/her pref-
erence. A stable matching is defined as a complete matching between men and women that admits
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no BP. The basic story of the GS algorithm is that one gender makes a sequence of “proposals” to
the other set. For example, each man proposes, in order, to the women in his preference list, and
pauses when a woman agrees to consider his proposal, but continues if a proposal is rejected. When
a woman receives a proposal, she rejects if she already holds a better proposal, and otherwise agrees
to hold it for consideration. The progress ends until no man needs to propose. The computation
complexity of the GS algorithm is O(m) [28], where m is the number of acceptable man-woman
pairs.
Similarly, D2D pairs and CUs can be regarded as men and women, respectively. The ad-
missible pairs and the optimal transmission powers can be acquired after the admission control and
power control. We use ci’s throughput Wi log(1 + Γci ) when sharing spectrum with dj to denote ci’s
preference over dj . Likewise, we use dj’s throughout Wi log(1 + Γdj ) to denote dj’s preference over
ci. Thus, we define the “prefer” relation for ci between dj and dj′ in Definition 3.1, and the “prefer”
relation for dj between ci and ci′ in Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.1. ci prefers dj to dj′ , if Wi log(1 + Γdj ) > Wi log(1 + Γdj′), denoted by dj ci dj′ , for
ci ∈ C, dj , dj′ ∈ Sci , j 6= j′.
Definition 3.2. dj prefers ci to ci′ , if Wi log(1 + Γci ) > Wi log(1 + Γci′), denoted by ci dj ci′ , for
dj ∈ D, ci, ci′ ∈ Sdj , i 6= i′.
We denote the rank(ci, dj) as the position of dj in ci’s preference list PLci , and rank(dj , ci)
as the position of ci in dj’s preference list PLdj . For example, if c3 is d6’s second favourite choice,
then rank(d6, c3) = 2. Now we define the stablity notation in Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.3. A matching M is stable, if there exists no blocking pair (ci, dj), such that dj ci
M(ci) and ci dj M(dj), where M(ci) represents CU ci’s partner in M and M(dj) represents
dj’s partner in M .
Next, we present how to use the GS algorithm to find a stable matching between the D2D
users and CUs in Algorithm 3.1.
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Algorithm 3.1 GS algorithm
Input: D2D users’ preference list PLd and CUs’ preference list PLc.
Output: Men-optimal stable matching M .
Metode:
1: Set up D2D pairs’ preference lists as PLdj ,∀dj ∈ S;
2: Set up CUs’ preference lists as PLci ,∀ci ∈ C;
3: Set up a list of unmatched D2D users UM = {dj ,∀dj ∈ S} ;
4: while UM is not empty do
5: dj proposes to the CU that locates first in his list, ∀dj ∈ UM;
6: if ci receives a proposal from dj′ , and dj′ is more preferred than the current hold dj (∀dj ∈
S is considered more preferred by empty hold) then
7: ci holds dj′ and rejects dj ;
8: dj′ is removed from UM and dj is added into UM;
9: else
10: CU rejects dj′ and continues holding dj ;
11: end if
12: end while
13: Output the matching M .
3.4.4 Stable Matching by Minimum Weight Algorithm
Gale and Shapley indicated in [28] that men and women whoever propose would be better
off than being proposed to. Using Algorithm 3.1, we can have the men-optimal stable matching.
On the other hand, if we let women propose, it would yield the women-optimal stable matching.
Since different proposing methods can yield different stable matchings, which stable matching is
“optimal” amongst all? There are typically several ways to define an “optimal” stable matching,
such as the minimum regret stable matching [55], the egalitarian stable matching [56] [57], and
minimum weight stable matching [56] [57]. The objective of this chapter is to maximize the social
welfare. Thus, the minimum weight stable matching can be utilized to achieve our system objective.
Notice here, it is possible that the minimum weight stable matching performance may be not so
good as the Hungarian algorithm, w.r.t. the social welfare, since the Hungarian method doesn’t
ensure network stability. Next, we discuss how to deploy the minimum weight stable matching
to achieve the optimal system throughput among all the possible stable matchings. The minimum
weight stable matching is defined in Definition 3.4.
Definition 3.4. We say that a stable matching M is a minimum weight stable matching if it has the
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minimum possible value of c(M). The value c(M) is given by
c(M) =
∑
ci∈N
wt(ci, dj) +
∑
dj∈L
wt(dj , ci).
Here we define wt(ci, dj) = rank(ci, dj), and wt(dj , ci) = rank(dj , ci), representing the
weights of (ci, dj) and (dj , ci), respectively. rank(ci, dj) represents the ranking of CU ci’s partner
dj in ci’s preference list, and rank(dj , ci) represents the ranking of D2D user dj’s partner ci in dj’s
preference list.
Algorithm 3.2 Minimum Weight Stable Matching
Input: D2D users’ preference list PLd and CUs’ preference list PLc.
Output: Minimum Weight Stable Matching Mopt.
Metode:
1: Run the man-optimal GS algorithm with the true preference list, the output matching is M0;
2: Find the men-oriented shortlist for the given problem;
3: According to the shortlist, find out all the rotations;
4: Construct a directed graph P ′ presenting (in some way) the weighted rotation poset P ;
5: Use the directed graph P ′ to find the minimum weight closed subset P ;
6: Eliminate the rotations in that closed subset to obtain the “optimal” stable matching Mopt;
In [56], Irving et al. derived a O(n4) algorithm that outputs the minimum weight stable
matching by exploiting the structure of the matching set that contains all the stable matchings.
Leveraging this algorithm, we define the weight of a matching pair as the negative value of the
throughput summation. Thus, the minimum weight stable matching can be used to achieve the max-
imum throughput. The basic idea of the minimum weight stable matching is to find all the rotations
first, and then by eliminating these rotations, we are able to enumerate all the stable matchings. To
reach the minimum weight stable matching, we search the closed subset of the rotation poset with
the minimum weight, and eliminate this rotation poset from the existing men-optimal stable match-
ing. A brief summary of the Irving’s algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3.2. For further details
please refer to [56]2.
In [33], Duan et al. adopted the so-called Hungarian algorithm, also known as the Kuhn
Munkres algorithm. In an unweighted bipartite graph, the Hungarian algorithm can be used to find
a maximum cardinality matching. While in a weighted situation, it can be used to find a maximum
2There is also another algorithm to find a minimum weight stable matching, which is described in [57].
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weight matching in polynomial time (O(n3)) [58]. The difference between the Hungarian method
and the minimum weight stable matching is whether or not the network stability is guaranteed. In
Section 3.6, the Hungarian algorithm will be used as a performance benchmark.
3.5 Cheating: Coalition Strategy
In this section, we discuss the strategic issue in matching, which means that some users can
lie on their preference lists to get better partners. We introduce a cheating strategy to improve some
D2D users’ throughput. In addition, we endeavor to find a cabal (defined in Definition 3.5) that can
benefit as many D2D users as possible, and thus further improving the throughput.
After we’ve reached a stable matching by the GS algorithm, some D2D pairs are not satis-
fied with their current partners (i.e., some D2D users are not matched to the first choices in their
preferences). We allow these D2D users to pursue better partners by cheating. Here, the “cheating”
action refers to the action of permutating some entries in the preference list or truncating the list [3].
In [59], Huang proposed a so-called coalition strategy (CS) in the SM game to allow some men to be
better off by cheating. The general idea is presented as follows: 1) we construct a cabal consisting
of men, within which each member prefers each other’s partner (woman) to its own; 2) we find the
accomplices for the cabal, who need to revise their preferences to assist the cabal members; 3) we
run the GS algorithm with the falsified preferences. Thus, in the resulting matching, all men in cabal
are strictly better off while the rest of men keep the same partners.
We denote PL(d) as the set of CUs, who are more preferred than M(d) by the D2D pair d,
and denote PR(d) as the set of CUs, who are less preferred than M(d) by d. We let M0 be the
man-optimal stable matching.
Definition 3.5. A cabal K = {k1, ..., km, ..., kK} is a subset of D, such that for each km, 1 ≤ m ≤
K, we have M(km−1) km M(km), km ∈ D.
Definition 3.6. The accomplice setH(K) of the cabal K is a subset of D, such that h ∈ H(K) if
1. h /∈ K, for any km ∈ K, if M(km) h M(h) and h M(km) km+1, or
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2. h ∈ K, and h = kl(kl ∈ K), for any km ∈ K, and m 6= l, if M(km) kl M(kl−1) and
kl M(km) km+1.
Definition 3.5 defines the cabal consists of any D2D user km ∈ K, who prefers M(km−1) to
M(km), where M(km) is km’s current partner and M(km−1) is km’s desired partner. Definition
3.6 defines the subset of D2D users H(K) as the accomplices, who need to falsify their preferences
to assist K to achieve their desired partners. Any D2D user h outside the cabal K, who would
have prevented a cabal member km from getting its desired partner, is defined as a accomplice of
K. We say h prevents km when h prefers M(km) to its own parter, while M(km) prefers h to
km. Similarly, any D2D user h within the cabal K, represented by kl, who would have prevented
another cabal member km from getting its desired partner, is also defined as an accomplice. We say
kl prevents km when kl prefers M(km) to its desired partner M(kl−1), while M(km) prefers kl to
km.
Algorithm 3.3 Coalition Strategy
Input: Men-optimal stable matching M0.
Output: Men-optimal stable matching Ms after cheating.
Metode:
1: Find the cabal K of M0 as defined in Definition 3.5;
2: Find cabal K’s accomplicesH as defined in Definition 3.6;
3: for all D2D pair d ∈ K do
4: if d ∈ H(K)−K then
5: d submits a preference list (pir(PL(d) − X),M0(d), pir(PR(d) + X)), where X =
{c|c = M0(dm) ∈M0(K), d c dm+1};
6: else
7: d = dl submits a preference list (pir(PL(d)−X),M0(dl−1), pir(PR(d) +X)), where
8: X = {c|c = M0(dm) ∈M0(K), c dl dm−1, dl c dm+1};
9: end if
10: end for
11: Run the man-optimal GS algorithm the falsified preference list, and output matching is Ms.
Different from the Theorem 2 stated in [59], which doesn’t specify how the unmatched users
should perform, we have defined the actions for those unmatched users in Algorithm 3.3. We also
find that, for the unmatched users within the cabal, their falsifying strategies should be different
from those outside the cabal. Thus, we revised the CS algorithm proposed in [59] into our cheating
strategy, which is stated in Algorithm 3.3.
In Algorithm 3.3, we use pir(PL(d)−X) to denote a random permutation of PL(d)−X , and
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we use pir(PR(d) +X) to denote a random permutation of PR(d) +X .
In the resulting man-optimal matching Ms, we have Ms(km) = M0(km−1) for km ∈ K, and
Ms(km) = M0(km) for km /∈ K. It means in the D2D-optimal stable matching after cheating, all
the D2D users in the cabal have obtained their expected partners, and the rest of the D2D users have
kept the same partners. The conclusion from [59] indicates that the CS algorithm is the only strategy
that has the nice property of ensuring that some men are better off and the other men are at least as
well off as before. This property is validated through our simulation.
Due to the NP-hardness of finding the largest cabal, which corresponds to finding the largest
loop in the directed graph, we try to search a cabal as large as possible, so that more D2D users
can be benefitted. In the random cabal search, we start from an arbitrary D2D user (whose current
partner is not his first choice) and stop whenever a cycle is reached. In order to benefit more D2D
users, we do the cabal search that starting from each possible D2D user so that we can find the cabal
with a larger size than the random search. Later in Section 3.6, we will show whether a larger cabal
can improve the D2D throughput or not through the simulation results.
3.6 Numerical Results
In this section, we consider a single cell network with the BS located at the cell center. We
assume that the same number of CUs and D2D pairs (i.e., N = L) are uniformly distributed within
the cell. The cell radius R ranges from 350 m to 650 m. We assume the proximity r between each
D2D pair is randomly distributed within (20, 40) m. The 5 MHz UL bandwidth is equally shared
within N CUs. We assume Gaussian noise with power−114 dBm for all the licensed channels. The
maximum transmission power is assumed to be identical for all the users as 24 dBm. The SINR
requirements for both D2D and cellular communications are uniformly distributed within [20, 30]
dB. As for the propagation gain, we set the pass loss constant K as 10−2, the path loss exponent α
as 4, the multipath fading gain as the exponential distribution with unit mean, and the shadowing
gain as the log-normal distribution with 8 dB deviation [60].
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Figure 3.4: D2D users Throughput
In the evaluation, we first show how much the D2D users’ and the system’s throughput can
be improved by cheating. Then by comparing the D2D users and the CUs’ performances, we can
show the advantage of proposing over being proposed to. Thirdly, we evaluate the D2D users’ and
CUs’ performances, w.r.t. the SINR. Specifically, we show how each individual D2D user can be
benefitted using the cheating algorithm. Finally, the probability of finding a cabal is provided.
In Fig. 3.4, we compare the throughput of D2D users under three methods, i.e., the GS
algorithm, the CS algorithm with a random cabal and the CS algorithm with a bigger cabal. The D2D
users’ total throughput is improved after cheating as shown in the figure. The CS algorithm with
a random cabal improves the performance for about 6.03%, while the CS algorithm with a bigger
cabal can improve the performance for about 17.39%, compared the GS algorithm. It demonstrates
that a cabal with larger size can yield better performance since more D2D users are benefitted.
In Fig. 3.5, we have evaluated the system throughput. The Hungarian algorithm [33] is used
as a benchmark here. Although the Hungarian algorithm can achieve the highest system throughput,
the resulted matching is not necessarily stable. In addition, we are not able to improve any user’s
satisfaction, since no preference is defined. The other three curves, i.e., the GS algorithm, the
cheating method with a random cabal, and the cheating method with a larger cabal, achieve 92.51%,
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93.12% and 93.24% of the optimal solution, respectively. With such performance, we say that all the
three algorithms are near-optimal while ensuring the system stability. In addition, the computation
complexities of the GS and the CS algorithms are lower than the Hungarian method. For the two
cheating strategies, we can also see from Fig. 3.5 that the CS algorithm not only benefits the D2D
users but also improves the total system throughput. We can find from Fig. 3.5 that there’s a cross
point between the two cheating methods when the D2D user number reaches 27, and after this point,
the cheating with a larger cabal outperforms the cheating with a random cabal. This is because
when the D2D users get better partners, the CUs’ partners get worse partners. It is difficult to tell
who have more impact on the system throughput. Thus, when the cabal size gets larger, the system
throughput not necessarily gets better, although the D2D performance is improved. However, when
the system size becomes large enough (i.e., N > 27), finding a larger cabal can better improve the
system throughput.
Fig. 3.6 illustrates the advantage of proposing than being proposed to by comparing the D2D
users’ and CUs’ performances. For the case that everybody is telling the truth, which includes the
bottom four curves, the ratio between D2D and CU throughput is between 1.1 and 1.6. It’s reason-
able since the men-optimal GS algorithm is performed. In the top four curves, which correspond to
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(a) D2D partners’ distribution without cheating.
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Figure 3.8: D2D partners’ distribution with and without cheating.
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Figure 3.9: D2D partners’ distribution comparison with and without cheating
the cheating case, this ratio is improved to almost 2. This results from the improvement of the D2D
users’ performance and the decrease of the CUs’ performance due to cheating.
Fig. 3.7 compares the average SINR for D2D users and CUs with and without cheating. The
network radius is increased from 350 m to 800 m by the step of 50 m. Both D2D users’ and CUs’
SINR values increase as the network radius increases. Apparently, D2D users’ SINR values are
improved, while CUs’ SINRs are decreased after cheating. It’s reasonable since the CS algorithm is
designed to benefit the D2D users by sacrificing CUs’ performance.
Fig. 3.8 shows how each D2D user’s satisfaction (i.e., its partner’s ranking) is improved by
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Figure 3.10: Ratio of D2D users that can improve performance
cheating. Fig. 3.8a and Fig. 3.8b provide the distributions of D2D users’ partner rankings before
and after cheating. If every user is honest, averagely 4.5 users get their favorite partners, averagely 5
users are matched to their second choices, and averagely 5 users are matched to their third choices.
Then in the case of cheating, we have more than 7 users matched to their first choices averagely, 6.5
users matched to their second choices, and 6 users matched to their third choices. In fact, more D2D
users are matched to their top 5 choices after cheating.
We evaluate the impact of different cabal sizes in Fig. 3.10. With the increase of user number
(i.e., L/N ), the ratio of the cabal members w.r.t. the total D2D users can achieve almost 30% by
using the cheating method with a larger cabal search. This value is about 3 times higher than the
ratio achieved by the random search. The random cabal search stops as long as a cycle is detected
no matter how large the cabal is. Thus, although the user number increases, the cabal size using the
random search does not necessarily increase.
In Fig. 3.11, we approximate the probability of finding a cabal under four different radius
values R = 350 m, R = 450 m, R = 550 m, and R = 650 m. Due to the high computational
complexity ( ((L− 1)!)(L−1)) of enumerating all the possible instances containing L D2D users, we
randomly generate 10000 examples for each L, ranging from 15 to 57, to approximate the probabil-
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Figure 3.11: Probability of finding a cabal
ity. As can be seen from Fig. 3.11, with the increase of L, we have a higher probability of finding a
cabal. For all the four network radiuses, when L reaches 50, the probabilities of finding a cabal can
reach 100%.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have implemented the SM game into the D2D communications to solve
the resource allocation problem. The two stable matching algorithms, i.e., the GS and the minimum
weight stable matching algorithms, are proposed and analyzed. The GS algorithm can achieve
92.51% (under our simulation set-up) of the optimal system throughput by the Hungarian algorithm
in polynomial time. In addition, the cheating mechanism, i.e., the CS algorithm, is utilized to further
improve both the D2D users and the system performances. The simulation results also show that a
larger cabal size can achieve even better performance.
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Chapter 4
Student Admission Matching based Content-Cache
Allocation
As a support to the backend storage, the content caching technique is of great importance
to the online social networks (e.g., Facebook) in reducing the service latency and improving the
user satisfaction. However, the limited caching capacity and booming user traffic have posed new
challenges for the content caching allocation. In this chapter, we propose a three-layer caching
model and investigate how to efficiently allocation the contents to different cache centers to mini-
mize the overall service latency. We tackle this issue by utilizing both the centralized Mix Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) optimization approach and the distributive Student Admission (SA)
matching-based approach. In the SA model, we leverage the Resident-oriented Gale-Shapley (RGS)
algorithm to yield a stable matching between the contents and the cache centers. We compare the
performances of the centralized and distributed algorithms regarding both the system welfare and
the computation complexity [61].
4.1 Introduction
Nowadays, with the emerging of mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, more and
more users are accessing the online social networks such as Facebook, Flickr and so on. As one
of the largest online social networks, Facebook stores billions of photo contents. To deliver the
contents to users efficiently, heterogeneous cache centers are used to support the Facebook Backend
storage center. One important measurement to evaluate the user satisfaction is the response delay of
the user request, which is highly depending on the data fetching paths, and thus relating to specific
content caching allocation techniques. As a result, an appropriate content caching methodology can
play a major role in improving the user satisfaction.
Before discussing any caching method, we first introduce the Facebook photo storage archi-
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Figure 4.1: The caching system architecture (e.g., Facebook).
tecture, as shown in Fig. 4.1. There are typically three layers of cache centers in front of the backend
storage, also called the Haystack storage. These three cache layers are the Browser cache, the Edge
cache, and the Origin cache. The Haystack storage stores all the data [11], part of which will be
cached to the one of the three-layer cache centers to reduce the service latency. The first layer, which
is the closest to the end users, is the Browser cache. The Browser cache centers are typically embed-
ded in the user equipment such as desktops and mobile phones. The second layer cache is called the
Facebook Edge cache [12], and the third layer is called the Origin cache. When a user requests data
from Facebook, it first looks up the content in the user’s local browser cache. If the fetch is a miss,
the browser sends an HTTP request to the Internet, and the Facebook web server calculates a photo
fetching path, which directs the search process to the higher layers of cache. Then, if the search in
the Edge cache fails again, it will proceed to the Origin cache. If a miss happens again, the last try
would be the Backend storage, which guarantees a 100% hit since it stores all the data [13].
Obviously, regarding the above data fetching procedure, the service latency increases as the
fetch path goes to the higher layer cache centers. Besides, the service latency also varies for different
cache centers in the same layer due to the geography diversity. Thus, as the preceding process of the
photo fetching, the content caching mechanism must be well designed to improve the user satisfac-
tion (i.e., to reduce the service latency). Some existing works have been proposed to efficiently store
the contents to increase the hit ratio in different layers and minimize the service latency [62]. [63]
introduces a domain name system that protects against the distributed denial of service attacks at-
40
tempting to overload the network to failure and the cache hacks.
In this chapter, we consder the Facebook photo storage system, and focus on the data caching
mechanism to maximize the user satisfaction. Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
1) We propose a three-layer caching system, where photos can be cached to different cache
centers to minimize the average service latency. Innovative metrics, such as the data’s popularity
and the cache centers’ delay hierarchy, are considered during the optimization. We formulate this
problem as an MILP problem, which can be solved by CPLEX [64].
2) We model the content caching problem as the SA matching game [3]. We treat the content
and the cache center as two distinct matching parties. The preferences of both parties are built based
on factors like popularity, locality and so on. We solve this matching problem by the proposed RGS
algorithm, which is a distributive algorithm compared to the centralized MILP optimization.
3) Finally, we evaluate the proposed framework through simulation. We compare the perfor-
mance of the centralized and distributed algorithms, as well as the random allocation mechanism.
The computation complexity analysis is also provided.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the network
model and the problem formulation. We discuss how to solve the problem in Section 4.3. Then, we
conduct the performance evaluation in Section 4.4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4.5.
4.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
As indicated in [11], the Facebook web browser caches are co-located with the user devices.
Currently, 9 Edge cache centers are located in San Jose, Palo Alto, LA, Dallas, Chicago, Atlanta,
Miami, Washington D.C., and NYC. Besides, 4 Origin cache centers are located in Virginia, North
Carolina, Oregon, and California. In this chapter, we consider a three-layer caching system, which
includes the Edge cache, the Origin cache and the Backend storage. The reasons that we do not
include the browser cache are stated as follows: 1) the Browser cache is dedicated for its co-located
end user, so no matter whether a request hits or misses in its local browser cache, any other browser
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Figure 4.2: The system model.
cache could not be the candidate cache for this client; 2) the response delay of data fetching from
the browser cache is almost ignorable compared to the other layer cache centers. Thus, we consider
the content allocation within the Edge cache, the Origin cache and the Backend storage.
In this model, we assume our network as a circular area with the radius of R. We assume K
users U = {u1, ..., uk, ..., uK} and N cache centers C = {c1, ..., ci, ..., cN} randomly located inside
the circle, as shown in Fig. 4.2. The N cache centers consist of Ne Edge caches, No Origin caches,
and Ns Backend storage, and thus, N = Ne +No +Ns. We denote the set of Edge caches by
Ce = {ce1, ..., cei , ..., ceNe}, 1 ≤ i ≤ Ne. (4.1)
The set of Origin caches can be represented by
Co = {co1, ..., coi , ..., coNo}, 1 ≤ i ≤ No. (4.2)
The set of Backend storage can be represented by
Cs = {cs1, ..., csi , ..., csNs}, 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns. (4.3)
Without loss of generality, we assume that cache centers in the same layer have identical
capacities, while the capacities of different layer cache centers are different, denoted as qe, qo, qs
for the Edge cache, the Origin cache, and the Backend storage, respectively. The capacities of
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the Edge cache, the Origin cache, and the Backend storage are defined as qe, qo and qs, respec-
tively. For simplicity, we assume all the contents are of equal size r, and are denoted by M =
{m1, ...,mj , ...,mM}, where M is the number of contents.
Definition 4.1. Allocation Matrix X: An N × M matrix with the (i, j)th element xij ∈ {0, 1}
indicating the allocation of the content mj to the cache center ci, ∀ci ∈ N and ∀mj ∈ M. If
xij = 1, the jth content is allocated to the ith cache center, and if xij = 0, otherwise.
We assume that each content can be cached only once, thus we have
∑
i∈N
xij ≤ 1. (4.4)
We assume the capacities of the cache centers as Q, Q(i) ∈ {qe, qo, qs}, ∀ci ∈ N . Each
cache center should cache the amount of data no more than its capacity.
∑
mj∈M
rxij ≤ Q(i),∀ci ∈ N . (4.5)
When determining the caching priority of different contents, we consider two factors: the con-
tent’s popularity distribution and the cache center’s service delay. We define them in the following
two subsections.
4.2.1 Popularity
Intuitively, the popular contents are requested more frequently than those less popular con-
tents. The work in [11] explores the geographical patterns in the data request flows and finds out
that most of the users’ traffic is served by the nearby cache centers. Thus, the popular contents
should have higher priority to be cached to the centers that are in nearby locations to the users.
On the other hand, as shown in [65, 66], the user online activity shows the homophily and locality
effects, meaning people who are geographically close may have similar trends of accessing the con-
tents. Thus, caching the content by its popularity regarding different districts can increase the hit
probability.
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A natural way to quantify the content popularity is by tracking the number of repeated requests
for this content. Here we define the popularity matrix as follows.
Definition 4.2. Popularity Matrix F: A K ×M matrix in which the kjth element fkj represents the
number of requests for the content mj from the user uk during a certain period of time, ∀uk ∈ K
and ∀mj ∈M.
4.2.2 Delay
According to [11], when a user receives an HTML file from the Facebook web server, the
fetching path is based on the URL information carried in the file. These URLs are generated by
the web servers to control the traffic distribution across the serving stack. The routing policy is
designed based on the joint consideration of the service latency, cache center capacity, Internet
service providers (ISP) peering cost and so on. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there’s
no literature available online that shows how exactly the Facebook web server calculates the URLs.
Thus, we make the following assumptions for our work: 1) the lower layer cache centers have higher
caching priorities than higher layer, 2) for cache centers in the same layer, we assume the priority
is geographically related. We denote the service delay for the Edge cache, the Origin cache, and
the Backend storage as te, to, and ts, respectively. Thus, we have the fetching delay inequality as
follows
te < to < ts. (4.6)
Jointly considering the above two assumptions, we represent the general service delay as
follows
tki =

te ∗ dki2R , if ci ∈ Ce,
te + to ∗ dki2R , if ci ∈ Cb,
te + to + ts ∗ dki2R , if ci ∈ Cs,
(4.7)
where dki is the distance between uk and ci, and R is the radius of our selected area. dki2R is a
real number within [0, 1]. By utilizing dki2R , we can add the geographical location into the delay
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definition. On the other hand, by adding the lower-layer delay (i.e., te, to, ts) to the current layer
delay calculation, we guarantee that higher-layer cache centers have higher latencies. Thus, the
delay matrix can be defined as follows.
Definition 4.3. Delay Matrix T: A K × N matrix in which the kith element is the response delay
tki for client uk when fetching from cache center ci, ∀k ∈ K and ∀ci ∈ N .
4.2.3 Problem Formulation
Under the caching constraints discussed in Section 4.2, we try to minimize the average latency
for the entire system. Since the allocation matrix X is the only variable matrix and is binary valued,
we can formulate this content caching problem as an MILP optimization as follows.
min :
X
T ◦ (F ×X ′), (4.8)
s.t. ∑
mj∈M
rxij ≤ Q(i), ∀ci ∈ C, (4.9)
∑
ci∈N
xij = 1,∀mj ∈M, and (4.10)
xij = {0, 1},∀ci ∈ C,mj ∈M, (4.11)
where (4.8) is the objective function, presenting the overall response delay, defined as the Hadamard
product [67] “◦” of the corresponding response delay and the request times of the contents from
users. The request times of the contents can be calculated by multiplying the popularity matrix F
with the transpose of the allocation matrix X . Constraint (4.9) defines the capacity of each cache
center as Q. Constraint (4.10) indicates that each content can be only allocated to one cache center.
Constraint (4.11) defines xij as a binary variable, which represents the caching of a certain content
to a certain cache center.
This MILP optimization can be solved by using the CPLEX [64] function for MATLAB. This
function provides an extension to the IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimizers, and allows users to define
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optimization problems and solve them with MATLAB. The centralized solution, will be used as the
benchmark in Section 4.4.
4.3 SA Stable Matching Problem
The computational complexity of the optimization problem in (4.8) increases exponentially
with the increase of the network size [53]. Thus, a low-complexity distributive solution is needed.
In this section, we propose a matching-based distributive solution which can achieve the similar
performance as the centralized optimization but with lower complexity. We introduce the SA game
to model the many-to-one matching between the contents and cache centers.
In the SA game, the students apply to the colleges and the colleges decide whether to accept
them or not. A student ranks all the colleges by order of his/her preferences over these colleges,
which may depend on the college locations, or whether they offer a major that interests the student.
On the other hand, after receiving applications from students, a college will rank the students who
apply for it based on their scores or expertise in certain fields. Each college has a quota limiting the
maximum number of students that it can recruit. Intuitively if a college receives applications more
than its capacity, it chooses the most preferred ones up to the quota and rejects the rest of students.
In this section, we introduce the SA model to formulate the content caching problem and leverage
the RGS algorithm to solve it.
4.3.1 Preference list
As we have discussed previously, we can make use of the locality of the content’s popularity
to reduce the response delay. For each user, the preferences over different contents are different
since people have various interests. Then taking the locality factor into consideration, the users are
more likely to be served by the nearby cache centers. Thus, considering the user interests of ci’s
Kclose closest user set Uclose(i), we calculate the average popularity of different contents among
Uclose(i), and define it as the preference of ci over these contents. It is represented as follows.
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Definition 4.4. For cache center ci, ∀ci ∈ C, its preference over content mj , ∀mj ∈M is
PLcache(i, j) =
1
Kclose
∑
k∈Uclose(i)
fkj . (4.12)
By sorting each row of N ×M matrix PLcache in a descending order, we can generate the
preference lists for all the caches centers. On the other hand, to define contents’ preferences, we use
the average latencies of different cache centers. For the preference of content mj over cache center
ci, we consider theKclose closest user set Uclose(i) of ci. By taking into consideration the popularity
of mj over Uclose(i), we can calculate the average service delay as mj’s preference over ci, which
is represented as follows.
Definition 4.5. For content mj , ∀mj ∈M, its preference over cache center ci, ∀ci ∈ C is
PLcontent(j, i) =
1
Kclose
∑
k∈Uclose(i)
fkj × tki. (4.13)
By sorting each row of M × N matrix PLcontent in an ascending order, we generate the
preference lists for all the cache centers.
4.3.2 Proposed Matching Algorithm
In this subsection, we introduce the RGS algorithm to find the many-to-one stable matching
solution [28]. In an SA instance consisting of M students and N colleges, the students keep propos-
ing to the colleges, until all the students are accepted or all colleges have recruitted enough students.
During the proposal, each student applies for his/her current favorite college, w.r.t. the student’s
preferences, and then removes this college from the preference list after proposing to it. Then for
each iteration, after all the students have proposed, each college checks its received proposals, to-
gether with the students it has accepted in the previous iterations, and then keeps the most preferred
students up to its quota and rejects the rest. The proposing and rejecting interaction continues until
either all the student are accepted or all the colleges are full [28].
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Algorithm 4.1 RGS Algorithm for Cache-Content Allocation
Input:C,M, T , Q, F , r
Output:X
Initialization;
Construct the preference list of cache centers PLcache;
Construct the preference list of contents PLcontent;
Construct the set of unmatched contentsMunmatch, setMunmatch =M;
whileMunmatch 6= ∅ do
Contents propose to cache centers;
for all mj ∈Munmatch do
Proposes to the first cache center ci in its preference list PLcontents(j, :), set xij = 1;
Remove ci from PLcontent(j, :);
end for
cache centers make decisions;
for all ci ∈ C do
if
∑
j∈M rxij ≤ Q(i) then
ci keeps all of the proposed contents;
Remove mj fromMunmatch;
else
ci keeps the most preferred Q(i) contents, and rejects the rest;
Remove these Q(i) contents from theMunmatch;
Add the rejected contents into theMunmatch, and set xij = 0;
end if
end for
end while
End of algorithm;
We model the content as the student and the cache center as the college. Firstly, the preference
lists are set up using the preference values defined in (4.12) and (4.13). Secondly, the contents
propose to their most favorite cache centers, and the cache centers, based on their preferences and
capacities, decide whether to accept these applications or not. Finally, when all the contents are
cached, the matching process terminates. The RGS algorithm is stated in Algorithm 4.1.
4.4 Numerical Results
Due to the lack of real data traces, we have made some assumptions to simplify the simula-
tions. In our setting, we assume that there are Ne = 10 Edge caches, No = 4 Origin caches, and
Ns = 1 Backend storage. Thus, the total number of cache centers is N = N1 +N2 +N3 = 15. The
capacities of the Edge cache, the Origin cache, and the Backend storage are assumed as qe = 0.1 Gb,
qo = 0.25 Gb and qs = ∞, respectively. The data size is assumed as r = 50 Mb. Thus, the quota
for the Edge cache, Origin cache, and Backend storage are assumed as qer = 2,
qo
r = 5,
qs
r = ∞,
respectively. The delay parameters are set up as te = 1, to = 10, and ts = 20. The total number of
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Figure 4.3: The response delay of the four mechanisms as the system scale varies.
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Figure 4.4: The response delay of the four mechanisms for all users.
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Figure 4.5: The average delay distribution at each user.
contents to be cached is M = 70, which slightly exceeds the total capacity of the Edge and Origin
caches. We assume the content popularity distribution (the photo request frequency) is a random
distribution within [0, 10].
In the simulations, we propose another allocation mechanism, the min rank method, which
is also solved by CPLEX. The optimization objective is to minimize the total popularity rankings.
This mechanism is similar to a combination of the matching theory and the centralized optimization,
which adopts the ranking definition in matching as the objective and solve the optimization using
CPLEX. In addition, we introduce the random allocation as another benchmark, to compared with
the three proposed mechanisms, i.e., the MILP with min delay, the MILP with min rank, and the
RGS algorithm. In the random allocation, we assign the contents randomly to the cache centers in
different layers while satisfying the capacity requirement.
Fig. 4.3 evaluates the average response delay for all users. Apparently, the proposed MILP
with min delay method generates the smallest delay, followed by the MILP with min rank method.
The difference between the two MILP curves shows that it’s better to use the actual delay value
instead of the ranking values when optimizing the response delay. For the other two curves, the RGS
and the random allocation, the RGS curve achieves better performance than the random method. It
is reasonable that the RGS method performs slightly worse than the two centralized mechanisms,
since it is a distributive algorithm with much lower computation complexity. The complexity of the
RGS algorithm isO(N×M) [3], whereN×M is the number of all possible (content, cache center)
pairs. With the scaling of the system size, the distributive matching algorithm can be a good choice
for reducing the computation complexity.
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Figure 4.6: The response delay variants of the four mechanisms as the system scale varies.
In Fig. 4.4, we fix the network size and evaluate the delay distribution of all the users. We
have run 1000 examples to obtain a relatively smooth and stable distribution. We can have similar
conclusions in Fig. 4.4 as compared with Fig. 4.3. Fig. 4.5 is a another way to interpret Fig. 4.4,
which is the histo graph for all clients’ the delay distribution. Most users’ latencies are distributed
within [8.5, 9.5] under the min delay, the min ranking, and the RGS methods, while the response
delay using the random allocation is more than 12.
The variant of the delay distribution is evaluated in Fig. 4.6, which can represent the fairness
between users. A small variant means a fair allocation. As can be seen from Fig. 4.6, the delay
variants of the two centralized mechanisms are relatively smaller than the RGS and the random
methods.
The hit ratio of each cache center is evaluated in Fig. 4.7, which represents the ratio of requests
found in different cache layers. The way we cache the data determines the way it is fetched, and
thus affecting the service latency. As shown in Fig. 4.7, the hit ratios in the lower layers using
the three proposed mechanisms are higher than the random allocation, which indicates that more
data are cached to the lower layers as we have expected. The RGS algorithm is achieving the same
performance as two centralized mechanisms since we give priority to the lower layer cache centers
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Figure 4.7: The hit ratio of the four mechanisms in three layer cache centers
when setting up the preference lists.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed an SA model to address the problem of caching online
contents to different cache centers. We have considered the popularity and locality of the contents,
together with the service delay of the cache centers, as the caching metrics. We have proposed
two centralized optimization solutions as the benchmarks. Also, we have proposed a distributed
algorithm, namely the RGS algorithm, to find the near-optimal performance while significantly
reducing the computation complexity compared with the centralized mechanisms. Simulation results
have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Path To Stability in LTE-Unlicensed with User
Mobility: A Matching Framework
The LTE-Unlicensed, has recently captured intensive attention from both academic and in-
dustrial fields for its potential in boosting the LTE network capacity. By aggregating the unlicensed
spectrum with the licensed spectrum, using the carrier aggregation technology, LTE-Unlicensed
users can experience enhanced transmission, while maintaining the seamless mobility management
and predictable performance. However, due to different transmission regulations, the coordina-
tion between the LTE and unlicensed systems (e.g., Wi-Fi) requires careful design. Especially, it’s
important to understand how to guarantee the transmission quality for the LTE users, and reduce
Wi-Fi users’ performance degradation, under the co-channel interference. In this chapter, we pro-
pose a matching theory framework to tackle this coexistence problem. Specifically, the interactions
between the LTE and Wi-Fi users, are modeled using the SM game. The coexistence constraints
are interpreted through the preference lists of both types of users. Two semi-distributed solutions,
namely, the GS algorithm and the Random Path to Stability (RPTS) algorithm are proposed. In ad-
dition, the resource allocation problem is studied with network dynamics, and under which case, the
RPTS method exhibits lower implementation cost compared with the GS algorithm. Moreover, to
address the external effect, the Inter-Chanel Cooperation algorithm is proposed. Finally, the mecha-
nisms are evaluated under two user mobility models: the Random Waypoint model and the HotSpot
model.
5.1 Introduction
The ever-increasing mobile broadband traffic load has led to a pressing need for additional
spectrum resources for the future 5G networks. To meet this demand, an intuitive idea is to exploit
more licensed spectrum, which ensures the reliable and predictable performance. However, it is
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not quite possible that sufficient additional licensed spectrum can be available in the near future. A
growing interest in exploiting the unlicensed spectrum to boost the network capacity has recently
arisen. Some cellular network operators have deployed the Wi-Fi access points to offload the cellular
traffic to the unlicensed spectrum. However, such efforts are limited by some disadvantages such
as the extra cost due to the investment in backhaul and core networks, degradation of the Wi-Fi
performance, and lack of good coordination between the cellular and Wi-Fi systems. Another way to
augment the LTE capacity to meet the traffic demands is to integrate the unlicensed carriers into the
LTE system to enhance the cellular transmission using the carrier aggregation (CA) technology. The
CA technology provides the option of aggregating two or more component carriers into a combined
virtual bandwidth for enhanced transmission [14]. By aggregating the unlicensed spectrum into
cellular networks with CA, the capacity of the LTE network can be boosted, while maintaining the
seamless mobility management and predictable performance. This technology is commonly referred
to as the LTE-Unlicensed [15].
5.1.1 LTE-Unlicensed Coexistence Issue
Recent studies have highlighted that the LTE technology has significant performance gains
over the Wi-Fi when operating in the unlicensed band [68]. The main advantages of LTE-Unlicensed
on the unlicensed spectrum include better link performance, seamless mobility management, and ex-
cellent coverage. These benefits have made LTE-Unlicensed a promising technology. Due to the low
power transmission regulation imposed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the
unlicensed spectrum, small cell (SC) deployment is an ideal implementation scenario for the LTE-
Unlicensed. It is shown in [69] that the LTE-Unlicensed has a great potential in the ultra-dense cloud
SC deployment, which combines the advantages of cloud radio access network and ultra-dense small
cells. However, the LTE-Unlicensed technology is still in its infancy and requires much effort and
careful design before it can fully meet the market requirements. More specifically, in this chapter,
we want to study how to guarantee a fair coexistence of the newly joined cellular users (CUs) and the
existing unlicensed users (UUs) on the unlicensed band. The traditional Wi-Fi transmission is colli-
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sion avoidance based, so the UUs may back off when the interference caused by the co-channel CUs
is higher than the energy detection threshold (e.g., -62dBm over 20MHz) [68]. On the other hand,
the interference from the co-channel Wi-Fi users may also degrade the LTE-Unlicensed devices’
performance, leading to the failure of meeting the QoS requirements of the cellular transmissions.
In addition, with limited unlicensed bands, CUs need to compete with each other for the same unli-
censed band. Thus, there may also exist interference between the co-channel CUs. Therefore, it is
critical to design a coexistence mechanism to avoid such co-channel interferences and guarantee the
harmonious coexistence of the Wi-Fi and LTE systems [70].
The existing projects on the LTE-Unlicensed come in multiple forms, the Licensed Assisted
Access (LAA), the LTE-U and the MuLTEfire [71]. The LTE-U targets on the markets without the
listen-before-talk (LBT) regulation on the unlicensed spectrum, while for markets with the LBT
regulation, the LAA paradigm is specified. For both LTE-U and LAA, the signaling and control
messages are sent through the reliable licensed anchor, and the unlicensed link is used only for
data. The MuLTEfire broadens the LTE ecosystem to new deployment opportunities by operating
solely in the unlicensed spectrum without a licensed anchor channel. For markets without the LBT
regulations, the coexistence mechanism can be realized through careful software design and allows
the fast-time-to-market launch. On the other hand, for markets with the LBT regulation, a num-
ber of modifications are needed to meet the channel occupancy requirements on the UL and DL
transmissions [71].
A fair coexistence is always evaluated from both the CUs’ and the existing Wi-Fi users’ sides,
and thus the coexisting interference can be summarized into the following three categories: (1) the
interference that CUs bring to the existing UUs; (2) the interference that the existing UUs bring to
CUs; and (3) the interference between multiple co-channel CUs. Therefore, to satisfy these coex-
isting constraints, certain transmission restrictions should be imposed on both the LTE and Wi-Fi
systems. Some methods have been proposed to deal with the coexistence issues, for example, the
Channel Selection mechanism, the Carrier-Sensing Adaptive Transmission (CSAT) and the Oppor-
tunistic SDL [71]. The Channel Selection method enables the SCs to select the cleanest channel
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based on the channel measurements. When no clean channel is available, the CSAT algorithm can
be used to apply adaptive TDM transmission based on the long-term carrier sensing of Wi-Fi ac-
tivities. The SDL method allows to turn off the CA when the small cell is lightly loaded to avoid
interference and transmission overheads. It is pointed out that, for most Wi-Fi and LTE-Unlicensed
SC deployments, Channel Selection is usually sufficient to meet the coexistence requirements [71].
In a case that one unlicensed band is the cleanest choice for multiple CUs, instead of allocating them
to the same unlicensed band, some of the CUs can be allocated to their second-best or third-best
choices for improving the network utilization. Thus, it becomes a critical issue to find an efficient
resource allocation method in the unlicensed bands so that we can not only achieve high network
utilization but also guarantee both the CUs’ and Wi-Fi users’ performances.
5.1.2 Matching Theory for LTE-Unlicensed
The future 5G mobile networks are expected to be characterized by features such as higher
data rates, reduced end-to-end latency, better network coverage and so on. The heterogeneous char-
acteristics exhibited by the mobile users and the network density are the two major challenges in
the 5G design. Current architectures for the cellular networks are highly centralized. The advantage
of the centralized approach resides in its optimality, however with the huge amount of informa-
tion to be collected by the centralized agent (e.g., eNBs) and the high computation complexity, the
service latency at the user end can be very high. In addition, considering the network dynamics,
such as the network topology change, channel condition change and so on, the distributive resource
management approaches are considered to be more efficient.
Matching game, as a Nobel-prize winning framework, can overcome some limitations of game
theory and the centralized optimization. It can model the competition and negotiation between the
distinct user sets of LTE and Wi-Fi, and solve the resource allocation problem in a semi-distributive
way. We claim it as a semi-distributive framework w.r.t. the fact that many operations in the match-
ing algorithms are implemented distributively, including the information collection, preference list
set-up, reject/accept decision making and so on, while some other operations may require global in-
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formation from a centralized agent, such as the detection of a BP. Different from the static resource
allocation studied in [72] [73], which is a one-time allocation, the dynamic case is not a simple
repeat of the static allocation over time. In this chapter, we propose a matching-based framework
to tackle the dynamic LTE-Unlicensed resource allocation problem. The major contributions are
summarized as follows.
1) We have summarized the coexistence issues in the LTE-Unlicensed into three categories.
To solve these issues we model the interactions between the CUs and UUs as the SM problem. The
coexistence constraints are interpreted through the set-up of both CUs’ and UUs’ preference lists.
2) We have introduced two semi-distributed solutions: the GS algorithm and the RPTS algo-
rithm to tackle the resource allocations dynamically. Both mechanisms guarantee network stability,
while achieving relatively low computation complexity compared with the centralized optimization.
Especially, the proposed RPTS algorithm further reduces the complexity compared with the GS
algorithm, and is more suitable for dynamic networks.
3) The external effect, which refers to instability caused by the inter-dependence of the match-
ing players’ preference lists, is addressed by the proposed ICC mechanism. The ICC procedure not
only re-stabilize the system but also further improves the network throughput.
4) We evaluate the adaptability and robustness of the GS-ICC and RPTS-ICC mechanisms
under two user mobility models: the Random Waypoint model, and the HotSpot model. The com-
putation complexity and system optimality analysis are performed both theoretically and through
simulations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The related works of the LTE-Unlicensed
are discussed in Section 5.2. The system model is provided in Section 5.3. Then, the problem
formulation and the centralized solution are presented in Section 5.4. Due to the NP-hardness of the
centralized solution, two semi-distributive matching approaches are introduced in Section 5.5. Both
theoretical and simulation analysis are provided in Section 5.6 to evaluate the proposed mechanisms.
Finally, conclusion remarks are drawn in Section 5.7.
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5.2 Related Work
The performance evaluation of the LTE-Unlicensed has been conducted in recent studies. For
example, [74] presents a system performance analysis, where the LTE and WLAN share the un-
licensed resource using a simple fractional bandwidth sharing mechanism. The simulation results
show that the coexistence has a negative impact on the WLAN system performance if without re-
strictions on LTE transmission. However, the severity of the impact can be controlled by restricting
the LTE activities. The results also suggest the silent time of the WLAN, which is the period that
the medium is idle when the WLAN users back off, can be exploited by the LTE users such that
WLAN performance would not be degraded. Similar evaluations are conducted in [75], which again
observes about 70% to 100% performance degradation of the Wi-Fi users if there is no inter-system
coordination.
Efforts have been devoted to tackle the coexistence issues in the LTE-Unlicensed. To alleviate
the coexistence interference, some techniques have been proposed, such as the channel selection,
the transmission power control, the blank subframe and so on [76]. An intuitive way to prevent
LTE/Wi-Fi users from accessing the channel at the same time is to use the blank subframe method,
the idea of which is similar to the LTE almost blank subframe technique proposed in 3GPP Rel.
10. By silencing some of the subframes in the LTE UL/DL transmission, Wi-Fi users can access
the channel during the blank subframe to increase the throughput [77]. A similar idea is proposed
in [78]. Alternatively, LTE users can adopt the transmit power control to enable the LTE/Wi-Fi co-
existence [79]. By measuring the interference at the LTE eNBs, LTE users estimate the presence and
proximity of Wi-Fi users, and adjust their transmission powers to avoid strong interference to Wi-Fi.
The idea of either blank subframe or power control can enable the coexistence of LTE/Wi-Fi, how-
ever, it more or less affects the transmission quality of the LTE users. Another enabler is the channel
selection technique that can be used by both the Wi-Fi and LTE users [76]. For example, some Wi-
Fi APs implement the least congested channel search (LCCS) to find the least congested channel.
Meanwhile, except the fixed bandwidth allocation, the adaptive bandwidth channel allocation can
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also be utilized in the LTE-Unlicensed environment.
There are some existing works on the resource allocation problem in the LTE-Unlicensed.
For example, in [80], a joint user association and unlicensed resource allocation problem is pro-
posed. The performance is measured by the average packet sojourn time. This work is solved by
a centralized optimization approach. Some other works have been proposed by using the cooper-
ative/noncooperative games. For example in [72], a coordinated hierarchical game is proposed for
modeling the multi-operator spectrum sharing in the LTE-Unlicensed. The Kalai-Smorodinsky bar-
gaining game is proposed to model the interactions among operators, and the Stackelberg game is
proposed to model the interactions between operators and users. The final equilibrium is achieved
by the price negotiation between operators and the transmission power control at the users. How-
ever, this work does not consider the interference caused by the unlicensed users. In addition, the
assumption that each unlicensed subband is allocated to only one CU has limited its practical imple-
mentation. An interesting idea of leveraging the LTE-Unlicensed to transfer the Wi-Fi users to the
LTE-Unlicensed system, while offering the unlicensed bands for compensation, is proposed in [81].
They developed a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) method to find the close-form expression for
the unlicensed time slot allocation and the optimal number of transferred users. A matching based
approach that addresses the LTE-Unlicensed coexistence issue has been discussed in [73]. The SPA
matching game is utilized to model the interactions between the LTE and Wi-Fi users. The interfer-
ence between LTE and Wi-Fi users can be avoided by generating the preference lists for both types
of users, while the interference among co-channel LTE users can be avoided by utilizing the TDMA
method. However, this work only considers the static resource allocation, and the dynamic resource
management issue in the LTE-Unlicensed remains unexplored. A dynamic unlicensed resource
sharing problem among multiple operators with time-varying traffic has been proposed in [82]. By
modeling it as the repeated game, operators change the power spectral density to optimize the util-
ities in different time slots. Again, this dynamic game fails to consider the interference from the
Wi-Fi system to the LTE system. Besides, only the DL transmission is discussed in this work.
The above-mentioned works and other existing works on the LTE-Unlicensed either address
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only part of the coexistence issue, or fail to consider the network dynamic management. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first that addresses the dynamic coexistence management problem
in the LTE-Unlicensed, with joint consideration of different types of coexisting interference.
5.3 System Model
We consider a single carrier cellular network consisting of a set of CUs CU = {cu1, ..., cui, ..., cuN},
as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. Each CU is served by its local eNB BS = {bs1, ..., bsb, ..., bsB1} with the
allocated licensed spectrum. B1 is the number of eNBs. Due to the time-varying traffic flow, some
transmission requests can not be satisfied by the currently allocated licensed bands. We assume a
set of such CUs, traveling around in the network with certain mobility patterns. Wherever the CUs
are located, they search for nearby UUs, and seek to share their unlicensed spectrum using the CA
technique for the supplemental downlink (SDL) transmission. The pre-assigned licensed bands of
CUs will be the primary carrier and will be aggregated with the shared unlicensed bands to enhance
transmission. To access a clean unlicensed channel, CUs need to have the channel sensing phase
before joining any unlicensed channel, and this channel sensing shall be repeated each time they join
the new unlicensed channels. During the channel sensing, CUs can detect the transmission energy
on the target unlicensed channel and decide if this channel is clean or not. The CUs then commu-
nicate with the local eNBs, who assist the CUs in accessing the unlicensed bands, through control
signal exchanges using the pre-assigned licensed bands. On the other hand, to model the interference
incurred at the UUs from the co-channel CUs, the Wi-Fi medium utilization (MU) estimation should
be performed. We denote the set of UUs as UU = {uu1, ..., uuj , ..., uuM}, and each UU is allocated
with a specific unlicensed subband denoted as F = {f1, ..., fj , ..., fK} for transmission. Typically,
each unlicensed band is shared by multiple UUs according to the CSMA/CA regulation. Thus to
simplify the representation, we assume that uuj , uuj ∈ UU is assigned with the unlicensed band
fk, fk ∈ F . Each UU is served by its local Wi-Fi AP, denoted as AP = {ap1, ..., apj , ..., apB2},
for transmitting/receiving data, where B2 is the number of Wi-Fi APs. The Wi-Fi MU estimation is
conducted by the Wi-Fi APs through network listening, where all the CUs are required to turn off
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Figure 5.1: System Model
the unlicensed spectrum sharing in this period. The Wi-Fi network listening decodes the preamble
of any WiFi packet detected during this time and records its corresponding received signal strength
indicator (RSSI), duration, modulation, coding scheme and source/destination address [83]. With
the above-estimated information, the Wi-Fi APs will share with the LTE-Unlicensed eNBs so that
this information can be further shared with the CUs. To the best of our knowledge, there’s no exist-
ing standard specifying how many unlicensed bands that each CU should use for aggregation in the
LTE-Unlicensed, besides, SDL is only considered as an enhancement to the cellular transmission.
Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that each CU will be matched to at most one UU, i.e.,
one unlicensed band. On the other hand, each unlicensed band can accommodate multiple CUs,
depending on the number of existing UUs.
As discussed in Section 5.1, the coexistence issues are categorized as follows: (1) the interfer-
ence that CUs bring to the existing UUs; (2) the interference that the existing UUs bring to CUs; (3)
the interference between multiple co-channel CUs. We elaborate them one by one into the following
constraints:
• It is well known that in Wi-Fi transmission, the UUs adopt the CSMA/CA mechanism for
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coexistence, which is different from the way that LTE system operates. Thus, it is required
that CUs should keep their interference to the UUs to be small enough, so that the channel is
treated as “idle” by the UUs. To achieve this requirement, we set the threshold as the energy
level of UU’s normal channel noise, denoted as σnoise.
• On the other hand, not all the unlicensed bands are clean enough for CUs to use. The exist-
ing UU can cause high interference that significantly reduces the transmission quality rather
than enhancing the transmission. Thus, by restricting the SINR for cui to be higher than the
minimum requirement Γmini , we can guarantee CUs’ QoS requirements.
• The inter-CU interference can be avoided by the management at the eNBs. We assume that
eNBs adopt the TDMA for the co-channel CUs, and each sharing CU is allocated an equal
share of time. With more CUs assigned to the same unlicensed band, each CU gets a smaller
share of the resource. Thus, it may happen that some CUs may prefer to switch to other
channels which are allocated with fewer CUs. To avoid such situation, we propose the ICC
strategy. The detailed mechanism discussion is provided in Section 5.5.2.2.
5.4 Problem Formulation
There are mainly two factors that may cause the network dynamics: the user mobility and
the channel fading. To model the network dynamics, we divide the simulation period [0, T ] into
identical time slots ∆T . The slot duration ∆T can be set according to specific applications. To
precisely model the dynamic network due to user mobility, we can set ∆T to be sufficiently small
that during each time slot (t, t+1),∀t ∈ {1, ..., t, ..., T}, the user distribution and channel conditions
can be treated as static.
In order to pursue higher spectrum efficiency, we allow multiple CUs to share the same unli-
censed channel as long as the coexisting interference is acceptable for all co-channel CUs and UUs.
Each CU is allowed to be allocated to no more than one unlicensed channel. We use the binary
matrix, denoted as ρ(t) = {ρi,j |cui ∈ CU , uuj ∈ UU}, to model the spectrum sharing between CUs
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and UUs. ρi,j(t) is a binary value equal to 1 or 0 indicating if cui is or is not assigned with uuj
at time t. To dynamically maximize the social welfare, we endeavor to find the optimal allocation
matrix ρ(t) at each time slot that can achieve the highest overall performance of CUs and UUs.
5.4.1 CUs’ Performance
We assume that CUs use the unlicensed spectrum for the SDL transmission. Thus, cui is the
receiver and its local eNB bsb is the transmitter. The interference from from the coexisting UU is
also incurred at the receiver cui. The received SINR at bsb when sharing fj with uuj at time t, is
represented as
Γi,j(t) =
ρi,j(t)Pb,i(t)gb,i(t)
σlN + Pj,i(t)hj,i(t)
, (5.1)
where Pb,i(t) and gb,i(t) are the transmission power and the channel gain from bsb to cui at time t,
respectively. Pj,i(t) and hj,i(t) represent the transmission power and the channel gain from uuj to
cui, respectively. σlN is the licensed channel noise.
5.4.2 UUs’ Performance
On the other hand, when fj is utilized by cui, both uuj and apj can be interfered by the
transmission power from cui depending on whether uuj is transmitting to or receiving from apj . If
uuj is the receiver, the interference from cui at time t is denoted as
IntfDLi,j (t) = Pi,j(t)hi,j(t), (5.2)
where Pi,j(t) and hi,j(t) represent the transmission power and channel gain from cui to uuj , re-
spectively.
While uuj is the transmitter, the interference is recieved at the Wi-Fi AP side, and is denoted
as
IntfULi,j (t) = Pi,j(t)hi,j(t), (5.3)
where Pi,j(t) and hi,j(t) represent the transmission power and channel gain from cui to apj , respec-
tively.
63
Thus, uuj’s interference Intfi,j equals to IntfDLi,j (t) if uuj is the receiver, and equals Intf
UL
i,j (t)
if uuj is the transmitter. We represent uuj’s SINR at time t when sharing fj with cui as
ΓUUj,i (t) =
ρi,j(t)Pj(t)gj(t)
σuN + Intfi,j
, (5.4)
where Pj(t) and gj(t) is the transmission power and channel gain for uuj , respectively. σuN is the
unlicensed spectrum noise.
Now, we formulate the dynamic spectrum sharing problem in LTE-Unlicensed as a sequence
of static resource allocation problems in each time slot. With the objective of dynamically maximiz-
ing the system throughput, the problem formulation is shown as follows.
max
ρi,j(t)
∑
i,j
fkρi,j(t)∑
j ρi,j(t)
log(1 + ΓCUi,j (t))
+
∑
j
∑
i fk log(1 + Γ
UU
j,i (t))∑
i ρi,j(t)
, (5.5)
s.t. :
ΓCUi,j (t) ≥ Γmini , ∀cui ∈ CU , (5.6)
Intfi,j(t) ≤ σnoise,∀uuj ∈ UU , (5.7)∑
j
ρi,j(t) ≤ 1, ∀cui ∈ CU , and (5.8)
∑
i
ρi,j(t) ≤ 1, ∀uuj ∈ UU . (5.9)
Notice that for any uuj , its associated unlicensed band is pre-assigned, and is denoted as
fk, ∀fk ∈ F . (5.6) is the SINR requirement that each CU should satisfy if to reuse a certain unli-
censed band. (5.7) represents the maximum interference that each UU can allow from the coexisting
CUs. (5.8) and (5.9) are the capacity requirements for CUs and UUs, respectively. Each CU can be
allocated to only one UU (i.e., one unlicensed band), and each UU can be allocated to only one CU.
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The formulated problem represents a sequential MINLP problems, which is in general NP-
hard to solve [53]. In addition, distributive solutions usually act more quickly with lower computa-
tion complexities. Thus, we introduce the matching-based approach as the semi-distributive solution
to cope with network dynamics.
5.5 Dynamic Matching Framework
The formulated optimization problem in Section 5.4 can be modeled as a one-to-one matching
game between the CUs and UUs, which results in a many-to-one matching between the CUs and
unlicensed bands. Typically, the two-sided one-to-one matching problem has been well studied
using the SM model. Intuitively, we can tackle the sequential optimization problems by taking
each individual time interval as a traditional SM game, and solving each of them independently
over time. This idea will be elaborated in Section 5.5.2. However, in a dynamic network, both the
network topology and channel conditions are not isolated in time, and thus there exist some relations
between the resource allocations in two adjacent times. Thus, we may make use of such relations for
the resource allocation. Under such belief, we propose another matching approach, called the RPTS
algorithm, to address the network dynamics. This approach will be discussed in Section 5.5.3. An
implementation flow chart for both approaches is shown in Fig. 5.2.
5.5.1 Basics of the SM Game
The SM problem is a bipartite matching problem with two-sided preferences. The final result
of the SM matching consists of man-woman pairs. The stability definition for the SM instance is
provided in Definition 5.1.
Definition 5.1. Let I be an instance of SM, andM be a matching in I . A pair (mi, wj) blocks M ,
or is a blocking pair of M , if the following conditions are satisfied relative to M :
(1) mi is unassigned or prefers wj toM(mi);
(2) wj is unassigned or prefers mi toM(wj).
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Figure 5.2: Matching Implementations
M is said to be stable if it admits no blocking pair.
M(x) refers to the partner of x inM, and x can be either a man or a woman.
We assume the CUs to be men and the UUs to be women. Then, as the pre-procedure of any
matching algorithm, we first establish each player’s preference list. With the channel sensing results
from both CUs and Wi-Fi APs, the CUs and UUs can set up their preference lists. The preference
of a CU cui, cui ∈ CU over its neighboring UUs uuj , uuj ∈ UU is based on cui’s achievable trans-
mission rate when sharing uuj’s unlicensed spectrum fj . Notice that each unlicensed band could
be shared within multiple UUs as long as these UUs satisfy the unlicensed transmission regulation.
Thus, each unlicensed band can also be shared within multiple CUs, which brings the co-channel
interference between CUs. However, before the CUs join any unlicensed spectrum, they have no
idea of the other coexisting CUs. Thus, the preference of cui over uuj at time t is simply assumed
to be cui’s transmission rate when only itself is sharing fj with uuj , and is represented as
PLCUi,j (t) = fj log(1 + ΓCUi,j (t)). (5.10)
On the other hand, the preferences of uuj over cui at time t is based on uuj’s achievable
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transmission rate when sharing spectrum with cui, which is shown as
PLUUj,i (t) = fj log(1 + ΓUUj,i (t)). (5.11)
5.5.2 Time-Independent Implementation
5.5.2.1 The GS Algorithm
A stable matching is always guaranteed by using the GS algorithm for the SM game, which is
stated in Theorem 5.2 [3].
Theorem 5.2. Given an instance of SM, the GS algorithm constructs in O(m) time, the unique
man-optimal stable matching, where m is the number of acceptable man-woman pairs.
The GS algorithm consists of sequential proposing and accepting/rejecting actions. Each
iteration starts with the men proposing to the most favorite women on their current preference lists.
After proposing, the women being proposed to will be removed from the men’ preference lists.
Then the women decide whether to accept or reject the proposals they’ve received so far. If the
cumulative proposals exceed the capacity 1, each woman chooses to keep the man that she favors
most, and rejects the rest. This proposing and accepting/rejecting iteration continues until all the
men are matched or all men’s preferences are empty. The convergence of the GS algorithm is
provided in [28]. The implementation details of the modified GS algorithm for the LTE-Unlicensed
can be found in Algorithm 5.1.
5.5.2.2 Eliminating the External Effect
For the conventional SM game, a stable matching is guaranteed using the GS algorithm. How-
ever, this conclusion is only correct under the canonical matching assumption. In this problem, there
exists the external effect, which refers to the inter-dependence of players’ preferences. For example,
if too many CUs are matched to the same unlicensed band, then each of them will be assigned a
smaller share (by TDMA) than they have expected, in which case some CUs may have the incentive
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Algorithm 5.1 Man-oriented GS (GS) Algorithm
Input:CU , UU , PLCU (t), PLUU (t), q
Output:MatchingM(t)
Construct the set of unmatched CUun, set CUun = CU ;
while CUun 6= ∅ and PLCU 6= ∅ do
CUs proposal to UUs;
for all cui ∈ CUun do
Propose to the first UU it in its preference list uuj , and remove uuj from PLUU ;
end for
UUs make decisions;
for all uuj ∈ UU do
if uuj has received proposals no more than 1 then
uuj keeps the proposal, and remove this CU from CUun;
else
uuj keeps the most preferred proposal, and rejects the rest;
Remove this favorite CU from the CUun, and add the rejected CUs into the CUun;
end if
end for
end while
to switch to other unlicensed bands with fewer CUs assigned. In addition, each CU is only admitted
by its matched UU, but are not necessarily acceptable to the other existing UUs on this unlicensed
band, thus making this matching pair no longer valid.
In order to eliminate such externalities, we propose the ICC strategy to validate and re-
stabilize the matching. As the first step, the invalid sharing pairs should be removed. This operation
is conducted by the eNBs by informing the related CU and UU to removing each other from their
preference lists. The next step is to re-stabilize the matching. Pay attention that, since the UUs rep-
resented by the eNBs, and thus, the matching is designed for the benefit of the CUs. As long as the
unlicensed transmission regulation is meet, the allocation strategy should focus on how to further
improve CUs’ performances. Therefore, at this time point, the external effect can be evaluated from
the CUs’ perspective. In other words, it becomes a one-sided “stability” problem. The new “stabil-
ity”, different from Definition 5.1, relies on the equilibrium among all CUs. We call this one-sided
“stability” as the “Pareto Optimality” in matching theory [3]. The definition of Pareto optimal is
provided as follows.
Definition 5.3. Pareto Optimal: A matching is said to be Pareto Optimal if there is no other match-
ing in which some player (i.e., CU) is better off, whilst no player is worse off.
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Accordingly, we provide the new definition of the BP for the one-sided matching problems in
Definition 5.4.
Definition 5.4. BP in the one-sided matching: A CU pair (cui, cuj) is defined as a BP, if both cui
and cuj are better off after exchanging their partners.
The basic idea of ICC is described as follows. First, we remove all invalid (CU, UU) pairs.
Secondly, we begin to search all the “unstable” CU-CU pairs regarding the current matching. Then,
we try to check whether the partner switch between such a pair is allowed (beneficial to related CUs)
or not. For all the BPs that are allowed to switch their partners, we find the pair that provides the
greatest throughput improvement, and let them switch partners. We keep searching such “unstable”
pairs until we reach a trade-in-free environment. The detailed ICC algorithm is stated in Algorithm
5.2.
Algorithm 5.2 Inter-Channel Cooperation (ICC) Strategy
Input: Existing matchingM, updated preference lists PLCU (t) w.r.t.M;
Output: Stable matchingM′.
1: M′ =M;
2: Remove all invalid (CU, UU) pairs;
3: whileM′ is not Pareto optimal do
4: Search the set of “unstable” CU-CU pairs BP(t) based on PLCU (t);
5: for all (cui1, cui2) ∈ BP(t) do
6: if ∃cu ∈M′(uuk1j1) ∪M′(uuk2j2), ∆U(cu) < 0 then
7: (cui1, cui2) are not allowed to exchange partners;
8: else
9: (cui1, cui2) are allowed to exchange partners;
10: end if
11: end for
12: Find the optimal BP (cu∗i1, cu
∗
i2);
13: cu∗i1 and cu
∗
i2 switch partners;
14: M′ ←M′/{(cu∗i1,M′(cu∗i1)), (cu∗i2,M′(cu∗i2))};
15: M′ ←M′ ∪ {(cu∗i1,M′(cu∗i2)), (cu∗i2,M′(cu∗i1))};
16: Update PLCU (t) based onM′;
17: end while
In Algorithm 5.2, we transform the current matching M (i.e., M(t) generated by GS) into
M′. We defineM(cui1) = uuj1,M(cui2) = vuj2. The utility of cui is represented as U(cui) =
fj log(1 + Γ
CU
i,j ), and ∆U(cui) = U(cui)
′ − U(cui), where U(cui)′ is the utility after exchanging
partner with another CU. The optimal BP is defined in (5.12).
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(cu∗i1, cu
∗
i2) = argmax
(cui1,cui2)
∑
cui1∈Mt(uuj1)
∆U(cui1) +
∑
cui2∈Mt(uuj2)
∆U(cui2), (5.12)
where (cui1, cui2) is allowed to exchange partners. The convergence of ICC is guaranteed by
the irreversibility of each switch. The dynamic stability, under the time-related implementation,
is reached by adopting the GS-ICC algorithm repeatedly for each time slot.
5.5.3 Time-Dependent Implementation
Although we can use the GS-ICC method repeatedly in each time slot to find the dynamic
stability, it is not computationally efficient to do so. Let’s consider the case, where the network
conditions vary very slightly for two adjacent time slots. In other words, only a small number of
users’ preferences are changed. Under such small network variation, the stable matching result also
only varies very slightly and the change only involves a small number of players. Thus, instead
of redoing the whole matching, we can utilize the relations between the two matchings, and try
to transform the previous matching into stable again. Thus, we propose the RPTS algorithm, also
called the Roth Vanda-Vate (RVV) Algorithm [84]. The basic idea of the RPTS algorithm is to use
divorce and remarry operations to transform a random matching into stable again.
As shown in Algorithm 5.3, the RPTS algorithm starts from an initial matching M0, which is
the matchingM(t− 1) from the previous time slot t− 1 1. Each loop of the RPTS algortihm comes
with a matching Mi, and it finally terminates with a stable matching. A set A is utilized during
the iterations of the RPTS algorithm, which is initially empty. Mi|A denotesMi ∩ (A × A), and
I|A denotes the sub-instance of I obtained by deleting every member of (CU ∪ UU)/A, including
the preference lists. The RPTS iterates as long asMi is not stable in I . During each iteration, if
there’s a BP (ai, bj) such that ai /∈ A and bj ∈ A, the procedure add is called with parameter ai.
Otherwise, the satisfy procedure is called with parameters ai and bj (ai /∈ A, bj /∈ A). Notice that
ai can be either a man or a woman. The two procedures add and satisfy are executed to ensure: 1)
no member of A is assigned inMi to a member outside of A; 2)Mi|A is stable in I|A.
1We assume the initial matchingM0 to be empty.
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In the add procedure, ai is either a man or a woman, which doesn’t belong to A. Our task is
to ensure that upon the arrival of ai, the matching can be restablized andMi|A is also stable in I|A.
We start by divorcing the pair (ai,Mi(ai)) if ai is assigned in Mi, and then add ai to the set A.
If ai, as the current proposer, is a blocking agent (i.e., involved in a blocking pair) in (I|A,Mi|A),
we search ai’s best blocking pair (ai, bi) in (I|A,Mi|A). This bi must belong to A, and will be
divorced from its current partnerMi(bi) if it is currently assigned. Then thisMi(bi) becomes the
next proposer, and we can add the pair (ai, bi) into Mi. The while loop continues as long as the
current proposer is a blocking agent in (I|A,Mi|A).
In the satisfy procedure, ai /∈ A and bj ∈ A. We assume ai and bj to be mi and wj , re-
spectively. Our task is to satisfy both mi and wj . We start by adding mi and wj to A. If mi/wj is
assigned inMi, we divorce it from its partnerMi(mi)/Mi(wj). Their partners (if any) will remain
unassigned. Then we add this BP (mi, wj) toMi.
Algorithm 5.3 Random Path To Statbility (RPTS) Algorithm
Input: Stable matchingM(t− 1) in the previous time t− 1
Output: Stable matchingM(t) at time t
1: Initialization:
2: Mi =M(t− 1), A = ∅;
3: whileM(t) is not stable in I do
4: if There exists (ai, bj) ∈ bp(I,Mi) such that ai /∈ A, and bj ∈ A then
5: add ai;
6: else
7: choose (mi, wj) ∈ bp(I,Mi);
8: satisfy (mi, wj);
9: end if
10: end while
11: M(t) =Mi
The dynamic stability, under the time-dependent implementation, is reached by adopting the
RPTS-ICC algorithm iteratively. Regarding the convergence of the RPTS mechanism in the SM
model, a conclusion is stated in Theorem 5.5 [84], and the proof is provided as follows.
Theorem 5.5. LetM0 be an arbitrary matching for an SM instance I with N men and M women.
Then there exists a finite sequence of matchings M0, ...,Ms, where Ms is stable, and for each
1 ≤ i ≤ s,Mi is obtained fromMi−1 by satisfying a blocking pair ofMi−1. Moreover,Ms can
be obtained in O((N +M)m) time, where m is the number of acceptable man-woman pairs in I .
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Algorithm 5.4 add procedure for RPTS algorithm
Input: ai,Mi
Output: A,Mi
1: if ai is assigned inMi then
2: Mi =Mi/{(ai,Mi(ai))};
3: end if
4: A = A ∪ {ai};
5: while ai is blocking agent in (I|A,Mi|A) do
6: ai is the proposer;
7: (ai, bi)
.
= bestbp(I|A,Mi|A, ai);
8: az
.
= ai;
9: if bi is assigned inMi then
10: Mi =Mi/{(Mi(bi), bi)};
11: ai =Mi(bi);
12: end if
13: Mi =Mi ∪ {(az, bi)};
14: end while
Algorithm 5.5 satisfy procedure for RPTS algorithm
Input: (mi, wj),Mi
Output: A,Mi
1: A = A ∪ {(mi, wj)};
2: if mi is assigned inMi then
3: Mi =Mi/{(mi,Mi(mi))};
4: end if
5: if wj is assigned inMi then
6: Mi =Mi/{(Mi(wj), wj)};
7: end if
8: Mi =Mi ∪ {(mi, wj)};
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Proof. During each iteration of the RPTS algorithm, A increases in size by either one (add proce-
dure) or two elements (satisfy procedure). At the end of each such iteration, we haveMi|A stable
in I|A. Hence we are bound to ultimately reach the outcome thatMs is stable (when A reaches the
size of (N +M), in which case the RPTS algorithm terminates.
The complexity of the RPTS algorithm is obtained by observing that A increases in size one
or two element(s) at each iteration. Since |A| ≤ (N +M), it follows that the same upper bound that
applies to the number of iterations of the RPTS algorithm. Each proposal-rejection sequence during
an execution of the add procedure, at mostm pair of agents are involved. Thus, each iteration of add
runs in O(m) time. While each call of the satisfy procedure takes O(1) time (no while loop inside).
Thus, the overall computation complexity of finding a stable matching is O((N +M)m).
5.6 Performance Evaluation
5.6.1 Complexity Analysis
The primary difference between the GS algorithm and the RPTS algorithm lies in their adapt-
abilities to network dynamics. Each time, the GS algorithm starts from an empty matching and by
using the propose/reject operations to reach a stable matching. The RPTS algorithm begins with
the matching from the previous time slot and takes the divorce/remarry operations to find its path
to stability. The computation complexities or say iteration times for both algorithms depend on the
number of users and how fast the network changes.
As provided in Section 5.5.2, the complexity of GS is O(m), where m is the total length
of all players’ preference lists. It makes sense since the worst case of the GS is to traverse each
player’s preference lists and terminate. On the other hand, the computation complexity of the RPTS
algorithm is O((N + M)m, as indicated in Theorem 5.5. Again, it is not necessary for the RPTS
algorithms to satisfy every possible BP to reach the stability. Regarding the ICC algorithm, it is
realized by the iterative search of the currently best BP and the swapping of their partners. The
complexity of finding all the BPs regarding the current matching, which requires the traverse of
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all users’ preference lists, is bounded by MN comparing operations. Since each swap in ICC is
irreversible, meaning any two CUs can only swap partners with each other no more than once,
the total iterations are bounded by N2. Thus, the worst case complexity of the ICC algorithm is
O(MN ×N2) or denoted as O(N3M). However, the actual computation cost is not necessarily as
high as shown in the theoretical analysis.
Theoretically, the RPTS algorithm has a higher complexity than the GS algorithm. However,
we should not ignore the piratical implementation. In practice, the actual complexity depends on
many complicated network factors, such as the user velocity, network density and so on. To best
evaluate the complexities of the matching algorithms in the LTE-unlicensed problem, we measure
the complexity by counting the number of new (CU,UU) connections that are attempted to be set
up during the matching. These new connections are not necessarily the final stable connections,
since during the matching a partnership may break up later. However, building such a potential
connection requires the exchange of information through the communication between the two user
ends of the link. As we know, the communication overhead is a big concern in protocol/mechanism
design regarding both cost and time efficiency. Thus, measuring the number of potential links that
are set up during the matching is a reasonable assumption for the complexity cost in the practical
implementations.
5.6.2 Experimental results
We first analyze the impact of the network dynamics on the resource allocations. Fig. 5.3,
Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5 evaluate the time dynamic performances of the proposed GS, RPTS and ICC
algorithms, w.r.t. the computation complexity, matching update ratio, and system throughput.
The complexity of the three proposed algorithms are evaluated under the RWP and the HotSpot
patterns in Fig. 5.3a and Fig. 5.4a, respectively. Apparently, the RPTS algorithm achieves a much
lower complexity than the GS algorithm in both mobility models. Although the theoretical analysis
indicates that the RPTS algorithm has higher complexity than the GS algorithm in the worst case,
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Figure 5.3: Time dynamics in the RWP mobility model.
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Figure 5.4: Time dynamics in the HotSpot mobility model.
the practical computation cost can be different. For the starting point, it’s reasonable that the RPTS
algorithm has a relatively high cost than the other time slots, but still lower than the GS algorithm,
since the initial matching is empty. Comparing the two curves of the ICC algorithm in both Fig. 5.3a
and Fig. 5.4a, we can see that they achieve similar results in both mobility models. In addition, we
can find from both figures that it averagely takes 8 swaps to re-stabilize the matching using the ICC
algorithm. In the HotSpot model, the complexities for all the three algorithms slowly decrease as
time evolves. This is reasonable since in the HotSpot model CUs are gathering toward the event
point (faster than UUs) and thus fewer CUs are matched as time evolves.
In Fig. 5.3b and 5.4b, we have evaluated both the user matching ratio and the matching
update ratio. The user matching ratio represents the percentage of CUs who are allocated with the
unlicensed bands. As indicated in both figures, the GS algorithm and the RPTS algorithm achieve
75
0 5 10 15
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Simulation time slots
Sy
st
em
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 
 
Original
Random
GS
RPTS
GS−ICC
RPTS−ICC
(a) RWP model.
0 5 10 15
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Simulation time slots
Sy
st
em
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 
 
Original
Random
GS
RPTS
GS−ICC
RPTS−ICC
(b) HotSpot model.
Figure 5.5: Average system throughput comparison.
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Figure 5.6: System throughput comparison with optimal solution.
similar matching ratios, which are both as high as 75% in the RWP model and 70% in the HotSpot
model, averagely. The matching update ratio represents the percentage of partnerships changed in
the next simulation time slot. Again, both algorithms achieve similar performances, which are both
around 30% averagely. The update ratios at the starting point for both algorithms reach 100% since
we assume to start with an empty matching.
For the throughput performance, we compare the GS and RPTS algorithms, with five other
methods: the GS-ICC method, the RPTS-ICC method, the Random method, the Original method
and the Optimal method. The GS-ICC and RPTS-ICC methods refer to the cases that the ICC
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Figure 5.7: CU density dynamics in RWP&HotSpot mobility model.
algorithm is used after the GS and RPTS algorithms, respectively. The Random method refers
to randomly allocating the unlicensed resources to the CUs, while the Original method refers to the
case that no spectrum sharing happens. In the RWP model, as shown in Fig. 5.5a, the average system
throughput is evaluated. Apparently, the four matching-based methods outperform the Random and
Original methods a lot. The GS and RPTS methods achieve similar performances. Apparently, after
using the ICC procedure, the system throughput is further improved with either the GS or the RPTS
algorithm. More specifically, the average system throughput achieved by the GS-ICC method or the
RPTS-ICC method is about 86% higher than the Original method, and about 53% higher than the
Random method. In addition, we have also compared the performance of the proposed methods with
the optimal solution in Fig. 5.6. The optimal result is achieved by using the brute force approach,
which is very time-consuming. Thus, the number of CUs and UUs are set as N = 4 and M = 4,
B1 = 2, and B2 = 2. As shown in Fig. 5.6, both the RPTS-ICC method and the GS-ICC method
can achieve about 75% of the optimal result regarding the system throughput.
Except the time dynamic analysis, we have also evaluated the impact of network density and
user velocity to the resource allocations. As shown in Fig. , we change the network density by
adding more users, including both CUs and UUs, into the network without adding any eNB, Wi-
Fi AP, or unlicensed band. We add 5 CUs and 5 UUs to the network each time by starting from
N = M = 20 and stop when N = M = 65. The number of unlicensed bands is set as K = 30.
As shown in Fig. 5.7a, the complexity of the GS, RPTS and ICC algorithms all increase as more
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Figure 5.8: CU velocity dynamics in RWP&HotSpot mobility model.
users join the network. In addition, the complexity of the GS algorithm grows faster than the RPTS
method, which demonstrates the good scalability of the RPTS algorithm. For the system throughput,
as shown in Fig. 5.7b, the peak value is achieved when each unlicensed band accommodates exactly
one CU. When more CUs join the network after this point, the unlicensed bands will be shared
between multiple CUs by using TDMA.
We also change the maximum velocity value in both mobility models to test our proposed
algorithms. As shown in Fig. 5.8, we increase the CU’s maximum velocity (identical for all CUs)
from 20 m/s to 60 m/s by 5 m/s. Apparently, the velocity changes do not necessarily have any impact
on the computation complexity or the system throughput.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the dynamic resource allocation problem in the LTE-Unlicensed.
The SM matching model has well interpreted the two-sided feature of the resource allocation prob-
lem. The proposed GS and RPTS algorithms provide near-optimal system throughput, and both
methods can guarantee the QoS requirements and network stability. Especially, the RPTS algorithm
achieves lower computation complexity than the GS algorithm. In other words, the RPTS algorithm
is more adaptable than the GS algorithm under network dynamics in providing dynamic stability in
the LTE-unlicensed.
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Chapter 6
Exploiting the Stable Fixture Matching Game for Content
Sharing in D2D-based LTE-V2X Communications
The study item: “Feasibility Study on LTE-based V2X Services”, approved at 3GPP TSG
RAN #68, has drawn much attention in the study of the LTE assisted vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications in the vehicular networks. By deploying the D2D
technology adopted in the traditional cellular networks into the V2X communications (including
both the V2V and V2I communications), performance improvements can be expected, such as bet-
ter reliability, lower latency, and more efficient content sharing. This chapter investigates the content
sharing problem in the D2D-based V2X communications. With both vehicles and eNBs carrying
different types of data, this chapter studies how to optimize the information exchanged within the
network. By jointly considering the data diversity and the communication link quality, the interac-
tions between the vehicles/eNBs are modeled as the stable fixture (SF) matching game. Different
from the traditional D2D communications, we allow vehicles.eNBs to set up multiple link connec-
tions for to further optimize the content sharing in the Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). The
SF game is solved by the proposed Irving’s stable fixture (ISF) algorithm.
6.1 Introduction
The technology of the connected vehicles has been envisioned as a paradigm capable of pro-
viding increased convenience to drivers, with applications ranging from road safety to traffic effi-
ciency. In the traditional IEEE 802.11p based vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, reliable
and efficient performance cannot be guaranteed since 802.11p is CSMA/CA based. Besides, the high
cost of deploying roadside units (RSUs) cannot be ignored. Thus, the concept of integrating LTE
into the V2X communications has been proposed, which is commonly referred to as the LTE-V [16]
or the LTE-based V2X [17]. The objectives of the study on LTE V2X communications include the
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definition of an evaluation methodology and the possible scenarios for vehicular applications, and
the identification of necessary enhancements to the LTE physical layer, protocols, and interfaces. So
far, 3GPP has defined 18 use cases in TR 22.885 for the LTE-based V2X services, such as Case 5.1:
Forward collision warning, Case 5.8: Road safety services, Case 5.9: Automatic parking system,
and so on [18].
The LTE-based V2X technology allows low-cost and rapid deployment in the Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS) compared with other solutions, since it can fully utilize the existing
cellular base stations. LTE, as the currently most advanced wireless communication technology,
features low-latency and high-reliability communications. Thus, the LTE-based V2X communica-
tions are perfect for some safety-critical VANET applications. Despite the above-mentioned advan-
tages of LTE-V, this technology is also facing some challenges, for example, the cellular spectrum
allocation, the network architecture design and so on.
The D2D communication technology has already paved the way for the LTE-V. Thus, if im-
plementing the D2D-based LTE-V, the advantages of D2D communications, such as improving the
spectrum efficiency, and extending the network coverage, can also be extended to the V2X commu-
nications. In fact, there have been some existing works on the D2D-based V2X communications.
For example, in [85], the resource allocation for the D2D-based V2X communications is discussed.
They addressed the latency and reliability issues by restricting the outage probability to be lower
than a threshold, and solved the social welfare optimization problem using the heuristic RBSPA
algorithm. The simulations proved the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. To think one step
further, if we allow each vehicle to be able to connect to multiple vehicles, then we may further
increase the network capacity. In fact, the restriction of only one radio interface equipped for each
traditional cellular user (e.g., cellphone), due to the size and energy issues, is no longer a problem
in the VANETs, since vehicles are relatively abundant in space and energy for carrying more ra-
dio interfaces. In addition, in [85], only the transmission rate is evaluated regarding the network
performance. However, the information value received by each vehicle through the data exchange
is another important factor that should be considered in various V2X communication applications,
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other than the pure transmission rate.
For the content sharing purpose, typically the cluster formation method is adopted in the
VANETs. Clusters are formed within multiple vehicles, and a cluster head (CH) is selected to be
responsible for all management and cooperation work of all the ordinary nodes (ONs) within the
cluster. For example, in [86], the content sharing framework between the RSUs and the vehicles is
formed by using the cooperative coalition formation game among the RSUs. In [86], the RSU acts as
the CH, and estimates its utility based on the vehicles currently associated with it. Thus, any vehicle
requiring information update has to go through the RSU, which may result in traffic congestion when
communicating with the CH. In addition, ONs (i.e., vehicles) may lack the flexibility of setting up
connections with any other node who may carry their interested information.
Motivated by the above reasons, we try to model the content sharing problem using a flexi-
ble many-to-many matching framework. The high complexity and the global information require-
ment have made the traditional centralized optimization less efficient in the high-density and high-
mobility VANETs. Thus, in this chapter, we propose a matching-based approach to solve the content
sharing problem in the V2X communications, and the major contributions are summarized as fol-
lows [87].
1) Different from the traditional D2D communications, our proposed V2X framework allows
multiple connections for each vehicle. This further improves the network performance compared
with the one-to-one communication case.
2) We introduce the weight factor for different data types to measure the data value. By
jointly considering the data weight and communication link quality, we can improve the information
diversity that circulated within the network, while achieving good throughput performance.
3) We model the content sharing problem as the SF game, where each node can set up multiple
independent links with other nodes. Such V2X links are more flexible than the many-to-many
relationships formed using the traditional clustering method. We solve the SF game by using the ISF
algorithm, which can provide comparable performance with the centralized optimization approach.
81
eNB 
RSU 
V2I 
V2V 
OBU 
Figure 6.1: The V2X communication network model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The system model is described in Sec. 6.2,
and we formulate the content sharing problem as a constrained optimization problem. The SF game
is proposed to model the many-to-many relationships between vehicles, and the ISF algorithm is
introduced to find a stable solution in Sec. 6.4. The performance of the proposed ISF algorithm is
evaluated in Sec. 6.5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. 6.6.
6.2 System Model
Consider a VANET, as shown in Fig.6.1, where vehicles can communicate with either its
neighboring vehicles, RSUs or eNBs through the cellular communications to receive the lasted infor-
mation. We denote the set of vehicles as V = {v1, ..., vi, ..., vN}. For representation consistency, we
use the set of eNBs BS = {bs1, ..., bsi, ..., bsM} to denote both RSUs and eNBs, since they perform
similar functionalities here. We assume that each vehicle is originally carrying a certain amount of
data in various data types, for example, the entertainment information, the accident information, the
road maintenance information and so on. We denote the data type set as D = {d1, ..., dj , ..., dK},
where K is the number of all the data types. Thus, the set of data carried by vehicle vi can be repre-
sented as Qi = {qi1, ..., qij , ...qiK}, where qij is the amount of data in type dj carried by vi. A content
sharing happens when any two vehicles (one vehicle and one eNB) set up a direct link connection,
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referred to as the V2V link (V2I link). Since eNBs also exchange information with vehicles, from
now on for simplicity, we denote the joint set of V and BS as N = {n1, ..., ni, ...nN+M}. We use
the term node to represent either a vehicle or an eNB. Different data types are in different weights
depending on the receiver nodes regarding their current interests. In other words, the data carried
by any node means different values to different receivers. Thus, each node ni defines a positive
weight value for each data type, denoted as WTi = {wt1, ..., wtj , ..., wtK}. Thus, the total in-
formation value that ni receives from n′i can be represented as vali,i′ =
∑
wtj∈WTi wtjq
i′
j , where
ni, n
′
i ∈ N , i 6= i′. The eNBs typically carry more data than the vehicles.
By the direct communication set up between any two nodes, the exchanged information can
improve the nodes’ knowledge of the current network. To quantify the exchanged information value
within the whole network, we first need to define the communication link matrix for all the nodes.
We denote the matrix as ρ = {ρi,j |ni, nj ∈ N}, where ρi,j is a binary value in {0, 1}, representing
if there is a communication link set up between ni and nj . We allow each node to be connected to
more than one nodes up to its capacity, which is defined by the number of radio interfaces equipped
in each node, denoted as ci, ni ∈ N .
6.2.1 System Requirements
6.2.1.1 Latency requirement
For safety-critical V2X services, there is usually a latency requirement. In the cellular com-
munication, we can use SINR as the latency metric. To satisfy the latency requirement for each node,
we require its received SINR from any other potential node to be higher than a threshold γmin. We
assume that each node pair (ni, nj) is assigned two subbands fi,j and fj,i for information exchange.
In fi,j and fj,i, the noise and interference powers are denoted as σi,j and σi,j , respectively. Thus,
the latency requirement for each link fi,j , ni 6= nj can be satisfied using the following inequality:
γj,i = ρj,i
pj,igj,i
σ2j,i
≥ γmin, (6.1)
where γj,i represents ni’s received SINR from node nj , for ni, nj ∈ N , i 6= j.
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6.2.1.2 Capacity requirement
Except for the transmission quality requirement, each node should also satisfy the capacity
requirement. The capacity requirement for each node ni, ni ∈ N is shown as follows:
∑
nj∈N
ρi,j ≤ ci. (6.2)
6.2.2 User Uitlity
When deciding who to exchange information with, each node concerns about not only the
information value carried by the potential partner, but also the communication link quality between
them. In other words, on one hand, nodes hope to communicate with the nodes with higher infor-
mation value. Besides, they also hope to set up good communication links so that more data can be
received during a fixed communication period T . The received transmission rate of ni from nj , is
represented as
rj,i = fj,i log
(
1 +
pj,igj,i
σ2j,i
)
, (6.3)
where pj,i and gj,i denote the transmission power and channel propagation gain from nj to ni,
respectively. gj,i = kpβj,iζj,id−αj,i , where kp is a constant system parameter, βj,i is the fast fading
gain, ζj,i is the slowing fading gain, α is the path loss exponent, and dj,i is the distance between ni
and nj . fj,i is the subband assigned for transmission from nj to ni. σj,i is the channel noise of band
fj,i.
Each node can set up multiple V2X links with other nodes up to its capacity. Thus, to measure
the overall content sharing, each user’s utility ui is defined as the total information value it gains
from all of its V2X links during the communication period T . Given the communication matrix ρ,
the the utility for each vehicle ni, i ∈ N is represented as
ui =
∑
nj∈N
ρi,j · T · ri,j · vali,j , (6.4)
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where T is the transmission period, and vali,j is the information value that ni can receive from nj .
The utilities of all the vehicles can be represented as the set U = {ui|vi ∈ V}.
6.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we provide the problem formulation of the content sharing problem. The
objective is to maximize the social welfare, which is the summation of all vehicles’ received infor-
mation value during the communication period T . The optimization problem is subject to the system
QoS requirements. Based on the above discussions, the problem is formulated as follows.
max:
ρi,j
∑
vi∈V
∑
nj∈N
ρi,j · T · ri,j · vali,j , (6.5)
s.t.:
γj,i = ρi,j
pj,igj,i
σ2j,i
≥ γmin, (6.6)
∑
nj∈N
ρi,j ≤ ci, ∀ni ∈ N , and (6.7)
ρi,j = 0,∀i = j. (6.8)
(6.5) is the system objective that maximizes all vehicles’ utilities. (6.6) represents SINR requirement
for each node, while (6.7) indicates the capacity requirement of each node. (6.8) states that if any
node cannot be assigned to itself as a V2X link.
The formulated problem is an MILP problem, which is NP-hard to solve in general [53].
The centralized solution typically requires the global information, and the complexity increases
exponentially with the increase of the user number. In addition, in the V2X communications, nodes
are in movement, and the channel conditions change as well. Thus it becomes hard to collect the
global information from all the nodes to do the optimization in a real-time manner. Thus it motivates
us to find a distributive approach where each vehicle can make local decisions rapidly. We introduce
the matching-based approach in the following sections.
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6.4 Matching-based Approach
In this section, we solve the V2X communication problem by modeling it as the SF game.
We start by introducing some basic definitions of the SF game in Section 6.4.1 and then propose a
distributive matching algorithm to solve the SF model in Section 6.4.2.
6.4.1 Stable Fixture Game
The SF problem stems from a practical situation, where players play against one another in
a chess tournament. Each player ranks their potential opponents in order of preferences. The task
is to construct a set of fixtures, consisting of distinct matched pairs (each involving two players,
and each player can be involved in more than one match but cannot exceed its capacity), which is
stable [88]. In the chess tournament, each competition happens independently. In other words, if
player a plays with b first, then plays with c, then player b and c are not required to be involved in
the same competition. Just like the many-to-many relationships in the chess tournament, in the V2X
communications each node can set up multiple independent communications with other nodes up to
its capacity.
Assume an SF instance consisting of a single set of players A = {a1, ..., an}, where n is the
number of all players/agents. Each player first set up a list containing all the other acceptable agents.
Then each agent ranks its acceptable list of the acceptable agents according to its preferences, and
this list is called the preference list. The matching decisions are made based on the preference lists.
A matching M in a SF instance is defined as a subset of E, where E = {(ai, aj)|ai, aj ∈ A, i 6= j}.
We denote aj = M(ai) if pair (ai, aj) is in the matching M . The formal definition of a stable
matching in the SF model is provided in Definition 6.1:
Definition 6.1. Stability: Let I be an instance of SF and M be a matching in I . A pair (ai, aj) ∈
E/M blocks M , if the following conditions are satisfied relative to M :
(1) ai is under subscribed or prefers aj to its worst partner;
(2) aj is under subscribed or prefers ai to its worst partner.
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A matching M is said to be stable if it admits no BP.
To model the V2X communications as the SF game, we assume the nodes (including both
vehicle and eNBs) to be the chess players. Each node first search for its acceptable set of nodes,
who can satisfy the SINR requirement. Then the preference value is calculated based on the received
information value during the communication period from its acceptable partner. We represent the
preferences of node ni over its acceptable set A(ni) as
PLi(j) = T · ri,j · vali,j ,∀nj ∈ A(ni). (6.9)
6.4.2 ISF Algorithm
In this section, we introduce the ISF algorithm to solve the SF game. The existence and
convergence of the ISF algorithm are stated in Theorem 6.2, and the proof can be found in [88].
Theorem 6.2. Given an instance of SF, the ISF algorithm constructs in O(m) time, a stable match-
ing, or reports that no stable matching exists, where m is the total length of all players’ preference
lists.
The key idea of ISF is the reduction of players’ preference lists PL = {PL1, ..., PLN+M}
and the construction of a player set S. This set S consists of order player pairs, which is initially
empty, and will be symmetric finally, in which case it reaches the stable matching. There are two
cases in which a stable matching does not exist: (1)
∑
i di is odd, (2) there’s short list in PL during
the execution of the ISF algorithm. di is the player’s degree, and will be defined later. The step-to-
step implementation of the ISF algorithm is provided in Algorithm 6.1.
The ISF algorithm consists of two phases. Phase 1 involves a sequence of bids from one
node to another. These bids enable the construction of the player set S and the reduction of the
preference lists PL. To start with, each node ni bids for its most favorite node who is currently
not in Ai, and denote it as nj . We denote ni’s target set and bidder set as Ai and Bi, respectively.
Ai = {nj |(ni, nj) ∈ S}, Bi = {nj |(nj , ni) ∈ S}, and ai = |Ai|, bi = |Bi|. Then, we construct
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Algorithm 6.1 ISF Algorithm
Input:N , c, PL, S = ∅
Output:Stable MatchingM
1: Phase 1:
2: while ai < min(ci, |PLi|) do
3: nj = the first player in PLi who is not in Ai;
4: S = S ∪ {(ni, nj)};
5: if bj ≥ cj then
6: nk = cj th ranked bidder for nj ;
7: for all successor nl of nk in PLj do
8: if (nl, nj) ∈ S then
9: S = S/{(nl, nj)}
10: delete (nl, nj) from PL;
11: end if
12: end for
13: end if
14: end while
15: Phase 2:
16: if
∑
i di is odd then
17: report instance unsolvable;
18: else
19: while there’s no short list in PL do
20: find a rotation ρ in PL;
21: PL = PL/ρ;
22: if some list in PL is short then
23: report instance unsolvable;
24: else
25: S = S(PL);
26: end if
27: end while
28: M = S;
29: end if
30: End of algorithm.
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Figure 6.2: System social welfare.
S by adding the pair ({(ni, nj)}) into it. Notice that all the pairs in S are ordered, which means
({(ni, nj)}) and ({(nj , ni)}) are different in S. Then for the target node nj , it checks whether its
received bids has exceeded its capacity cj . If yes, it deletes the bids who are worse than the cj’s
rank in PLj . By the deletion of a pair {(ni, jj)} from PL, we mean the removal of ni from PLj
and the removal of nj from PLi. The bid of ni continues as long as ai < min(ci, |PLi|). Phase 1
terminates when each node’s target set size has reached min(ci, |PLi|).
After the Phase 1, we have achieved a reduced preference list PL and a constructed set S. We
define di as min(ci, |PL1i |), which is the degree of ni. To start Phase 2, we first check if
∑
i di is
odd, if yes then we report this instance is unsolvable, otherwise we continue. The key idea of Phase 2
is the further construction of S, and the further reduction of PL. We classify all players’ preference
lists into the short lists and the long lists. We call PLi short if |PLi| < di, and long if |PLi| > di.
During any time of the execution, if any node has a short list, then no stable matching exists. While
no short list occurs, we try to find a rotation first, which is the key to the further reduce PL. A
rotation is defined as a sequence of ordered pairs ρ = ((ni0 , nj0), (ni1 , nj1), ..., (nir−1 , njr−1)),
where for each 0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1, nik = nl(jk) and njk+1 = nf(xik ). xl(i) is the last player in PLi,
and xf(i) is the first player in PLi who is not in Ai. To find a rotation, we begin by any node who
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Figure 6.3: Average vehicle performance.
has a long list, and set it as nj0 . Then by the relations between nik , nl(jk) and nl(jk+1), we can
start building the rotation ρ. The building process stops when any node is visited twice, and then
we claim a rotation is found. To eliminate ρ from PL, we delete all the pairs (njk , nl), such that
njk prefers ng(jk) to nl, where ng(jk) is the least favored member of njk in {Bjk ∪ nik−1}/{nik}.
The finding and eliminating rotation process terminates, whenever any short list occurs or when no
rotation can be found, meaning that we have reached a stable matching.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the performance of the proposed ISF algorithm will be evaluated by comparing
with both the centralized optimization and four other heuristic mechanisms. Both the social welfare
and the average user performance will be analyzed. In addition, the network connection ratio and
the existence of stable results will also be evaluated.
6.5.1 Simulation Set Up
Within a circle VANET with radius of R = 800 m, we assume N = [0, 200] vehicles and
M = 8 eNBs. The channel bandwidth that allocated to each communication link is set as 1MHz.
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The SINR requirements for both vehicles and eNBs are uniformly distributed within (20, 30) dB.
For the propagation gain, we set the pass loss constant kp as 10−2, the path loss exponent α as 4,
the multipath fading gain as the exponential distribution with unit mean, and the shadowing gain as
the log-normal distribution with 0 mean and 4 dB deviation. The capacity of each vehicle is set as
4, and capacities of the eNBs are randomly distributed within [10, 15]. The total data type number
is set as K = 10.
6.5.2 Numerical Results
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the ISF algorithm, we compare it with four heuristic mech-
anisms: (1) Without V2V, (2) ISF-one, (3) Proximity V2X, (4) ISF-Unweighted. In the Without V2V
method, we simply assume each vehicle only communicates with its local eNBs. For the ISF-one
method, each vehicle is only allowed to set up one connection. The one-to-one stable matching is
also generated by the ISF algorithm with the capacity of each node set to 1. For the Proximity V2X
method, each vehicle ni is connected to the c(i) closest nodes which can meet its SINR requirement.
While in the ISF-Unweighted method, the data weight is not considered in the ISF algorithm.
We evaluate the information exchanged in one communication period T . N varies from 20
to 160 with the step of 20. As shown in Fig. 6.2, the total information values exchanged within
the network, using all the five methods, increase as more users join the network. Among the five
curves, the Without V2V curve achieves the worst performance, which demonstrates that the V2X
communications can improve system performance. Then, by comparing the many-to-many V2X
communications (i.e., the Proximity V2X, ISF-Unweighted and ISF methods) with the ISF-one
method, we find that by setting up more connections, the network capacity can be improved. Be-
sides, both the ISF-Unweighted and ISF methods outperform the Proximity V2X method. Last but
not least, the ISF algorithm achieve slightly higher performance than the ISF-Unweighted because
of the weight factor. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Fig. 6.3, which evaluates the average
user performance. One thing to mention in the Fig. 6.3 is that the Without V2V curve decreases
as N increases. This is because there is no V2V communication in the network, while the eNBs’
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Table 6.1: Existence of stable matching ratio
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
93.9% 81.2% 67.5% 58.6% 53.3% 45.2% 43.5% 39.8%
capacities are limited. Thus, with more vehicles join the network, the average user performance
decreases.
We also compare our distributive ISF algorithm with the centralized solution. We vary the
number of vehicles N from 1 to 4 and set the number of eNB as 1. As shown in Fig. 6.4, the ISF
algorithm can achieve very close-optimal results, while the complexity of the ISF algorithm is much
lower than the centralized optimization.
The connecting ratio is evaluated in Fig. 6.5. The ISF, ISF-Unweighted and ISF-one methods
all achieve 100% connectivity when N > 20. For the Without V2V method, since eNBs have
limited service capacity, with more vehicles joining the network, only a certain number of vehicles
can be served. As a result, the average vehicle performance decreases. While for the Proximity V2V
method, its average connectivity is around 91%.
We have also provided the ratios of solvable SF instances in Table. 6.1 regarding different
player numbers. With the increase of N from 20 to 200, this ratio drops from 93.9% to 39.8%. In
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Figure 6.5: Ratio of connected vehicles.
addition, this decrease becomes slower as N further increases.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has proposed a novel content sharing approach in the D2D based LTE-V net-
works. In particular, the communication latency and reliability issues that arise in the 802.11p-
based V2X have been addressed, and the diversity of data classes is taken into consideration in the
optimization problem. The proposed ISF algorithm can provide a stable result for the SF game in
a distributive manner. The simulations have further demonstrated that the flexible many-to-many
matching relations achieved by the ISF algorithm can greatly boost the network performance.
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Chapter 7
Joint Radio and Computational Resource Allocation in Fog
Computing: A Student Project Allocation Matching
The fog computing is considered as an emerging paradigm to complement the cloud com-
puting platform for providing end-user with computational resources. With the fog computing,
the service providers can better fulfill users’ heterogeneous requirements by offloading the delay-
sensitive tasks directly to the fog nodes (FNs). So far, most existing works are focused on either the
radio or computational resource allocation in the fog computing. In this chapter, we investigate a
joint radio and computational resource allocation problem to optimize the system performance and
improve the user satisfaction. Some important factors, such as service delay, link quality, mandatory
benefit and so on, are taken into considerations. Instead of the conventional centralized optimiza-
tion, we propose the matching theory framework to offer a distributed solution. The formulated
resource allocation problem is modeled as the student project allocation (SPA) game. The so-called
SPA-(S,P) algorithm is implemented to find a stable matching for the SPA problem. In addition, the
instability caused by the external effect is removed by the proposed the user-oriented cooperation
(UOC) strategy.
7.1 Introduction
Cloud computing is an Internet-based computing platform that provides shared processing
resources and data to computers and other devices on demand. The cloud computing and storage
solutions can provide users and enterprises with various capabilities to store and process their data
in the third-party data centers [19]. In particular, mobile cloud computing (MCC), as a combination
of cloud computing, mobile computing and wireless networks, has made it possible for the mobile
users to access the cloud resources to offload the computational tasks [20]. With the emerging of
the new paradigm, namely, Internet of Things (IoT), a new range of services and applications have
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been enabled, such as the connected vehicles, smart grid, wireless sensor networks and so on. Not
only facing the volume, velocity and variety increase in the communication contents, but also the
new communication requirements, such as location awareness, real-time mobility management, and
so on. Therefore, it requires a new designed MCC framework to meet these critical requirements.
CISCO first proposed the idea of Fog Computing in 2014, as a platform that exists between
the end devices and the cloud data centers. It provides computation, storage and communication
resources to the nearby mobile users [21]. The fog computing brings the cloud closer to the end
users, and is characterized by features such as low latency, large-scale distribution, support for mo-
bility, heterogeneity, and federation [22]. Largely distributed at the network edge, the FNs provide
storage, computation and communication services to the nearby users. An FN can be a cellular
BS, a Wi-Fi AP or a femtocell router with upgraded CPU and memories in either fixed locations
or being mobile [23]. FNs can communicate with nearby users for both control signal and actual
data transmission. However, such direct communication may cause some security issues, such as
eavesdropping and data hijack, without the surveillance from the cloud security system [89]. One
way to avoid such security issues is to transfer them from the FNs to the cloud. In other words, the
cloud, as the centralized controller of all the FNs and other resources, will be responsible for the
security control, such as authentication, authorization and so on. Thus, the communication between
FNs and users only involves the actual computation/storage data communication.
Currently, there are some obstacles that limit the performance of the fog computing. A lot of
research has been done on studying how to efficiently allocate the cloud/fog computational resource
to various users with heterogeneous requirements. Some frameworks, such as MAUI, ThinkAir and
Phone2Cloud [90], have been proposed for offloading the computational tasks, which aim at re-
ducing the energy cost by CPU and memories. A dynamic offloading framework for extending the
lifetime of mobile users is discussed in [91]. The proposed algorithm, based on Lyapunov optimiza-
tion, is able to extend the battery lifetime while satisfying the execution requirement. The energy
efficiency issue of the mobile users is also discussed [92] [93]. For example, [92] studies the op-
timal offloading problem in the MCC under the stochastic wireless channel. By reconfiguring the
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CPU frequency and varying the transmission rate, the objective is to conserve energy for the mo-
bile devices. A closed-form solution for the optimal scheduling is derived. The above-mentioned
works are all solved in a centralized way. However, the large scale and high mobility features of the
IoT devices have made the centralized optimization less efficient considering the high computation
complexity and heavy communication overhead. Game theory, as a popular distributive framework,
has already been applied in the resource allocations of the MCC. For example, [94] discusses the
resource management problem in the fog computing network, which is modeled as a 3-layer archi-
tecture: the FNs are in the upper layer, the data center operators are in the middle layer, and the
users are in the bottom layer. A hierarchical Stackelberg game is proposed to find the network equi-
librium. In [90], a joint radio and computation resource allocation in cloud computing is discussed,
with users’ energy and delay requirements considered. The optimization problem is solved in a
distributive way. However, only one cloud provider is considered.
In this chapter, we want to study a jointly radio access and computational resources allocation
when optimizing the system performance. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first
that investigates the joint radio and computational resource allocation problem with multiple cloud
providers considered in the fog computing. The major contributions of this chapter are summarized
as follows.
• We propose a joint radio and computational resource allocation framework for the fog com-
puting. We allow users to express their requirements, regarding the delay and offloading data
size, in the form of the mandatory offer to the cloud providers. On the hand, cloud providers
try to find suitable FNs for offloading users’ computation tasks to satisfy users’ requirements.
• With the objective of optimizing the user satisfaction, we formulate this joint radio and com-
putational resource allocation as an MINLP problem. In the formulation, system constraints,
such as the service delay, transmission quality, power control and so on, are considered. We
model the optimization problem using the SPA game, where cloud providers (modeled as the
lecturers) own the radio/computation resources (modeled as the the projects), and are respon-
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sible for the control information communications with the users (modeled as the students).
• We adopt the SPA-(S,P) algorithm to find a stable matching. In addition, the external ef-
fect, due to the inter-independence of players’ preferences lists, is removed by the proposed
UOC strategy. After the UOC procedure, the network stability is guaranteed and the system
performance is further improved.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we provide the system model.
Then in Section 7.3, we formulate the optimization problem that aims at maximizing the system cost
performance. Then, the SPA game is introduced to model the optimization problem, and the SPA-
(S,P) algorithm is adopted as a distributed solution in Section 7.4. Simulations results are analyzed
in Section 7.5 and conclusions are drawn in Section 7.6.
7.2 System Model
In this chapter, we assume a network comprised of a set of mobile users U = {u1, u2, ..., uM},
and a set of cloud service providers (SP) SP = {sp1, sp2, ..., spN}, as shown in Fig. 7.1b. These
SPs can meet different users with specific computing requirements regarding different data sizes and
service latencies. For those users who are not delay sensitive, the computing tasks will be sent to
the cloud, while for those users with certain delay requirements, the SPs will allocate the nearby fog
nodes (FNs) to offload the computation tasks. However, the geography location is not the only factor
that affects the service delay. In fact, the service latency consists of three time periods, which are
the data transmitting time, the CPU processing time and the result receiving time. The transmitting
and receiving periods are defined as the time used for sending data to FNs for processing and the
time used for receiving the processed results, respectively. Such communication latency is not only
related to the channel conditions but also affected by the data size of the computing task. On the other
hand, the CPU processing time is related to the CPU rate of the FN. Thus, for any SP spj , when
selecting an FN from the set FN j = {fnj1, fnj2, ..., fnjL} for each user, it will jointly allocate
its radio resource Wj = {wj1, wj2, ..., wjK} (the channel bandwidth) and computational resource
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Figure 7.1: System model.
Cj = {cj1, cj2, ..., cjL} (the CPU cycle rate).
From the users’ perspective, who have delay-sensitive tasks to process, will offer high prices
to the SPs to compete for better resources (both the radio and computational resources). Intuitively,
users who are requiring smaller latencies tend to offer higher prices. Besides, users also take their
data sizes into consideration, since typically more data results in longer transmission period and
longer CPU processing time. Notice here, the CPU cycles for the processing tasks are related to
the data size but not exactly equal to it. Thus, we assume each user ui carries Di bits data, and
the corresponding processing task requires DCi CPU cycles. Without loss of generality, we simply
assume a linear relation between the DCi and Di [90].
The joint radio and computation resource allocation can be treated as the mapping between
the user set U and the (radio,computation) resource pair setRPj = {(wjk, cjl )|∀wjk ∈ Wj , cjl ∈ Cj}
owned by each SP spj , spj ∈ SP . In the rest of this chapter, we may use rpjl,k to denote the resource
pair (wjk, c
j
l ) for simplicity. We represent such mapping relation with the binary value ρ
i,j
k,l, where
ρi,jk,l = 1 if ui is offloading a task to FN fn
j
l using the channel w
j
k owned by spj , and ρ
i,j
k,l = 0
otherwise. In order to optimize the joint resource allocation, we consider the profits of both users’
and SPs’, which will be discussed in the following sections.
98
7.2.1 User Satisfaction
One of the most important measurements that all SPs considers is the user experience or user
satisfaction. As we mentioned previously, we are discussing a set of users with delay-sensitive tasks,
so the service latency will be used as the user satisfaction measurement. However, before talking
about the delay, we should first guarantee that the transmission quality between the users and FNs
can meet the requirement. In other words, the SINR should be higher than a threshold Γmin in order
to deliver the correct/complete data. We define the received SINR from ui at fn
j
l using w
j
k as
Γi,jk,l =
Pig
i,j
k,l∑
ui′∈U ,i′ 6=i ρ
i′,j
k,l Pi′h
i′,j
k,l + σ
2
N
, (7.1)
where Pi and g
i,j
k,l are the transmission power and channel gain between ui and fn
j
l using channel
wjk, repectively. h
i′,j
k,l represents the interference channel gain from any other co-channel user ui′ at
fnjj . σ
2
N represents the channel noise. We require Γ
i,j
k,l ≥ Γmin for a successful transmission.
The data transmission rate from ui to fn
j
l using w
j
k, if satisfying the SINR requirement, can
be represented as
ri,jk,l = w
j
k log(1 + Γ
i,j
k,l). (7.2)
As we have discussed previously, the service delay consists of three time periods: the trans-
mitting time ttrans, the CPU processing time tproc, and the receiving time trecv. Generally speaking,
the received data size from the FN after processing is typically trivial compared to the original un-
processed data size. Besides, with no knowledge of the data process result, we cannot predict the
exact size of the data to be returned. Thus, the receiving period is assumed to be very short, and
we use a random variable δt, δt ∈ [0, 1] to represent trecv. When defining ttrans and tproc, we should
consider the channel reuse and the CPU sharing among multiple users. We allow each channel to
be shared among multiple users up to its capacity qR, and also allow each FN to accommodate
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multiple users to share its CPU up to its capacity qC . Thus, the transmission rate for each user can
be affected by the interference from the co-channel users, as represented in (7.1). In addition, the
CPU processing rate for each user is also affected by the co-FN users. For simplicity, we assume
each co-FN user will be allocated an equal share of the total CPU rate owned by the FN, denoted
as ci,jk,l =
1∑
ui∈U ρ
i,j
k,l
cjl . Now, we can represent the service delay of ui when using the resource pair
(wjk, c
j
l ) as follows:
ti,jk,l = ttrans + tproc + trecv =
Di
ri,jk,l
+
DCi
ci,jk,l
+ δt. (7.3)
7.2.2 SP Revenue
The monetary revenue is the incentive that SPs provide better services to the subscribed users.
As another important factor to measure the system performance, the monetary offers from the users
are considered, and are treated as SPs’ benefits. As we have discussed, the price that each user offers
is not only related to its delay requirement Tdelay but also its data sizeDi. Without loss of generality,
we assume a linear relation between the price and user’s data size, and also a linear relation between
the price and the inverse of user’s delay requirement. Thus, the price offer from each user can be
represented as
Oi = f(Di, Tdelay), (7.4)
where f(·) is a monotonically increasing function for Di and monotonically decreasing function for
Tdelay. For Simplicity, we use the following function to define f(Di, Tdelay).
Oi = a
Di
Tdelay
, (7.5)
where a is a parameter with unit dollar/Mbps, and Oi is the price that ui is willing to pay for any SP
if matched.
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Each SP serves more than one user, and thus receiving more than one offer. We define spj’s
revenue as the summation of the mandatory offers collected from all the matched users, which is
represented as
Revj =
∑
ui∈U
ρi,jk,lOi. (7.6)
7.3 Problem Formulation
In the previous section, we introduced two performance metrics, which are both essential for
achieving a good resource allocation in the fog computing. The system objective is designed as a
combination of the two metrics, and is named as the cost-performance (CP). The CP is defined as the
ratio between the service delay and the price cost for each user, with the unit of sec/dollar. The total
system CP CPsys is defined as the average value of all users’ CP CP (i), which can be represented
as
CPsys =
∑
ui∈U CP (i)
M
,ui ∈ U , (7.7)
where CP (i) is the CP value for user ui, and is defined as
CP (i) = ρi,jk,l
ti,jk,l
Oi
. (7.8)
Now we can formulate the optimization problem, which is shown as follows.
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max :
ρi,jk,l
∑
ui∈U CP (i)
M
(7.9)
s.t. : ρi,jk,lti, jk,l ≤ Tdelay,
∀ui ∈ U , rpjl,k ∈ RPj , spj ∈ SP, (7.10)
ρi,jk,lΓ
i,j
k,l ≥ Γmin,
∀ui ∈ U , rpjl,k ∈ RPj , spj ∈ SP, (7.11)∑
ui∈U ,fnjl∈FN j
ρi,jk,l ≤ qR,∀wjk ∈ Wj , spj ∈ SP, (7.12)
∑
ui∈U ,wjk∈Wj
ρi,jk,l ≤ qC ,∀fnjl ∈ FN j , spj ∈ SP, (7.13)
∑
ui∈U ,rpjl,k∈RPj
ρi,jk,l ≤ qSP , and∀spj ∈ SP, and (7.14)
ρi,jk,l ∈ {0, 1}. (7.15)
(7.9) is the system objective, representing the average cost performance for all the users.
(7.10) represents the delay requirement for each user. (7.11) defines the minimum SINR requirement
for each user. (7.12), (7.13) and (7.14) satisfy the capacity constraints for each channel, FN and SP,
respectively.
Obviously, this optimization problem is an MINLP problem, which is NP-hard to solve in
general [53]. Therefore, it motivates us to find a feasible solution. Thus, we introduce the SPA game
as a distributive solution, which will be discussed in the next section.
7.4 A Student-Project Matching Game
The fact that the assignment of the radio and computational resources are coupled has mo-
tivated us to treat the (radio, computation) resource pair as one entity. We can enumerate all the
possible combinations of the resource pairs, and then map the user set to the resource pair set. Ap-
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parently, this process should be under the assistance of the SPs, who are responsible for the control
signal communications with both the users and the resources.
A suitable matching model that offers such structure is the SPA problem [95], where various
students will be assigned to various projects (owned by different lecturers) under the assistance of
the lecturers. In this section, we first introduce how to model the proposed problem using the SPA
model, and then implement the SPA-(S,P) algorithm to find a stable matching solution in Section
7.4.1. In addition, to deal with the externality that appears during the matching, we propose the
UOC strategy to remove the external effect in Section 7.4.2.
7.4.1 Student-Project Allocation Modeling
In many university departments, students seek to undertake a project (e.g., senior design) from
lecturers. Typically each lecturer will offer a variety of projects. Each student has preferences over
the available projects, whilst a lecturer normally has some form of preferences over his/her projects
and/or the students who find them acceptable. There are upper bounds on the number of students that
can be assigned to a particular project and the number of students that can be assigned to a particular
lecturer. In one variant of the SPA problem, the lecturers have preferences over the student-project
pairs. This model is referred to as the SPA-(S,P) model, in which each lecturer has a preference
list that depends on not only the students who find his/her projects acceptable but also the particular
projects that these students would undertake [3].
We assume the SPs, the (radio, computation) resource pairs, and the users to be the lecturers,
the projects and the students, respectively. The SPs offer available radio and CPU resource bundles,
and the users propose to the SPs for the acceptable resource bundles. The SPs make decisions based
on the monetary benefits that can be collected from the users regarding particular resource pairs. The
stability notion here implies robustness to deviations that can benefit both the users and the resource
pairs. The formal stability definition in this chapter is provided in Definition 7.1.
Definition 7.1. Stability: A matchingM is said be stable, if there’s no blocking pair (BP). A pair
103
(ui, rp
j
l,k) is defined as a BP that if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) ui finds rp
j
l,k acceptable;
(2) either ui is unmatched inM, or ui prefers rpjl,k toM(ui);
(3) either
(3.1) rpjl,k is under subscribed and either of the following three conditions is satisfied:
a)M(ui) ∈ RPj , and spj prefers (ui, rpjl,k) to (ui,M(ui)); or
b)M(ui) /∈ RPj and spj is under-subscribed; or
c)M(ui) /∈ RPj and spj is full and spj prefers (ui, rpjl,k) to its current worst pair (uwst, rpjwst);
(3.2) rpjl,k is full and spj prefers (ui, rp
j
l,k) to the its current worst pair (uwst, rp
j
wst), and either of
the following two conditions is satisfied:
a)M(ui) /∈ RPj;
b)M(ui) ∈ RPj and spj prefers (ui, rpjl,k) to (ui,M(ui)).
In Definition 7.1,M(x) represents the partner/matching of the player x in matchingM. More
precisely,M(ui) = rpjl,k, (wjk, cjl ) ∈ RPj .
To find a stable matching, both the users’ and SPs’ preference lists, denoted as PLuser and
PLSP , need to be established first. During this procedure, the constraints (7.10) and (7.11) should be
satisfied from the both users’ and SPs’ perspectives. After each player has found its acceptable set, it
ranks the players in this acceptable set in a descending/ascending order according to the preferences.
Intuitively, users prefer the resource pair most which can offer the smallest service latency. On the
other hand, each resource pair will accommodate multiple users, and the coexistence will affect
users’ performances. For simplification, we assume these coexisting users will share the channel
band and the CPU equally. Each SP, radio, and CPU have quotas, denoted as qSP , qR, and qC ,
respectively. To calculate the potential service delay, each user assumes that it can get 1Q share of
the radio and CPU resources. The true performance for users may deviate from the evaluation, which
causes the external effect during the matching (We’ll address this issue in the Section 7.4.2). Thus,
the preference of ui over the rp
j
l,k is defined as the potential service delay t
′i,j
k,l , and is represented as
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PLuseri (j, k, l) = t
′i,j
k,l = t
′
trans + t
′
proc + t
′
recv
=
Di
1
qR
r′i,jk,l
+
DCi
1
qR
cjl
+ δt′, (7.16)
where r′i,jk,l the data rate from ui to FN fn
j
l when only ui is using the channel w
j
k, and is represented
as r′i,jk,l = w
j
k log(1 +
Pig
i,j
k,l
σ2N
). δt′ is a real value within [0, 1] that represents the possible period for
sending back the processed result.
On the other hand, when selecting the users to match its resource pairs, the SPs not only
consider the monetary benefit, but also the potential service delay. Users expect faster services, and
SPs also pursue shorter service latencies in order to serve as many users as possible from the long-
term consideration. Thus, the preference of the SP over any user is defined as the ratio between its
price offer and the potential service delay, which is represented as
PLSPj,k,l(i) =
Oi
t′i,jk,l
. (7.17)
With the preference lists set up, we can apply the SPA-(S,P) algorithm, as illustrated in Al-
gorithm 7.1, to find a matching between the users and resources. The SPA-(S,P) algorithm consists
of sequential propose and accept/reject operations. The convergence of the SPA-(S,P) algorithm is
guaranteed and the proof is provided in [95].
7.4.2 User-Oriented Cooperation Strategy
Due to the inter-dependence of the preferences of users and resources, the matching yielded by
the SPA-(S,P) algorithm is not necessarily stable. We call the matching framework with such inter-
dependence between players’ preferences as matching with externalities [4]. Our system objective
is defined as the users’ average cost performance, thus, we believe that it’s reasonable to evaluate
the stability notion solely from the user’s side. In other words, we assume that only users have the
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Algorithm 7.1 SPA-(S,P) Algorithm
Input: U ,SP,W,FN ,PLuser,PLSP ;
Output: MatchingM;
Initialization: setM empty, set all users free;
1: while some user ui is free and ui has a non-empty preference list do
2: for all ui ∈ U do
3: ui proposes to the first entity rp
j
l,k in PLuseri , and then remove rpjl,k from PLuseri ;
4: M←M∪ (ui, rpjl,k);
5: end for
6: for all rpjl,k, rp
j
l,k ∈ RPj , spj ∈ SP do
7: while rpjl,k is over-subscribed do
8: Find the worst pair (uwst, rpwst) assigned to rp
j
l,k in spj’s list;
9: M←M/(uwst, rpwst);
10: end while
11: end for
12: for all spj ∈ SP do
13: while spj is over-subscribed do
14: Find the worst pair (uwst, rpwst) in spj’s list;
15: M←M/(uwst, rpwst);
16: end while
17: end for
18: end while
19: Terminate with a matchingM.
incentive to make changes. Thus, a new “stability” notation should be defined among the users.
Cooperations between the users are needed to transform the existing matching into stable again. We
call such one-sided “stability” as the “Pareto Optimality” in matching theory [3]. The definition of
Pareto optimal is provided as follows.
Definition 7.2. Pareto Optimal: A matching is said to be Pareto Optimal if there is no other match-
ing where some player is better off, whilst no player is worse off.
Accordingly, the new BP definition in provided in Definition 7.3.
Definition 7.3. BP in the one-sided matching: A user pair (ui, uj) is defined as a BP, if both ui and
uj are better off after exchanging their parters.
To find such Pareto optimal matching, users again requires assistance from the SPs for the
utility evaluation. The Pareto optimality is achieved through finite partner switch operations between
the user pairs. As stated in Definition 7.2, the stability is reached when no player is better off without
any other player being worse off. In other words, every swap operation should be beneficial to some
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user(s) while doing no harm to the rest of users. Through finite swaps, we can finally reach a swap-
free system, which means a stable system. We call such procedure as the UOC Strategy, and the
details are illustrated in Algorithm 7.2.
Algorithm 7.2 User-Oriented Cooperation (UOC) Strategy
Input: Existing matchingM0;
Output: Pareto optimal matchingMs.
1: Mt =M0;
2: whileMt is not Pareto optimal do
3: Search the set of “unstable” (user,user) pairs BP;
4: for all (ui1, ui2) ∈ BP do
5: if ∃u ∈Mt(rpi1) ∪Mt(rpi2), ∆U(u) < 0 then
6: (ui1, ui2) are not allowed to switch partners;
7: else
8: (ui1, ui2) are allowed to switch partners;
9: end if
10: end for
11: Find the optimal BP (u∗i1, u
∗
i2) ∈ BP;
12: u∗i1 and u
∗
i2 switch partners;
13: Mt+1 ←Mt/{(u∗i1,Mt(u∗i1)), (u∗i2,Mt(u∗i2))};
14: Mt+1 ←Mt ∪ {(u∗i1,Mt(u∗i2)), (u∗i2,Mt(u∗i1))};
15: Update PLuser based onMt;
16: end while
17: Ms =Mt.
In Algorithm 7.2, rpi1 = Mt(ui1), rpi2 = Mt(ui2). We define U(x) as the utility function
of user x, which is equal to its service delay. We define ∆U(x) = U(x)′ − U(x), where U(x)′ is
the utility after exchanging the partners. In other words, ∆U(x) represents x’s performance change,
and is said to be improved if ∆U(x) > 0 or decreased if ∆U(x) < 0. A user pair is allowed to
switch partners if and only if ∆U(x) ≥ 0 for any user x that is affected in this switch. Then to find
the optimal BP among all the BPs, we search for a BP which provides the highest the performance
improvement. The performance here refers to the average time delay of all the users. We define the
optimal BP as
(u∗i1, u
∗
i2) = argmax
(ui1,ui2)
∑
u∈{ui1∪ui2∪Mt(rpi1)∪Mt(rpi2)}
∆U(u), (7.18)
We summarize the steps of the UOC strategy as follows. Firstly, we search all the “unstable”
user-user pairs regarding the current matching. Secondly, we check whether the exchange/switch
between such a pair is allowed (beneficial to related users). Thirdly, we find the pair that provides
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Figure 7.2: Users’ average service latency.
the greatest throughput improvement, and allow this pair to switch partners. We keep searching for
such BPs until we reach a trade-in-free network. The convergence of the UOC process is guaranteed
by the irreversibility of each switch. Finally, UOC terminates with a Pareto optimal matching.
7.5 Performance Evaluation
In this Section, we evaluate the SPA-(S,P) algorithm and the UOC strategy regarding the
users’ service latency, SPs’ profit and the system cost performance. In addition, the convergence of
UOC will be analyzed.
We consider a network consisting of N = 2 SPs, and each equipped with L = 5 FNs. The
network radius is R = 1 km. Assume a number of users M,M ∈ [45, 210] are randomly distributed
within the network. Each SP owns K = 5 channel bands, and each bandwidth is set to w = 5 MHz.
The SINR requirements Γmin for users are uniformly distributed within [20, 30] dB. We set equal
capacity requirement for each channel and each FN, which is qR = qC = 10, and the SP’s capacity
is set as qSP = 80. The service delay requirement Td for each user is uniformly distributed within
[6, 7] sec. The users’ data sizes D are uniformly distributed within [2, 8] Mb, and the corresponding
CPU cycles are set asDC = D∗104. The CPU processing rates of the FNs are uniformly distributed
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within [5, 6] ∗ 1010 cycles/sec. For the propagation gain g, we set the pass loss constant C as 10−2,
the path loss exponent α as 4, the multipath fading gain as the exponential distribution with unit
mean, and the shadowing gain as the log-normal distribution with 4 dB deviation [60].
In Fig. 7.2 and Fig. 7.3, we evaluate the performance of the users and SPs, respectively. For
comparison purposes, we use the Random method as the victim strategy, which refers to a random
resource allocation between the users and the resource pairs. Fig. 7.2 evaluates the average service
delay under the comparison of three methods: the Random method, the SPA-(S,P) method and the
SPA-(S,P) with UOC method. We increase the number of users from 45 to 210 by the step of 15.
Apparently, the service latencies for all three strategies increase with the number of users. It is true
since more users result in a smaller resource share for each, which thus leading to a higher average
delay. Among the three methods, the Random curve gives the highest average latency, and is much
higher than the other two methods. For the two matching curves, the SPA-(S,P) with UOC method
is slightly better than the SPA-(S,P) method when M < 150, and is similar to the SPA-(S,P) method
when M > 150. Thus, we can find the UOC strategy can further improve user performance while
guaranteeing network stability. Besides, this improvement is less apparent when the user number is
close to or has reached the network capacityM = 160. The network capacity refers to the maximum
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Figure 7.4: The ratio of users satisfying delay requirement.
number of users that the SPs can accommodate. As shown in Fig. 7.3, the average profits gained by
the SPs are almost the same for all the three methods when M < 150, and after M > 150 both the
SPA-(S,P) method and the SPA-(S,P) with UOC method outperform the Random method. Before
the user number reaches the network capacity, almost all the users can be matched to a resource
pair using different methods. Thus, SPs can still gain all the money. However, when the users are
more than the network capacity, then users need to compete with other. Thus, which users will be
kicked off and which ones will stay? As we discussed in Section 7.2, the users who have higher
latency requirements offer higher prices, thus making them more likely to be selected by the SPs. In
turn, the users with higher offers can make the SPs gain more profits. That is why the two matching
curves can beat the Random method when M > 150.
The user satisfaction is evaluated in Fig. 7.4, w.r.t. the ratio of users whose actual service
latencies can meet their requirements. Apparently, the ratio of satisfied users decreases as more
users join the network. The starting points of all the three methods are almost 100%, and then the
Random method drops faster than the two matching algorithms. The two matching curves drop
with similar speeds, and drop slower after M > 150. At the end point when M = 210, both the
SPA-(S,P) with UOC method and the SPA-(S,P) method reach around 75% satisfaction ratio, while
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Figure 7.5: The system cost performance.
the Random method falls below 50%. Fig. 7.4, together with the average delay evaluation shown in
Fig. 7.2, shows that our proposed matching algorithms not only consider the SPs’ benefit, but also
take each individual user’s performance into consideration.
In Fig. 7.5, we evaluate the system cost performance under three methods. It’s an joint con-
sideration of both users’ and SPs’ benefits, with the objective to allocate the best resources to users
who want them most (i.e., who offer the highest prices). As shown in Fig. 7.5, when M < 75,
the SPA-(S,P) with UOC method outperforms the other two, while the Random allocation beats
the SPA-(S,P) method. This happens because in the SPA-(S,P) method, users first propose to their
favorite resources, and thus some good resources may receive many more proposals than the other
resources. When the user number is relatively small and there are sufficient resources, the previ-
ously good resources, who are matched with more users, may be not so good compared with those
resources who are not matched. Thus, when the user number is small, the SPA-(S,P) method is
worse than the Random method. After M > 80, both matching algorithms are better than the Ran-
dom one. The SPA-(S,P) with UOC method outperforms the SPA-(S,P) method when M < 150.
The performances of all the three curves are decreasing with the increase of M . It is reasonable
since the price offers and the resources are unchanged, and more users may result in less resource
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Figure 7.6: UOC Convergence Analysis.
for each, which results in the average cost performance reduce.
Lastly, the convergence of the proposed UOC strategy is analyzed in Fig. 7.6. The iteration
of users switches during the UOC method is considered the measurement of its convergence. As
we discussed in Section 7.4, the convergence of UOC to a Pareto optimal matching is guaranteed
since each switch is inrevertible. By each switch, some users can switch to better resource pairs,
which were previously under-evaluated. With so many switch options, our proposed UOC method
selects the currently best pair to switch. It’s not hard to understand, such pair selection procedure
can greatly reduce the number of switches. We can see a decrease of the iteration number with the
increase of the user number when M < 150, and then an increase when M > 150. Notice that
the network capacity is M = 160, and the user increase step is 15, which means when M > 150
the user number exceeds the network capacity. So before the user number exceeds the capacity, SPs
have some resource pairs who have spare rooms for more users. Thus with such rooms, users have
more chances to improve their performance by switching. Thus, it explains that with the decrease
when M < 160. Then, after the user number has reached the network capacity, there are more
users who can not get any resource. Thus the competition between these unmatched users and the
matched users will bring more switches. Thus, after M > 160, with more unmatched users, the
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switch numbers start to increase. The average switch number is limited by 10 under this network
setting, which is in fact a trivial number.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the joint radio and computational resource allocation problem
in the fog computing. With the proposed semi-distributive SPA framework, we have modeled the
interactions between the mobile users, the SPs and the FNs. System requirements, such as the trans-
mission quality, service latency, and maximum power requirement, have been addressed through
the representation of players’ preference lists. The proposed SPA-(S,P) algorithm together with the
UOC procedure can guarantee a stable matching. The simulation results have demonstrated that
our proposed framework can provide close-optimal performance from both the users’ and the SPs’
perspectives.
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Chapter 8
Cyclic Three-Sided Matching Game Inspired Wireless
Network Virtualization
The network virtualization has drawn substantial attention from the wireless communication
field recently. The key idea of the wireless network virtualization is about the abstraction, iso-
lation and sharing of the wireless resources, including both the radio resources and the physical
infrastructures. By such kind of isolation and sharing, the network virtualization can provide great
flexibility, higher network efficiency and new services to the wireless networks. Traditionally, the
virtual resource allocation job is controlled by the so-called virtual wireless network controller, who
sell the service combos (consisting of the radio resources and physical infrastructures) to the service
providers (SPs) in a wholesale way. The SPs then allocate the purchased services to their subscribed
mobile users. However, such centralized allocation decouples the service generation from the user
resource allocation. In this chapter, we propose a three-sided (3D) matching game to model the
interactions between the radio resource, physical infrastructure and mobile users.
8.1 Introduction
Nowadays, virtualization has become a popular concept applied in many areas, such as the
virtual memory, virtual machine and virtual data center. Virtualization refers to the abstraction and
sharing of resources among different parties. It offers great network flexibility, maximizes network
utilization, as well as inspires new services and products [24]. On the other hand, the mobile wireless
traffic is expected to grow exponentially due to the massive user number and the rich communication
contents. By extending the network virtualization into cellular networks, and more specifically, by
abstracting, slicing and sharing the physical infrastructures and radio resources, the wireless traffic
can be relieved. This paradigm is commonly referred to as the wireless network virtualization [25].
Wireless network virtualization decouples the services from the network resources, and en-
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ables the sharing of both radio spectrum and physical infrastructures. Thus, the network utilization
can be improved. In addition, with unified control and allocation of resources, new wireless services
can be innovated in a more efficient way. Despite the visible potential of the wireless network vir-
tualization, several design challenges remain to be addressed, which include the isolation, control
signaling, resource discovery and allocation, mobility management, security and so on [25]. In par-
ticular, the resource management challenge calls for the comprehensive efforts, as it decides how
the virtual networks are embedded on top of the physical networks, and directly affects the network
utilization.
A popular way to define different roles in the wireless network virtualization is by classifying
these roles into the service providers (SPs), the mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), the
infrastructure providers (InPs) and the end users [25]. The InPs own the infrastructure resources,
while the MVNOs own the spectrum resources and are responsible for creating and managing the
virtual resources. The SPs then allocate specific services, such as VoIP, video call and so on, to the
end users, which are rented or purchased from the MVNOs in a wholesale way. Such purchasing
and reselling jobs of the SPs are in fact the resource allocations between the MVNOs, SPS, and the
end users 1. The traditional resource allocation solution in the wireless network virtualization is to
configure the virtual resource/services packages first and then offer the off-the-rack services to the
users [96]. Such approaches decouple the virtual service generation procedure (accomplished by
the MVNOs) from the user service assignment procedure (accomplished by the SPs), which lack the
flexibility regarding some specific user requirements.
In this chapter, we jointly consider the service generation and service allocation procedures,
and more specifically, we propose a matching-based resource allocation framework that matches
the three network elements: spectrum, infrastructure and end users, simultaneously. The major
contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows.
1) We propose a resource allocation framework in the wireless network virtualization. Un-
1In this chapter, we assume that the MVNOs create and manage the virtual resources, including both spectrum and
infrastructure resources.
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Figure 8.1: System Model
like the conventional decoupled service generation and service allocation, we tackle this problem
by modeling it as a three-sided matching between the radio spectrum, physical infrastructures and
mobile users.
2) With joint consideration of the user satisfaction, SPs’ revenue and the system cost-performance,
we formulate the three-sided matching as an optimization problem. We model the optimization
problem by exploiting the three-dimensional stable marriage (3DSM) model.
3) The restricted three-sided matching with size and cyclic preference (R-TMSC) model can
be solved by the proposed spectrum-oriented R-TMSC algorithm, and a stable solution is always
guaranteed. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is validated through simulations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, we provide the system model.
Then in Section 8.3, we formulate the optimization problem that aiming at maximizing the system
cost performance. Then, a three-sided matching approach is proposed to solve the optimization
problem in Section 8.4. Simulations results are analyzed in Section 8.5 and conclusions are drawn
in Section 8.6.
8.2 System Model
In this chapter, we assume a wireless network virtualization framework consisting of the
SPs, MVNOs and end users, as shown in Fig. 8.1. We assume a set of spectrum bands S =
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{s1, s2, ..., sK} available for sharing, where K is the number of bands. Each band is assumed
to have identical bandwidth. A set ofN physical infrastructures B = {b1, b2, ..., bN}, which include
the base stations, APs, core network elements and so on, can be rented. The group of subscribed
mobile users are represented by U = {u1, u2, ..., uM}, where M is the number of all users. The
three-sided matching between S , B and U can be represented by M ⊆ S × B × U . Henceforth,
we call S, B and U the matching agents. Each spectrum band, which was initially owned by the
cellular network operators, can now be shared between multiple infrastructures, and is limited by
its capacity qs regarding the number of users. On the other hand, each infrastructure is also shared
between multiple bands, and is limited by its capacity qb regarding the number of users. In addition,
any band assigned with some infrastructure can be shared between multiple users. In other words,
the matching between S and B is a many-to-many matching, while the matching between the (band,
infrastructure) resource pairs and the users U is one-to-many matching.
We begin by defining the performance metrics from the following two perspectives: the user
experience and the SP’s revenue.
8.2.1 User Experience
One of the most important things that the SPs concern about is the user experience or the
user satisfaction. We use the user’s SINR to measure its user satisfaction in this chapter. Since the
channel condition primarily relies on the transmitter and receiver, we define the user experience as
the transmission SINR between the user and the infrastructure. It can be represented as
Γi,j =
Pi,jgi,j
σ2I + σ
2
N
, (8.1)
where Γi,j is the received SINR of infrastructure bj from user ui. The UL transmission is discussed
in this chapter. Thus the SINR will be the received SINR at the infrastructure side. Pi,j and gi,j are
the transmission power and channel gain between ui and bj , respectively. σ2N represents the channel
noise, and σ2I represents the channel interference from the other mobile users due to channel reuse.
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8.2.2 SP Revenue
The monetary revenue is the incentive that SPs provide better services to the subscribed users.
In this chapter, another factor that we use to measure the system performance is the revenue that
SPs earn from the users. We assume each user offers a price based on its desired rate, thus the SPs
would prefer to serve the ones with higher offers. We define SP’s revenue as the summation of all
the offers collected from the matched users, which is represented as
Revn =
∑
ui∈U
Oi =
∑
ui∈U
αri, (8.2)
where Oi is the price that user ui offers to any spectrum, based on its desired transmission rate ri.
α is a parameter with the unit dollar/Mbps.
8.3 Problem Formulation
In the previous section, we introduced two performance metrics, which are both essential for
a good resource allocation scheme in the wireless virtual networks. The system objective in this
chapter is designed as a combination of both metrics. We define the overall cost-performance (CP)
as our system objective under the three-sided matching, which is represented as
CPsys =
∑
ui∈U CP (i)
M
,ui ∈ U , (8.3)
where CP (i) is the CP value for user ui, and the system CPsys is the averaged value of all the users,
i.e.,
CP (i) =
∑
bj∈B,sk∈S ρi,j,ksk log(1 + Γ
k
i,j)
Oi
, (8.4)
where ρi,j,k is a binary value, which is equal to 1 if ui is utilizing the channel band sk as its DL
transmission through the infrastructure bj , and 0 otherwise. Γki,j is the actual SINR of user ui if
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matched with infrastructure bi and spectrum sk (considering the interference from other users that
share the same sk and bj), which is represented as
Γki,j =
Pi,jgi,j
σ2N + σ
2
I
=
Pi,jgi,j
σ2N +
∑
i′ 6=i ρi′,j,kPi′,jgi′,j
. (8.5)
Now we can formulate the optimization problem, which is shown as follows.
max :
ρi,j,k
CPsys (8.6)
s.t. :
∑
ui∈U ,bj∈B
ρi,j,k ≤ qs,∀sk ∈ S, (8.7)
∑
ui∈U ,sk∈S
ρi,j,k ≤ qb, ∀bj ∈ B, (8.8)
Γi,j ≥ Γmin,∀ui ∈ U , bj ∈ B, and (8.9)
ρi,j,k ∈ {0, 1}, (8.10)
where (8.6) is the system objective, representing the overall cost performance. (8.7) and (8.8) are
the capacity constraints for the spectrum and infrastructure, respectively. (8.9) defines the minimum
SINR requirement for each user.
Obviously, this optimization problem is an MINLP problem 2, which is NP-hard to solve [53].
Therefore, it motivates us to find a feasible solution. In the next section, we introduce a matching-
based distributive solution: the man-woman-dog model to solve the problem.
8.4 Cyclic Three-sided Matching Game
Three-sided relationship is very common in the social and economic fields, e.g., the supplier-
firm-buyer relationship, the kidney exchange problem, and so on. Generally, the three-sided match-
ing can be treated as the 3D generalization of the SM model [3], where the three types of matching
2The nonlinearity is caused by Γki,j in the objective function.
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agents can be referred to as the men, women and dogs. This three-dimensional variant of the SM
game is usually referred to as the 3DSM problem. Primarily, there are two types of models studying
the 3DSM problem, depending on the nature of agents’ preferences. For the first model, each agent
may rank the pairs of other agents that they are prepared to form triples with in order of preferences.
In the other model, the agents’ preference lists involve only one type of agents (e.g., men only rank
women in order of preferences, women only rank dogs, and dogs only rank men). This type of pref-
erence lists are commonly referred to as the cyclic preferences. In this section, we are discussing
the 3DSM model with cyclic preferences.
8.4.1 3DSM Model
As an intriguing variant of the 3DSM, the three-dimensional stable marriage problem with
cyclic preferences (3DSM-CYC) model refers to case that the matching agents’ preference lists
involve only one type of agents (instead of pairs of agents). The problem of deciding whether a given
instance of the 3DSM-CYC model admits a weakly or strongly stable matching is NP-complete as
studied by [97]. However, in [98], Cui and Jia studied an interesting variant of the 3DSM-CYC
model, where a stable matching can always be found with certain restrictions in the preference lists.
In the man-woman-dog instance, we assume that men only rank women in order of prefer-
ences, women only rank dogs, and dogs only rank men. We use m, w and d to represent man,
woman and dog, respectively. Each agent can be matched to the other type of agents in its pref-
erence list up to its capacity. We define the three-sided matching with size and cyclic preference
problem (TMSC) problem as follows:
Definition 8.1. Three-sided matching with size and cyclic preference problem (TMSC): the three-
sided matching problem of TMSC is to find a matching M = {(mi, wj , dk)} with the maximum
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cardinality:
max : |M | (8.11)
s.t. : N (M,mi) ≤ cm, (8.12)
N (M,wj) ≤ cw, and (8.13)
N (M,dk) ≤ cd, (8.14)
where (8.11) represents the cardinality of the matching M (i.e., the number of (m,w, d) triples in
the matching). N (M,x) represents the number of partners that x has in the matching M3 (8.12),
(8.13) and (8.14) represent the capacity of each man, woman, and dog, respectively. As claimed
in [98], the TMSC problem is NP-hard.
In order to solve the TMSC problem, we add some extra restrictions to transform it into the
R-TMSC model as follows: (1) The preference lists of men are derived from a master preference
list. This master list is the set of all the women with strict order (e.g., according to the age), and
then all men’s preference lists are derived from this master list. (2) The dogs are indifferent with the
men, thus for each dog, the men in its preference list forms a tie. We refer to this restricted TMSC
model, satisfying both (1) and (2), as the R-TMSC model. Before we discuss the property of the
R-TMSC model, we provide some basic matching definitions. As a fundamental requirement for a
matching result, the concept of stability is widely used in algorithm design. A matching is said to
be stable is if it admits no BP in case of the two-sided matching, and thus no blocking triple in case
of the three-sided matching. Under restriction (1) and (2), the definition of the blocking triple can
be updated as in Definition 8.2. Intuitively, a blocking triple consists of one man, one woman and
one dog, each of which has the desire to be matched to each other as a triple instead of staying with
their current partners.
Definition 8.2. Blocking triple in 3DSM:
{N (M,dk) ≤ cd} ∧ {M(mi) = ∅ ∨ wj mi M(mi)} ∧
{M(wj) = ∅ ∨ dk wj M(wj)}.
3Here the partner refers to the type of agents in x’s preference list.
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Finding the maximum cardinality matching of the R-TMSC problem is still NP-hard as proved
in [98]. However, regarding the stability perspective of the matching, we have a nice conclusion,
which is stated in Theorem 8.3. Due to page limitation, the proof of Theorem 8.3 is not provided in
this chapter. Please refer to [98] for the detailed proof.
Theorem 8.3. The user-oriented R-TMSC algorithm will stop and output a stable matching after a
finite number of steps.
8.4.2 Stable Matching solution for R-TMSC
We assume the spectrum to be man, user to be woman, and infrastructure to be dog. Following
the R-TMSC model, we define the preference lists for the spectrum, user and infrastructure. The
preference lists of the spectrum over users are derived from the master list that ranks all users’ offers
in a descending order 4. In this case, all the spectrum resources create the same preference lists,
which are represented as follows
PLs(k, i) = Oi, ∀sk ∈ S. (8.15)
On the other hand, the users rank the acceptable infrastructures according to the service quality
(the acceptable set is generated by applying (8.9)), which is measured by the SINR Γi,j 5. We
represent the preference lists of users as follows
PLu(i, j) = Γi,j ,∀ui ∈ U , bj ∈ B. (8.16)
According the R-TMSC model, the infrastructures are indifferent with all the spectrum re-
sources. In other words, the preference list of any infrastructure consists of identical rankings,
which can be represented as
PLb(j, k) = 1,∀bj ∈ B, sk ∈ S. (8.17)
4Here, the spectrum is on behalf of the SP’s interest/revenue.
5We assume the σ2I = 0 in building the preference lists, since the matching actions of other users are not known in
advance to any user.
122
After generating all agents’ preference lists, we propose the spectrum-oriented R-TMSC al-
gorithm. Slightly different from the R-TMSC algorithm discussed in [98], we tailor it to fit our
problem setting. The basic idea of this algorithm is to iteratively search for the “best” triple and add
this triple to the matching, which starts from empty. Each “best” triple (in the form of (u, b, s)) is
generated by first selecting a spectrum satisfying the requirements, and then this selected spectrum
decides the best user that can meet the requirements, and finally this selected user decides the best
qualified infrastructure. The detailed procedure is provided in Algorithm 8.1.
In Algorithm 8.1, we use A+1(M, sk) = {ui|ui sk M(sk)}to represent all the users that
spectrum sk prefers to its own partner M(sk). We use A+1(M,ui) = {bj |bj ui M(ui)} to
represent all the infrastructures that user ui prefers to its own partner M(ui). Then we define
A−1(M,ui) = {bj , |N (M, bj) ≤ qb}, which contains all the infrastructures that still have rooms to
accept ui. We also define A−2(M, sk) = {ui|A+1(M,ui) ∩ A−1(M,ui) 6= ∅}, which represents
any user ui, such that there exists a bj , who still has room to accept ui, and ui prefers it to its current
partner.
Algorithm 8.1 Spectrum-oriented R-TMSC Matching
Input: U , B, S
Output: M
Initialization;
Construct the preference lists PLu, PLb, and PLs;
M = ∅, flag = 1;
while flag = 1 do
Set flag = 0;
for all each sk ∈ S do
U ′ = A+1(M, sk) ∩A−2(M, sk);
if U ′ 6= ∅ then
ui = Head(U ′, sk);
B′ = A+1(M,ui) ∩A−1(M,ui);
bj = Head(B′, ui);
end if
if N (M, sk) == 1 then
M = M ∪ {M(sk),M(M(sk)), sk};
flag = 1;
end if
if N (M,ui) == 1 then
M = M ∪ {ui,M(ui), ∗};
flag = 1;
end if
M = M ∪ {ui, bj , sk};
end for
end while
End of algorithm;
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Figure 8.2: User throughput Analysis.
8.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the proposed the spectrum-oriented R-TMSC algorithm by com-
paring it with the user-oriented R-TMSC algorithm, the decoupled allocation, and the random alloca-
tion, regarding the user throughput, spectrum revenue and system cost performance. The spectrum-
oriented R-TMSC algorithm operates by adding a triple to the matching each time, while the triple is
generated by finding a qualified spectrum first, and then finding the best qualified user for this spec-
trum, and finally finding the best qualified infrastructure for this user. The user-oriented R-TMSC
algorithm operates similarly by adding one triple per time, but the triple is generated from finding
a qualified user first. The decoupled allocation is the scheme that decouples the service generation
from the service assignment. For simplicity, we assume a random combination of the spectrum S
and infrastructure B resources. Then, with the generated services (i.e., the resource pairs), it will be
assigned to the users U using the GS matching algorithm, which can be used to find a stable solution
for the two-sided matching problems [3].
We assume a circle network with the radius of R = 800 m, consisting of M ∈ [0, 160] mobile
users, N = 7 infrastructures, and K = 20 spectrum bands. The bandwidth of each band is set to
be 5 MHz. The capacity of each infrastructure is 20, while the capacity of each frequency band
is 7. The minimum SINR requirements for all mobile users are set as 25 dB. For the propagation
gain g = Cβζd−α, we set the pass loss constant C as 10−2, the path loss exponent α as 4, the
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Figure 8.3: User satisfaction.
multipath fading gain β as the exponential distribution with unit mean, and the shadowing gain ζ as
the log-normal distribution with 4 dB deviation.
In Fig. 8.2a and Fig. 8.2b, the overall and average throughput of users are evaluated. We
increase the user number from 30 to 170 by 20. As shown in Fig. 8.2a, the network throughput
increases as more users join the network. It’s reasonable since spectrum is reused between users
and more users can bring higher spectrum utilization. On the other hand, Fig. 8.2b shows that the
average user performance decreases slightly as more users joint. This is due to the interference
caused by users who are sharing the same infrastructure and spectrum. Similar conclusions can be
drawn from Fig. 8.2a and Fig. 8.2b, that the spectrum-oriented R-TMSC algorithm outperforms the
user-oriented one slightly, and both outperform the decouple and random allocation methods a lot,
w.r.t. both the overall and average throughput.
Fig. 8.3 gives another insight on the performance from the perspective of the user satisfaction.
The user satisfaction is defined as the ratio between the actual transmission rate and the expected
data rate. As discussed in Section 8.1, users make offers to the SP according to the expected rate.
As a result, any user who has a higher rate requirement will offer a higher price. In turn, users who
provider higher offers are more preferred by the spectrum, and thus better served. It is obvious that
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Figure 8.4: Spectrum Revenue.
as more users join the network, the user satisfaction decreases. With more users sharing the same
radio and infrastructure resources, the interference grows and leads to the performance degradation.
However, the spectrum-oriented algorithm still outperforms the user-oriented one, and both achieve
better performance than the decoupled and random allocation.
Fig. 8.4 evaluates the revenue of the SPs. The revenue is defined as the summation of the all
the income collected from the matched users. Apparently, more users will bring more revenue. A
turning point can be found for both algorithms when the user number M becomes 140. This turning
point is related to the network capacity, since both the infrastructure and the spectrum have the same
capacity of 140. Thus, after the user number reaches 140, the revenue no loner increases linear with
the increase of user number. Both matching algorithms achieve the same system revenue since all
the users are accepted and served when M < 140.
In Fig. 8.5, we analyze the cost performance of the system. As defined in Section 8.3, the
system objective is to optimize the system cost performance, which is calculated by averaging all
the users’ transmission rates over their price offers. This cost performance metric not only evaluates
how good the users perform, but also evaluates how much benefit the SPs make. As can be found
in Fig. 8.5, the average CP value decreases as more users join. This is caused by the average user
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Figure 8.5: System cost performance
throughput reduce as indicated in Fig. 8.2b and Fig. 8.3. Again, the spectrum-oriented algorithm
outperforms the user-oriented one. In addition, both matching algorithms beat the random allocation.
8.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have developed a framework to solve the resource allocation problem in
the wireless network virtualization. Utilizing the three-sided matching: man-woman-dog model,
we are able to formulate the interactions between the radio resource, the physical infrastructures,
and the mobile users. The proposed spectrum-oriented R-TMSC algorithm can always generate
a stable three-sided matching result. The simulation results have proved the effectiveness of the
proposed matching approach in improving the user satisfaction, SP revenue, as well as the system
cost-performance.
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Chapter 9
Exploiting the Stable Fixture Matching Game for Mobile
Crowd Sensing: A Local Event Sharing Framework
The surging of the smartphone sensing and social media have enabled a great variety of ap-
plications, such as the environment surveillance, marketing, health monitoring and so on. This new
paradigm is typically referred to as the mobile crowd sensing (MCS). Existing solutions on the
MCS are majorly based on text, image and video analysis using the distributively sensed/collected
data. One shortcoming of such approaches is the data processing delay. Considered as an enhanced
function to the temporary social media services, e.g., Twitter, we propose a real-time event sharing
framework that gives mobile users the freedom of expressing their various interests. We introduce a
novel Hashtag, which is the combination of five types of information: time, location, keywords, data
type and data size. Users, by comparing their interests with the uploaded Hashtags in the Twitter
server, can search for suitable partners to share their information with in real time. The formulated
user pairing problem is modeled as the SF matching game, and can be solved by the ISF algorithm
in a semi-distributive manner.
9.1 Introduction
The widespread of mobile devices, such as smartphones and vehicular networks, has provided
us a new type of sensing infrastructure. These smart mobile devices are embedded with various
types of sensors, such as camera, GPS, accelerator, digital compass, light sensor, and even health
and pollution monitoring sensors in the future. These sensed data has enabled a broad range of
applications such as the road transportation, health care, environmental surveillance, and so on [26].
Compared with the traditional static sensor networks, the mobile people-centric measurement has
many advantages, such as scalable, better computation capability, direct access to the Internet and so
on [26]. This new paradigm is typically referred to as the MCS, where individual users with sensing
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and computing devices collectively share data and extract the information to measure and map the
phenomena of common interest [27].
MCS applications can be majorly classified into three categories depending on the type of
phenomenon being measured, which are environmental, infrastructure, and social applications [27].
Among these three types, the social-based type is intrinsically more complicated due to the interac-
tive nature between social users. There have been several examples of applying the MCS platform
into the mobile social networks. For example, the mCrowd is a platform implemented in iPhone
that relies on the general public to capture the geo-tagged images, audio snippets, and so on [99].
Twitter is a popular online social media that provides time-critic world trends and events based on
the analysis of the tweet contents. Microblogs, like Twitter, are typically more efficient than the
traditional blogs in terms of timeliness, which can provide the ongoing information collected from
users all over the world [100]. With the popularity of the microblogs, there have been a growing
number of works on the event detection/discovery using the MCS approach.
Different user tweets are collected and analyzed by the Twitter server to study the trends and
events. However, most of them are based on text analysis, where the outputs are only the event
keywords with locations and times. The advantage of such text-based MCS analysis is its time
efficiency, but it does not provide enough event details. Thus, some works have proposed to analyze
the image or video tweets for better event visualization. This type of MCS analysis is called the
photo mining [100] or visual sensing [101], and is usually accomplished by feature extraction and
clustering methods. Although image/video tweets are commonly seen, the disadvantages of such
approaches are the huge data size, high processing complexity and delay. Suppose in a local event,
such as a concert or a sports game, people who attend the event are already familiar with the general
information, i.e., the event location and time. Thus, they expect to see more real-time and diverse
event details about the event when using the social network, e.g., Twitter. From this point, using the
image/video MCS analysis to summarize the event may result in not only the data uploading delay
but also the processing and analyzing delay. In addition, users who want to review specific event
moments or view from a different angle may have to download and go through some irrelevant data
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Figure 9.1: The mobile crowd sensing communication model.
before they find the right content, which is a waste of phone energy, storage and time.
Motivated by the above reasons, in this chapter, we propose an MCS-based platform for the
real-time information sharing in a local event. It can be considered as an enhancement to the ex-
isting text/image/video analysis. Our novelly defined Hashtags, generated by distributed users, can
provide detailed location and time information, data type and size information, as well as the key-
word description of the data content. Users can search for the Hashtags according to their interests.
Then we allow suitable users pairs to communicate directly with each other to exchange their data
(text/image/video). To guarantee users’ sharing incentives, only two users who both have interests
in each other’s Hashtags are allowed to exchange. Now the question becomes how to map these
users into sharing pairs so that the information circulating within the network can be optimized. In
this chapter, we propose the SF game to model the many-to-many matching relations between the
users.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The system model is described in Sec. 9.2,
and then we formulate the crowd sensing problem as an optimization problem. The SF game is
utilized to model the problem, and we tackle it with the ISF algorithm in Sec. 9.4. Performance of
the ISF algorithm is evaluated in Sec. 9.5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. 9.6.
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9.2 System Model
Consider a circular event area with the radius of R, as shown in Fig. 9.1, with mobile users
are uniformly distributed within it. We denote the set of mobile users (i.e., audiences) as U =
{u1, ..., ui, ..., uN}, where N is the total number of users. For the convenience of quantifying the
relative positions of the mobile users, we abstract the actual area of the event as one point. We
assume the geometry center of the event as its event location. For example, in an NBA game, the
geometry center of the rectangle basketball court is taken as the event location. It’s very common
that people can miss some exciting moments when they are distracted, and sometimes in a large
stadium people are not guaranteed with clear or complete views of the event. Thus, it is incentive
and necessary that people share their self-generated event information with each other, which may
include text, picture and video information, for a better understanding of the event. To quantify the
data exchange/sharing among the users, we should first define the communication link matrix. We
denote the matrix as ρ = {ρi,j |ui, uj ∈ U}, where ρi,j is a binary value in {0, 1}, representing
if there is or not a communication link set up between ui and uj . Each user can be connected to
multiple users simultaneously. The capacity of each user is defined as the number of radio interfaces
equipped in the mobile devices, and is denoted as ci, ui ∈ U .
Now we assume this set of users have agreed to share their information within themselves.
To achieve the information sharing purpose, a social media platform is required, and without loss of
generality, we adopt Twitter as the communication platform in this chapter. The information content
generated by different users vary with generating time, location, data type and data size. In order
to efficiently organize and analyze the generated data, a “Hashtag” in Twitter is often utilized to
highlight and organize the data content. A traditional Hashtag is represented with a # symbol, and
is used to index keywords or topics on Twitter. These Hashtags usually come at the beginning or
the end of the actual tweets. However, using such traditional tags will make it hard to distinguish
the data generated for the same event, and thus failing to help the users to identify the specific
information that interests them. Thus, we propose a novel Hashtag definition, which allows users to
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better distinguish between different tweets in the event.
9.2.1 A Novel Hashtag
We define the Hashtag generated by user ui at time t as
Hi = {timi, loci, keyi, dtpi, dszi}. (9.1)
timi is the data generation time t. In this chapter, we assume the period for each time slot as
1 sec. loci represents the user ui’s location. Since the event area is defined as a circle, we can divide
it into sub-areas by direction and distance to the event center point. Suppose we divide the whole
360 degree area into 8 sections evenly according the angle range. Thus, each 45 degree represents
a view direction, staring from 0 to 360 degree. Then, we further divide each such section into 2
parts according to the distance range to the event center point. The closer R/2 area of each sector
represents the closer user group and the farther R/2 represents the farther user group. In other
words, the whole area is divided into 16 sections and is numbered in order of direction and distance.
Thus, loci must belong to one of the sub-areas in L = {l1, l2, ..., l16}. Except the location and time,
the data content also varies other factors. For example in the sports game, the text/picture/video
data may cover different targets, such as players, coaches or judges, and different topics, such as
audiences’ reactions or players’ performances. These content differences can be realized by the
combination of the user-defined keywords. We denote the keywords of ui as keyi, where keyi =
{k1, k2, ..., kK}. The number of keywords for each user is a fixed numberK. Finally, an unignorable
factor that may affect the user’s interest is data type. Some users may prefer image data, while some
others may prefer text or video data. We denote the data type of ui as dtpi, which is an integer value
within {1, 2, 3} with 1 representing text, 2 representing image, and 3 representing video. With the
knowledge of data type, users also care about the data size, denoted as dszi, to fulfill different levels
of requirements. dszi is a positive real number, with the unit of MB.
With different tweets generated, users upload their Hashtags to the Twitter server. Notice
that in this chapter, we assume that the Hashtag and the actual data are generated together but are
132
uploaded/transmitted separately1. The uploaded Hashtags can be viewed by all the event audiences
in real time and will be used for making the paring decisions.
9.2.2 User Interest
As we have stated in Section 9.1, one of the advantages of our framework is allowing users
to select the information according to their interests without downloading redundant/irrelevant data.
To achieve the information filtering, we need to rely on the Hashtag defined in the previous section.
Users can review the uploaded Hashtags and then compare them to their interests to decide if they
want to set up communication links with other users who uploaded those Hashtags. Following the
structure of the Hashtag Hi = {timi, loci, keyi, dtpi, dszi}, users can express their interests in the
same way so that the comparison can be done easily. More specifically, the user interest for ui is
defined as Ii = {timi, loci, keyi, dtpi, dszi}. The definition of each element in Ii is the same as
the Hashtag, except that the elements in Ii are the value that ui is interested in. In practice, to
generate the user interest, the Twitter system can be revised to provide five types of options (i.e.,
time, location, keywords, data type and data size) for users to select. Especially, in the keyword
selection, a keyword library is generated from the existing uploaded Hashtags. Users can select K
keywords from the library to describe their interests.
To find the best Hashtag that matches the user interest, we measure the difference between
these two vectors. The difference between ui’s interest and a Hashtag uploaded by uj is denoted as
δi,j = Ii −Hj . The difference is still a vector, and thus we define its value as
V(δi,j) = a1|timi − timj |+ a2|loci − locj |+
a3(K − |keyi ∩ keyj |) + a4|dtpi ∩ dtpj |+ a5|dszi − dszj |. (9.2)
In the above equation, |timi− timj | represents the non-negative time difference, |loci− locj |
represents the non-negative location section difference, K − |keyi ∩ keyj | represents the keyword
1The event summary function of traditional crowd sensing is beyond the scope of this chapter. Thus, for information
sharing purpose only, it’s not necessary to upload the actual data to the Twitter server.
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difference, |dtpi∩dtpj | represents the non-negative data type difference, and |dszi−dszj | represents
the non-negative data size difference between ui’s interest and uj’s Hashtag. a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 are the
weight parameters for measuring the five types of differences. These five parameters are defined to
round V(δi,j) within [0, 1]. V(δi,j) can used to measure the similarity/difference of the user interest
and an existing Hashtag. The smaller it is, the more matched Ii andHj are.
9.2.3 Link Quality
However, when selecting an user to exchange data with, not only the user interest, but also the
link quality between two users should be considered. First of all, each potential link should satisfy a
minimum SINR requirement, denoted as γmin. We assume that each sharing pair (ui, uj) is assigned
with two bands fi,j and fj,i for information exchange. For both fi,j and fj,i, the noise levels vary
with ui and uj , and are denoted as σi,j and σi,j , respectively. Thus, the QoS requirement for each
data link can be satisfied using the following inequality:
γj,i =
pj,igj,i
σ2j,i
≥ γmin, (9.3)
where γj,i represents ui’s received SINR from uj , for ui, uj ∈ U , i 6= j. pj,i and gj,i denote the
transmission power and channel propagation gain from uj to ui, respectively. gj,i = Cβj,iζj,iD−αj,i ,
where C is a constant system parameter, βj,i is the fast fading gain, ζj,i is the slowing fading gain,
α is the path loss exponent, and Dj,i is the distance between user ui and uj .
9.3 Problem Formulation
With joint consideration of the user interest and the link quality, we define the utility for user
ui as the weighted transmission rate when exchanging data with uj . The user interest is expressed
with V(δi,j) and is used as the data weight of the transmission. Thus, we can represent the utility of
ui when exchanging information with ui as follows
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Ui,j = V(δi,j)× rj,i = V(δi,j)fj,i log (1 + γj,i) , (9.4)
where rj,i is the received transmission rate of ui from uj . fj,i is the subband assigned for transmis-
sion from uj to ui.
Intuitively, by allowing users to select the their sharing partners, we aim to maximize the
information exchanged within the whole network. This objective can be achieved by optimizing the
binary link matrix ρ. Thus, we define the summation of all users’ utility as our system objective.
Based on the above discussions, the problem can be formulated as follows.
max:
ρ
∑
ui∈U
∑
uj∈U
ρi,j · Ui,j , (9.5)
s.t.:
γj,i = ρi,j
pj,igj,i
σ2j,i
≥ γmin, (9.6)
∑
uj∈N
ρi,j ≤ ci,∀uj ∈ U , and (9.7)
ρi,j = 0, ∀i = j. (9.8)
(9.5) is the system objective that maximizes all users’ utilities. (9.6) represents SINR require-
ment for each potential communication link, while (9.7) indicates the user capacity requirement.
(9.8) states that if no user can be assigned to itself. The formulated problem is an MILP problem,
which is NP-hard in general [53]. Thus, it motivates us to find a distributive approach where each
user can make the decision directly. We introduce the matching-based approach in the following
sections.
9.4 Matching-based Approach
In this section, the optimization problem is modeled as the SF game. We start by introducing
some definitions of the SF game in Section 9.4.1 and then propose a distributive solution for the SF
135
game in Section 9.4.2.
9.4.1 Stable Fixture Game
The SF problem stems from a practical situation, where players play against each another in
a chess tournament. Each player ranks their potential opponents in order of preference, and the task
is to construct a set of fixtures, consisting of distinct matches (each involving two players), which
is stable [88]. In the chess tournament, each competition happens independently. In other words,
if player a plays with player b and player c, then players b and c are not necessarily required to
compete with each other. Just like the many-to-many relationships in the chess tournament, each
mobile user can set up multiple independent communication links with other users, and thus forming
a mesh-style network.
An SF instance consists of a single set of agents A = {a1, ..., an}, where n is the number of
all players/agents. Each player maintains a list of all the acceptable agents. Then each agent ranks
its acceptable list of agents according to its preferences, and this list is called the preference list.
The matching decisions are made based on the preference lists. A matching M in an SF instance
is defined as a subset of E, where E = {(ai, aj)|ai, aj ∈ A, i 6= j}. We denote aj = M(ai) if
pair (ai, aj) is within the matching M . A fundamental requirement for a good matching is to be
stable. Intuitively, a stable matching refers to the matching in which no player has the incentive to
make any changes (switch partners). The formal definition of a stable matching in the SF model is
provided in Definition 9.1:
Definition 9.1. Stability: Let I be an instance of the SF game and M be a matching in I . A pair
(ai, aj) ∈ E/M blocks M , or is a blocking pair (BP) of M , if the following conditions are satisfied
relative to M :
(1) ai is under subscribed or prefers aj to its worst partner;
(2) aj is under subscribed or prefers ai to its worst partner.
A matching M is said to be stable if it admits no BP.
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Modeled as the SF game, we assume mobile users as the agents. Each user first searches for
its acceptable setA(ui) of partner users, who satisfy the SINR requirement, as shown in (9.6). Then
each user’s preference is ranked based on its utility function defined in (9.4) for all its acceptable
partners. We denote ui’s preference list as follows
PLi(j) = Ui,j = V(δi,j)× rj,i, ∀uj ∈ A(ui). (9.9)
9.4.2 ISF Algorithm
Now we modify the SF stable matching algorithm proposed by Irving et al. in [88] to fit our
crowd sensing problem. We name the algorithm as the ISF algorithm in this chapter. The existence
and complexity property of the ISF algorithm is stated in Theorem 9.2, and the proof can be found
in [88].
Theorem 9.2. Given an instance of the SF game, the ISF algorithm constructs in O(m) time, a
stable matching, or reports that non exists, where m is the sum of the preference list lengths.
The general idea of the ISF algorithm is the reduction of users’ preference lists and the con-
struction of a player set S. S is initially empty, and will finally be symmetric, in which case it
becomes the stable matching if one exists. There are two cases that a stable matching does not exist:
(1)
∑
i di is odd, (2) there exists short list in PL during the execution of the ISF algorithm. The
step-to-step implementations are provided in Algorithm 9.1.
The ISF algorithm consists of two phases. Phase 1 involves a sequence of bids from one user
to another. These bids enable the construction of the set S and the reduction of the preference lists
PL. We denote ui’s target set and bidder set as T Si and BSi, respectively. T Si = {uj |(ui, uj) ∈
S},BSi = {uj |(uj , ui) ∈ S}, and we define tsi = |T Si|, bsi = |BSi|. To start with, each user ui
bids for its most favorite user in PLi who is not in T Si, and denote it as uj . Then, we construct
S by adding the pair (ui, uj) into it. Notice here that all the pairs in S are ordered, which means
(ui, uj) and (uj , ui) are different. Then for the target user uj , it check whether the received bids has
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exceeded its capacity cj . If yes, it deletes the bidders who are worse than the cj’s rank in PLj . The
bidding action of ui continues as long as tsi < min(ci, |PLi|). Phase 1 terminates when each user
ui’s target set size has reached min(ci, |PLi|).
Algorithm 9.1 ISF Algorithm
Input: U , PL, S = ∅
Output: Stable MatchingM
1: Phase 1:
2: while tsi < min(ci, |PLi|) do
3: uj = the first player in PLi who is not in T Si;
4: S = S ∪ {(ui, uj)};
5: if bsj ≥ cj then
6: uk = cj th ranked bidder for uj ;
7: for all successor ul of uk in PLj do
8: if (ul, uj) ∈ S then
9: S = S/{(ul, uj)}
10: delete (ul, uj) from PL;
11: end if
12: end for
13: end if
14: end while
15: Phase 2:
16: if
∑
i di is odd then
17: report instance unsolvable;
18: else
19: while there’s no short list in PL do
20: find a rotation rot in PL;
21: PL = PL/rot;
22: if some list in PL is short then
23: report instance unsolvable;
24: else
25: S = S(PL);
26: end if
27: end while
28: M = S;
29: end if
30: End of algorithm.
After Phase 1, we have achieved a reduced preference list PL and an increased players set
S. We represent min(ci, |PL1i |) as di, which is the degree of ui. To start Phase 2, we first check
if
∑
i di is odd, if yes then we report this instance is unsolvable, otherwise we continue. The key
ideas of Phase 2 are the further construction of S and the further reduction of PL. We first classify
PL into short lists and long lists. We call PLi short if |PLi| < di, and long if |PLi| > di. During
the execution, if any user has a short list, then no stable matching exists. If no short list occurs, we
search for a rotation in PL, which is the key to the further reduction of PL. A rotation is a sequence
of ordered pairs rot = ((ui0 , uj0), (ui1 , uj1), ..., (uir−1 , ujr−1)), where for each 0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1,
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uik = ul(jk) and ujk+1 = uf(xik ). xl(i) the last player in PLi, and xf(i) is the first player in PLi
who is not in T Si. To find a rotation, we begin by any user who has a long list, and set it as uj0 .
Then by the relations between uik , ul(jk) and ul(jk+1), we can start building the rotation rot. The
building process stops when any user is visited twice, and the rotation is found. To eliminate rot
from PL, we delete all the pairs (ujk , nl), such that ujk prefers ug(jk) to nl, where ng(jk) is the least
favored member of ujk in {BSjk ∪ uik−1}/{uik}. The rotation searching process stops whenever
a short list occurs (i.e., there is no stable result) or when no rotation can be found (i.e., we have
reached a stable matching).
9.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the performance of the proposed ISF algorithm will be evaluated by comparing
it with the centralized optimization, the greedy and one heuristic method. Both the social welfare
and the average user performance will be analyzed.
9.5.1 Simulation Set Up
Within a circle area with radius of R = 800 m, we assume a local event with N = [20, 120]
uniformly distributed audiences. The bandwidth that allocated to each potential communication link
is set within [1, 3] MHz. The SINR requirement for each link is a uniform random distribution,
within (20, 30) dB. For the propagation gain, we set the pass loss constant C as 10−2, the path loss
exponent α as 4, the multipath fading gain as the exponential distribution with unit mean, and the
shadowing gain as the log-normal distribution with 0 mean and 4 dB deviation. The user capacity ci
is set as 4, identical for each one. For the Hashtag parameters, the time element timi is set between
[1, 10], where the unit is set as min. The location section loci belongs to one of the 16 sections L as
defined in Section 9.1. The keyword numberK is set as 5, meaning that the overlap of uploaded and
interested keywords is within {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The data type dtpi is set as {1, 2, 3} representing text,
image, video, respectively, and the data size dszi is set within [1, 100] MB. a1, ..., a5 are fine-turned
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Figure 9.2: System welfare evaluation.
in the simulations to unitize V(δi,j).
9.5.2 Numerical Results
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the ISF algorithm, we compare it with three other meth-
ods: (1) Hungarian, (2) Greedy, and (3) Random. The Hungarian method represents the centralized
optimal solution in finding the maximum weight one-to-one matching [102]. The edge weight is set
as the weighted data rate, as defined in (9.9). The Greedy method is a method proposed by [102],
that offers a non-iterative algorithm for finding a one-to-one matching in the D2D communications.
The Random method is a method that randomly matches the users into pairs while satisfying the
capacity and SINR requirements.
We evaluate the information sharing by measuring the weighted data rate from the perspec-
tives of the social welfare and the average user performance. Notice here, since both the Hungarian
method and the Greedy method are designed for the one-to-one matching, we set the user capacity as
1 when implementing the four algorithms in Fig. 9.2, Fig. 9.3 and Fig. 9.5. In Fig. 9.2, we increase
the user number from 20 to 120 by 10. Apparently, the centralized Hungarian method provides the
best system throughout, followed by our proposed ISF method. However, the ISF algorithm is a dis-
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tributive algorithm that has a much lower complexity (O(m)) compared to the Hungarian method
(O(n4)). What’s more, the ISF algorithm beats both the Greedy and the Random methods, which
are both non-iterative. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Fig.9.3, which evaluates the average
user performance. In fact, we can find a performance increase with the increase of the user number
in both Fig. 9.2 and Fig. 9.3. It’s easy to understand the increase in Fig. 9.2, since more users can
bring more system throughput. For average user performance in Fig. 9.3, the increase is credited
to the more partner options brought by new users. Apparently, the Random method doesn’t benefit
from having more choices since it’s a random selection.
Except the special case of the one-to-one matching, we also provide the many-to-many match-
ing evaluation in Fig. 9.4. We compared the ISF method with the one-to-one ISF method and the
Random method regarding the social welfare. The one-to-one ISF method represents the matching
using the ISF algorithm with each user’s capacity set as 1. Apparently, the ISF method outperforms
the other two methods. What’s more, the one-to-one ISF method also beats the Random method,
which shows the superiority of the ISF algorithm even under specific capacity assumptions.
Finally, we evaluate the percentage of users that successfully shared data with others in Fig.
9.5. The Hungarian method still achieves the best performance, with the Greedy and ISF methods
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following closely. With the increase of the user number, this ratio almost reaches 100% when using
the Hungarian or the ISF method. For the Random method, this ratio keeps an average value of
57%.
9.6 Conclusion
This chapter has proposed a novel event sharing framework using the mobile crowd sensing
technique. It offers mobile users with real-time information update, and provide users with the
freedom of selecting their interested data. Using the SF matching game, the flexible many-to-many
sharing relations between users can be accurately modeled. The proposed ISF algorithm provides a
stable solution for the SF game in a distributive manner. The simulation results have further proved
that superiority of the ISF algorithm in achieving close-optimal network performance.
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Chapter 10
Future Works
Beyond the previous works, we are also working on some new topics/ideas. In the following
sections, two future works will be briefly discussed.
10.1 Dynamic Stability in LTE assisted V2V commmunications
The technology of connected vehicles has been envisioned as a paradigm capable of providing
increased convenience to drivers, enabling applications ranging from road safety to traffic efficiency.
In traditional IEEE 802.11p based V2V communications, reliable and efficient performance cannot
be guaranteed since 802.11p is CSMA/CA based. Besides, the high cost of deploying roadside units
(RSUs) cannot be ignored. Thus, the concept of integrating LTE into the V2X communications has
been proposed, which is commonly referred to as LTE-V [16] or LTE assisted V2X [17]. The objec-
tives of the study on LTE-based V2X services include the definition of an evaluation methodology
and possible application scenarios, and the identification and evaluation of necessary enhancements
to LTE physical layer, protocols, and interfaces. So far, 3GPP has defined 18 use cases for LTE-
based V2X services, such as Case 5.1: Forward collision warning, Case 5.8: Road safety services,
Case 5.9: Automatic parking system, 5.18: vulnerable road user safety and so on [18]. These use
cases cover major road safety and traffic efficiency applications.
On the other hand, dynamic management is one of the expected characteristics of the 5G
wireless communications. Typically, network dynamics can be caused by user mobility, channel
fading, or some other factors. Many popular mobility models have been used to model different
movement patterns. For example, the RWP and HotSpot models can be used to model unpredictable
and predictable user motions, respectively. User mobility, in fact, can further cause channel fading.
Therefore, in the vehicular communications networks, where vehicles can be in fast movement and
the surroundings can change very rapidly, it is necessary to find an efficient solution for the LTE
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V2X content sharing applications to guarantee user satisfactions.
In Chapter 6, we have studied the content sharing in the LTE V2X networks, where we have
considered a static (i.e., one-time) resource allocation. In order to cope with the network dynamics,
new solutions approaches should be proposed. Instead of solving the static resource allocations of
the different time slots in a repeated manner, i.e., using the ISF algorithm introduced in Chapter 6
repeatedly for each time slot, we can try to transform the previously unstable matching into stable
again. Just like the RTPS algorithm adopted in Chapter 5 to find the dynamic stabilities in the
two-sided matching problem, there are also algorithms that can be used to re-stabilize the matching
in the one-sided case. For example, Inarra et al. in [103] proposed an algorithm for finding a p-
stable matching by continuously satisfying BPs. Biro and Norman in [104] extended the Tan-Hsueh
algorithm to construct a sequence of matchings that ultimately yield a p-stable matching in the
one-sided matching problem. Thus, by following the idea of the above-mentioned approaches, we
can either directly implement or slightly revise one of these algorithms to find the many-to-many
dynamic stability in the LTE V2X scenario.
10.2 Stable Allocation Modeling in the HetNets
With the exponential increase of smart mobiles devices, there has been an explosion in not
only the communication content diversity but also the device diversity. On the other hand, mobile
users are characterized by more accurate user information and specific QoS requirements. All these
factors can result in user heterogeneity and will bring more challenges for the resource management.
Previously implemented matching models, such as the SF model studied in Chapter 6, only consider
one type of connection relationship between players. However, in the heterogeneous networks (Het-
Nets), it is very likely that the communication links between different users are diverse, and even
for the same player pair, the communication contents, delay requirements, and channel conditions
have various specifications. Thus, the single-type matching relationship may no longer be adequate
to fulfill the resource management requirements for the HetNets.
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On the other hand, there are some existing models that study the multi-type partnerships
between players in the matching theory. For example, the Stable Multiple Activities (SMA) game
is a generalization of the SF model in which the underlying graph may have parallel edges. The
SMA model represents a practical situation, where players form multiple partnerships according to
different sports activities: for example, player ai might play tennis, chess, and badminton games
with player aj . A stable solution to such an instance can be achieved inO(m2), wherem is the edge
number in the underlying graph, as proved by Cechlarova and Fleiner in [105]. Thus, we may utilize
this SMA model to characterize the various user specifications in the HetNets. For example, two
mobile users may communicate with each other through multiple types of connections, such as voice
call, text messaging, video sharing and so on. Different types of communications are characterized
by different requirements, and thus should be allocated with different resources. By modeling the
resource allocation in the HetNets as the SMA model, we can provide higher user satisfaction while
improving the spectrum utilization.
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